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21. INTRODUCTION
This report examines the competitiveness of the food processing sector in Viet Nam, focusing
on four subsectors: rice milling, coffee processing, seafood processing, and fruits and
vegetables.  The rationale for the study is that Viet Nam, as a member of the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), is obliged to follow the trade liberalization schedule
defined by the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA).  Under this agreement, Viet Nam will
have to reduce the import tariffs on almost all goods imported from ASEAN members to less
than 5 percent by 2003.  An important question for the government is how trade liberalization
is likely to affect the food processing sector and what steps can be taken to make the
transition a successful one.  
This chapter provides an overview of the food processing sector in general and a brief outline
of its size and structure in Viet Nam.  Chapters 2 through 5 examine each of the four selected
subsectors.  In each chapter, production, marketing, processing, domestic demand, and export
demand are described.  There is also a discussion of the prospects and main policy issues for
the sector.  Chapter 6 provides the conclusions of the study, including recommendations for
with recommendations 
1.1. INTERNATIONAL PATTERNS IN FOOD PROCESSING
Food processing can be defined as the transformation of agricultural commodities as part of
their preparation for human consumption.  This definition encompasses relatively simple
activities such as cleaning, grading, and storage as well as more involved transformations such
as milling, canning, and freezing.  
The food processing sector is best understood as one link in the marketing channel between
the farmer (or fisherman) and the ultimate consumer.  On the one hand, the characteristics of
the raw material have a strong influence on the way the food processing sector is organized. 
For example, the processing of goods that are bulky but highly perishable, such as sugarcane,
normally takes place close to the producing areas.   On the other hand, changes in the food
processing sector are often driven by shifts in consumer preferences.  For example, rising
incomes tend to increase the demand for convenience foods and hence for food processing. 
1.1.1. Role of food processing in development
Food processing plays an important role in economic development.  Food processing can
provide new outlets for agricultural output, raising the income of farmers, who tend to be
poorer than the non-farmers.  This sector is sometimes involved in providing credit, seed, and
technical assistance to producers in order to obtain a higher-value crop.  Furthermore, food
processing generates employment, more so than many other manufacturing sectors because it
is relatively labor-intensive.  Furthermore, since food processing plants are often located in
rural areas, they create jobs for rural households, where poverty is often concentrated.  Finally,
the food processing sector can play a role in improving nutrition through fortification and the
supply of foods with longer shelf-life (Austin, 1996).
3On the other hand, food processing should not be seen as a panacea.  Food processors may
prefer to purchase raw materials from larger, well-endowed farmers rather than the poorest
farmers.  The employment created by the food processing sector is usually relatively low-
paying, at least compared to other manufacturing sectors.  And processed foods are usually
more important in the consumption patterns of high income than low-income households. 
Nonetheless, a healthy and dynamic food processing sector is an important component in the
process of economic development and industrialization.  
1.1.2. Distinctive characteristics of food processing
Food processing differs from other manufacturing sectors in several important respects, mainly
related to the raw material.  First, the supply of the raw material for food processing is often
highly seasonal.  For larger capital-intensive food processing activities, this creates a strong
incentive to store the commodity for off-season processing when possible.  When storage is
not possible, food processors often attempt to stagger production to reduce its seasonality. 
Alternatively, food processors may seek other commodities to process in the off-season.  In
spite of these strategies, food processing plants are sometimes idle during part of the year. 
Thus, excess capacity is not necessarily a sign of poor management, although it does raise the
unit processing costs.
Second, the supply of the raw material is difficult to predict and often varies significantly from
one year to the next.  As a result, prices and profitability may fluctuate.  This complicates the
procurement of the raw material and can result various types of risk reducing or risk shifting
behavior such as fixed-price contracts with suppliers.  Skills and flexibility in procurement are
critical to the success of food processing enterprises.
Third, the quality of the raw material used by food processors is quite variable, in large part
due to its perishability.  This would not be a problem if quality could be observed without cost,
but it is often difficult for buyers for food processors to assess the quality of the raw material. 
This leads to the establishment of grading systems and price differences between different
grades.  The unavoidable subjectivity in the grading process often leads to conflicts between
producers and processors. 
Fourth, as mentioned above, the raw material for food processors tends to be “bulky” in the
sense that the value per kilogram is low.  This means that food processors tend to locate their
plants in or near producing areas, particularly when the commodity is more perishable or more
costly to transport in its unprocessed form than in its processed form.  
Fifth, the cost of raw materials accounts for a relatively large share of the total cost of food
processors, typically 50-80 percent in developing countries.  The implication is that
procurement of high-quality raw materials at low prices is even more important in food
processing than in other manufacturing sectors.  
Sixth, food processors are subject to special attention by the government because of the
importance of the final product in social well-being.  Food processors face health and safety
regulations to protect the consumer.  This is another consequence of the difficulty in observing
quality.  In addition, they may face political pressure and/or government controls to pay “fair”
prices to farmers or to charge “reasonable” prices to consumers.  
41.1.3. Trends in food consumption
The development of the food processing industry in most countries reflects the changes in
food consumption patterns as incomes rise.  Engle’s Law, one of the most universal patterns
of economics, is that as income rises, the budget share allocated to food declines.  More
precisely, the total expenditure on food continues to rise, but it does so more slowly than total
expenditure.  
In addition, the composition of food expenditure changes with higher incomes.  There is a shift
from staple foods, which are generally the least expensive source of calories, to foods that are
more expensive on a per calorie basis.  Fruit and vegetable consumption rises more quickly
than staple consumption, and meat, fish, and dairy consumption rises the fastest.
 
As part of this process of diversification of diets, households begin to purchase more
processed foods.  Some processed foods are easier and quicker to prepare, such as instant
soup packages or canned beans.  Higher-income households are willing to pay extra for semi-
prepared foods because it saves them time, whether they use that extra time for work or
leisure.  In a sense, with higher incomes, households can afford to "hire" food processors to
assist with food preparation.  Other processed foods have the advantage of allowing
consumption of a greater variety of foods than are possible from fresh products alone. 
Canned and frozen goods can be consumed thousands of kilometers from where they were
produced.
Another trend is that as per capita income rises, households begin to put greater priority on
food quality and safety.  This may take the form of buying goods with trusted brand labels
rather than buying in bulk, since the reputation behind the label serves as an assurance of
quality.  Another example is trend toward "organic" or "clean" fruits and vegetables, responding
to the fact that high-income consumers are willing to pay a premium for produce grown without
the use of agricultural chemicals.  In addition, these households are willing to pay extra for
packaging that makes shopping or consumption more convenient.  Examples include
beverages that are sold in one-portion containers rather than 1-2 liter containers and canned
goods with easy-to-open lids.  In 
1.1.4. Trends in food processing
The trends in food consumption have important implications for the evolution of the food
processing sector.  Initially, when the market consists primarily of low-income consumers, the
food processing sector concentrates on the minimum transformation necessary to make the
commodity edible.  Furthermore, the processing is often done on a small scale if technology
permits.  The drying of fish and fruits, grain milling, and cassava processing are examples.  
Later, processing responds to the demand for variety in the diet, becoming larger and more
diverse.  As wage rates rise and markets expand, the scale and capital intensity of food
processing gradually increase.  It is worth noting that automation and capital intensity are not
the cause of development but rather the consequence.  In other words, development and
higher wages make it profitable to purchase machinery that replaces labor.  In a low-wage
economy, a modern capital-intensive processing plant may be less profitable than a more
labor-intensive one.  In some cases, automated processes are necessary to achieve export-
  This is based on the food processing value added of 4600 million dong in 1989 prices (see1
Table 1.1), a GDP deflator of 0.117 for 1997, and an exchange rate of 13,000 dong/US$.
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level quality, but technical efficiency (in terms of conversion ratios or canning rate) does not
guarantee economic efficiency in the sense of profitability.  
As the complexity of food processing increases, a larger share of consumer food spending
goes to marketing and processing.  As a result, the proportion of consumer spending reaching
the farmer declines.  Finally, there is a paradoxical pattern regarding the size of the food
processing sector.  Although it tends to grow in absolute terms, since consumers are
purchasing more processed foods, it tends to shrink as a proportion of the manufacturing
sector.  This is a consequence of Engle’s Law - as incomes rise, a larger share of household
budgets are allocated to non-food items, creating the demand for larger industrial and services
sector.  Once again, it is the trend of rising income that causes the expansion of the industrial
sector, rather than the reverse. 
1.2. FOOD PROCESSING IN VIET NAM
1.2.1. Role of food processing in Vietnamese economy
The food processing sector is a large and rapidly growing industry in the Vietnamese
economy.  In 1997, the value added in the food processing sector is estimated to be about
US$ 2.0 billion.  As shown in Table 1.1, this represents about 8.8 percent of GDP and 35.51
percent of industrial value added.  Furthermore, the contribution of food processing to GDP
appears to be growing.  In 1991, food processing represented just 6.7 percent of GDP, but
over the period 1991-1997, value added in food processing has grown 14.0 percent annually,
while GDP has grown only 8.9 percent annually.   Furthermore, the growth in the food
processing has even outpaced, by a small margin, the industrial sector in general. 
Food processing also plays an important role in Viet Nam’s exports, as shown in Table 1.2. 
Agricultural, fishery, and forest products, almost all of which are processed in some way before
being exported, account for US$ 3.2 billion in exports, or 36.8 percent of total exports.  In spite
of the 19.7 percent annual rate of growth in exports of agricultural, fishery, and forestry
exports, its share in total exports has declined somewhat due to even more rapid growth in
other exports such as oil and manufactured goods.  
The four subsectors that are the focus of this study, rice, coffee, seafood, and fruits and
vegetables, account for 25.3 percent of all exports, though this figure has varied between 25
and 33 percent in recent years.  The value of exports of these four commodities has grown at
23.2 percent annually, almost as fast as the growth in the total value of exports (26.9 percent).  
As will be shown later, seafood and rice are the most important exports among the four,
followed by coffee.  Fruit and vegetable exports are relatively small.  
1.2.2. Characteristics of the food processing sector
A picture of the structure of the food processing sector can be obtained from the 1995
Economic Census, carried out by the General Statistics Office.  The Economic Census
  The 1995 Economic Census included state, private, and foreign-invested companies, but2
excluded farmers, who probably number 22-24 million.   It is likely that the Census also omitted
many self-employed individuals, based on the average enterprise size (3.1) is large by
international standards.
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covered 2 million enterprises and 6.7 million workers.  Thi  Census identified 163 thousand2
food processing enterprises employing 505 thousand workers.  Thus, the food processing
sector represents about 8 percent of the enterprises and a similar percentage of the
employment in the enterprise sector (see Table 1.3).  In other words, employment per
enterprises is roughly the same in food processing and other sectors.   Enterprises with less
than 10 workers account for the vast majority of food processing enterprises (98 percent) and
most of the food processing employment (62 percent).  Just one quarter of the food processing
sector workers are in enterprises with more than 100 workers.
Foreign-invested enterprises account for 6.2 percent of the employment in the food processing
sector (see Table 1.4).  This percentage is somewhat higher than for enterprises in general
(4.8 percent), suggesting that the food processing industry attracts foreign investment more
than the average of other sectors.
Tables 1.5 reveals that food processing enterprises have less capital (fixed and operating)
than enterprises in other sectors, on average.  Almost 84 percent of food processing
enterprises have less than 1 billion dong (US$ 91 thousand) in fixed capital, compared to just
76 percent of all Vietnamese enterprises.  A similar pattern holds if we examine total capital, as
shown in Table 1.6.  Capital intensity can be measured by the value of capital per worker. 
Although the available data from the 1995 Economic Census do not allow the calculation of
the capital intensity (capital per worker), the data do suggest that food processing is less
capital intensive than other sectors.  This conclusion is based on the fact that food processing
enterprises have the same number of workers as other enterprises (see Table 1.3), but have
less fixed and total capital (see Tables 1.5 and 1.6).
Table 1.7 indicates that over three quarters (78 percent) of food processing enterprises have
gross revenues below 1 billion dong, compared to just 59 percent of all enterprises.  Once
again, this suggests that food processing enterprises are, in general, somewhat smaller than
enterprises in other sectors.
The 1995 Economic Census also attempted to identify enterprises that were making profits
and those that were making losses.  Although the results should be interpreted with caution
due to the difficulty in getting reliable data on profits, the results in Table 1.8 suggest that 9
percent of food processing enterprises make losses, compared to 11 percent of all enterprises. 
To extent that these figures can be trusted, they suggest that food processing companies,
although they are smaller and less capital intensive than others, are no less likely to be
profitable.  
State enterprises dominate the food processing sector.  According to Table 1.9, state
enterprises represent over half the value of fixed assets and 64 percent of the revenue in the
food processing sector.  Foreign and joint stock enterprises follow with 42 percent of the fixed
assets and 29 percent of the revenue.  
7In summary, food processing enterprises are relatively small.  Not only do they have less fixed
capital and smaller revenues than other enterprises in Viet Nam, but 62 percent of them
employ less than 10 workers.  Second, food processing enterprises tend to be less capital
intensive than other enterprises in Viet Nam, probably reflecting simpler technology.  Third, the
food processing sector is linked to a sector, agriculture, that is declining as a percentage of
gross domestic product.
These factors might lead one to believe that food processing is a "backward" sector with low
profits and poor growth prospects.  In fact, however, the food processing sector is large,
profitable, and growing, with a demonstrated ability to attract foreign investment. This example
illustrates some of the risks in assessing the potential of an economic sector based on its level
of technology or capital-intensity.
8Table 1.1 Contribution of food processing to Gross Domestic Product
Year Gross Industrial Food Food Food
Domestic value added processing processing as processing as
Product value added pct of GDP pct of industry 
(billion dong at 1989 prices) (percent) (percent)
1991 31,286 6,042 2,100 6.7% 34.8%
1992 33,991 6,921 2,346 6.9% 33.9%
1993 36,735 7,766 2,602 7.1% 33.5%
1994 39,982 8,771 2,994 7.5% 34.1%
1995 43,797 9,998 3,460 7.9% 34.6%
1996 47,888 11,448 4,000 8.4% 34.9%
1997 52,198 12,960 4,600 8.8% 35.5%
Annual 8.9% 13.6% 14.0%
growth
Source: Data provided by DSI, Ministry of Planning and Investment.
Table 1.2 Contribution of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries to exports
Year Total exports Export of agricultural, forestry, Export of rice, coffee,
and fisheries products seafood, fruits, and
vegetables 
(million US$) (million US$) (% of  total (million US$) (% of total
exports) exports) 
1991 2,087 1,090 52.2% 629 30.1%
1992 2,581 1,276 49.4% 849 32.9%
1993 2,985 1,444 48.4% 923 30.9%
1994 4,054 1,905 47.0% 1,327 32.7%
1995 5,449 2,521 46.3% 1,806 33.1%
1996 7,260 3,051 42.0% 1,954 26.9%
1997 8,700 3,200 36.8% 2,204 25.3%
Annual 26.9% 19.7% 23.2%
growth
Source: Data provided by DSI, Ministry of Planning and Investment.
9Table 1.3 Size of food processing enterprises
Number of Food Percent Food Percent Workers per
workers processing processing enterprise
enterprises workers 
1-10 160,238 98.1% 311,823 61.7% 1.9
11-100 2,645 1.6% 63,278 12.5% 23.9
101-500 325 0.2% 72,533 14.3% 223.2
501-1000 47 0.0% 30,655 6.1% 652.2
1001-2000 19 0.0% 24,969 4.9% 1,314.2
More than 2000 1 0.0% 2,460 0.5% 2,460.0
Total 163,275 100.0% 505,718 100.0% 3.1
Food processing 8.0% 7.9%
as pct of all
enterprises
Source: 1995 Economic Census.  Cited in GSO, 1998, p. 182-183.
Table 1.4 Employment in food processing sector by type of ownership
Number of workers Food Percent Enterprise Percent
processing employment 
employment 
Domestic invested 173,009 93.8% 1,937,023 95.2%
Foreign invested 11,366 6.2% 97,832 4.8%
Total 184,375 100.0% 2,034,855 100.0%
Source: 1995 Economic Census.  Cited in GSO, 1998, p. 365.
Note: Figures appear to be based on a subsample of enterprises.
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Table 1.5 Value of fixed assets of food processing enterprises
Value of fixed assets Food Percent All enterprises Percent
processing
enterprises
0-1 billion VND 2,683 83.8% 18,094 76.3%
1-5 billion VND 319 10.0% 3,548 15.0%
5-10 billion VND 79 2.5% 927 3.9%
Over 10 billion VND 119 3.7% 1,139 4.8%
Total 3,200 100.0% 23,708 100.0%
Source: 1995 Economic Census.  Cited in GSO, 1998, p. 375.
Note: Figures appear to be based on a subsample of enterprises.
Table 1.6 Value of capital of food processing enterprises
Value of fixed assets Food Percent All enterprises Percent
processing
enterprises
Less than 1 bill. VND 2,621 81.9% 16,673 70.3%
1-5 billion VND 346 10.8% 4,183 17.6%
5-10 billion VND 82 2.6% 1,083 4.6%
Over 10 billion VND 151 4.7% 1,769 7.5%
Total 3,200 100.0% 23,708 100.0%
Source: 1995 Economic Census.  Cited in GSO, 1998, p. 381.
Note: Figures appear to be based on a subsample of enterprises.
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Table 1.7 Gross revenue of food processing enterprises
Gross revenue Food Percent All enterprises Percent
processing
enterprises
Less than 1 bil. VND 2,488 77.8% 14,004 59.1%
1-5 billion VND 362 11.3% 5,454 23.0%
5-10 billion VND 118 3.7% 1,478 6.2%
Over 10 billion VND 232 7.3% 2,772 11.7%
Total 3,200 100.0% 23,708 100.0%
Source: 1995 Economic Census.  Cited in GSO, 1998, p. 387.
Note: Figures appear to be based on a subsample of enterprises.
Table 1.8 Food processing enterprises with profits and with losses
Type of enterprise Food Percent All enterprises Percent 
processing
enterprises
With profits 2,664 91.2% 17,606 89.0%
With losses 256 8.8% 2,172 11.0%
Total 2,920 100.0% 19,778 100.0%
Source: 1995 Economic Census.  Cited in GSO, 1998, p. 393
Note: Figures appear to be based on a subsample of enterprises.
Table 1.9 Fixed assets and revenue of food processing enterprises
Type of Value of Percent Revenue Percent Contribution Percent
enterprise fixed to state
assets budget
State-owned 2,263 54.6% 12,581 64.2% 1,680 68.3%
Collective 13 0.3% 103 0.5% 1 0.0%
Private 137 3.3% 1,261 6.4% 40 1.6%
Joint stock 622 15.0% 2,907 14.8% 96 3.9%
Foreign 1,107 26.7% 2,736 14.0% 642 26.1%
Total 4,142 100.0% 19,588 100.0% 2,459 100.0%
Source: 1995 Economic Census.  Cited in GSO, 1998, p. 398, 403, 408, 413, 419.
Note: Figures appear to be based on a subsample of enterprises.
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2. RICE MILLING
For decades, Viet Nam was a consistent importer of rice.  This was understandable during the
war, but the inability of the country to meet its own food requirements even after reunification
and peace in 1975 was a key factor in raising doubts about the efficiency of agricultural
collectives and central planning.  A series of partial reforms carried out in the 1980s, yielded
limited but encouraging successes.  As part of the doi moi (renovation) policies starting in
1986, more dramatic reforms were introduced including the allocation of collective land to farm
households, market liberalization, and depreciation of the exchange rate to a realistic market
level.  In 1989, Viet Nam became one of the three largest rice exporter in the world, a position
it has maintained ever since.  
The rice milling sector is still responding to the expansion in rice production, the new
orientation toward exports, and the liberalization of rice markets. This section describes the
rice milling industry in the context of the rice sector. A number of policy issues are raised and
the impact of alternative policies is discussed.  
2.1 BACKGROUND
Rice has been the dominant staple in Viet Nam for several thousand years.  Wet rice
cultivation is thought to have been practiced in the Red River Delta as early as 2000 BC.  The
organization required to build and maintain dykes and irrigation systems was an important
motivation for the development of centralized authority in northern Viet Nam.  Furthermore, the
surpluses generated by intensive rice cultivation allowed high population densities in the Red
River Delta and facilitated the the expansion of the Vietnamese nation toward the south over
the period 1200-1800.  
Intensive cultivation of the Mekong Delta is more recent, having been initiated by the French
colonial administration around the turn of the century.  Tenant farmers in the Mekong Delta
produced surpluses allowing Viet Nam to export 1-2 million tons from the 1920s until the end of
World War II.  These exports coincided with periods of deprivation and even famine within the
country, contributing the sensitivity of policymakers today to the food security implications of
rice exports.  
In the 1960s, the north was self-sufficient and the south became a consistent rice importer,
due to the effect of economic and military aid on the exchange rate.  After reunification in
1975, the government attempted to organize farmers into collectives which were obliged to sell
their surplus to the government at fixed prices.  The repeated failure of the country to stimulate
rice production under this system was a key factors leading to various experiments giving more
autonomy and incentives to farm households.  The process of decollectivization, market
liberalization, and exchange rate adjustment in 1989 created an impressive response from
farmers: after years of rice imports, Viet Nam became the third largest rice exporter in 1989. 
Rice exports have climbed from around 2 million tons in the early 1990s to 3.6 million tons in
1997.  
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Rice export policy is politically sensitive, and the decision to liberalize exports was not an easy
one.  Policymakers are concerned about the impact of exports on domestic availability and
prices.  This is understandable given that rice accounts for 75 percent of the caloric intake of
the average Vietnamese household (World Bank, 1996).  Thus far, however, rice export
growth has not been achieved at the expense of domestic consumption.  In fact, per capita rice
consumption has risen since the late 1980s.
2.2. RICE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING
2.2.1. Crop characteristics
Rice (oryza sativa) is an annual grass that grows from 70 cm to more than 2 meters.  It is the
only grain that can germinate in submerged soil and produces the highest yield when grown
under these conditions.  The growing period varies from four to six months.  Although there are
over 6000 varieties of rice, most of them can be classified into two types.  Indica rice is grown
in tropical areas such as south and southeast Asia and southern China.  Japonica is grown in
temperate regions such as Korea, Japan, Europe, the United States, and Australia.  
Both lowland and upland cultivation methods are used to grow rice.  Most of world production
is lowland rice, in which irrigation is used to keep the rice field submerged during most of the
growing period.  The water level is generally 5-15 cm, but it may be over one meter in the case
of deepwater rice.  The yields average around 2 tons/ha in developing countries and around 5
tons/ha in Japan and the United States.  Upland rice is grown in areas where irrigation is not
possible, although the rainfall must be relatively high.  The yields are much lower than for
lowland rice, averaging 1 ton/ha or less (Brown, 1991).
  
2.2.2. Production trends
Between 1985 and 1995, rice production expanded by 57 percent, representing an average
annual rate of 4.6 percent.  This growth occurred in spite of a small reduction in the area of
land cultivated with rice.  The expansion was due to increases in cropping intensity and yield. 
Cropping intensity (the average number of rice crops produced in a year) has increased from
1.3 in 1985 to 1.6 in 1995, or 2.0 percent per year.  Much of this change has been the result of
improved irrigation and drainage infrastructure in the Mekong River Delta, converting single-
cropped areas into double-cropped areas.  In addition, the average yield has increased from
2.78 tons/ha in 1985 to 3.69 tons/ha in 1995, or 2.9 percent per year.   Yield growth is the
result of greater use of fertilizer, better water control, and the adoption of higher-yielding
varieties of rice.  Thus, yield growth contributed somewhat more than half of the increase in
output over this time, while increased cropping intensity accounted for the remainder. 
  
2.2.3. Geographic patterns 
The Mekong River Delta in the south and the Red River Delta in the north are the "rice
baskets" of the country, accounting for 51 and 18 percent of total production (see Table 2.3). 
The importance of the rice production in these two delta does not stem from their overall size:
they represent barely 15 percent of the national territory.  Rather it is due to the fact that, as
river deltas, over half of their area can be farmed and over three quarters of their agricultural
  Cultivated rice area refers to land which has rice during at least one cropping season during3
the year.  Sown rice area refers to the sum of areas planted with rice over the different
cropping seasons.
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land is used for rice production.  Thus, these two regions account for 60 percent of the
cultivated rice area and 63 percent of the sown rice area in Viet Nam.  In addition, better water3
control in these two regions allows yields of over 4 tons of paddy per hectare, compared to an
average of less than 3.5 tons/ha in the rest of the country.
  
Between the two, the Red River Delta is more intensively cultivated in terms of cropping
intensity, the degree of specialization in rice, and average yield.  Nonetheless, the Mekong
River Delta accounts for a much larger share of national rice production because its cultivated
rice area is over three times that of the Red River Delta.  
The Northern Uplands and the Central Highlands are both rice deficit regions, importing rice
from the deltas.  The yields and cropping intensity are lower, largely because irrigation is less
prevalent.  Upland rice production (including “slash and burn” cultivation) is practiced on a
relatively large area of the remote parts of these regions, but production is limited.
The North and South Central Coast are also rice deficit regions.  Irrigated rice production takes
place in the small river valleys along the coast, while less intensive production occurs in the
mountainous areas away from the coast.  The Southeast produces rice, but crop mix is more
diversified than in other regions due to the demand for fruits, vegetables, and other specialty
crops by Ho Chi Minh City.  
2.2.4. Seasonal patterns 
The concept of crop seasons is somewhat artificial since rice is harvested somewhere in Viet
Nam every month of the year.  Nonetheless, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
(MARD) classify production into three growing seasons.
Since most of the rain falls in the second half of the year, the winter-spring season is the dry
season.  In the Mekong River Delta, the winter-spring crop is planted in November-December
and harvested in February-March.  In the Red River Delta, the winter-spring crop is planted in
February and harvested in May-June.  In both areas, the winter-spring rice crop is often part of
a double-rice cropping rotation.
In the Mekong River Delta, the summer-autumn rice crop is planted in April-May and harvested
in August-September.  Rice is generally not grown during this season in the Red River Delta,
the North Mountain and Midlands, and in the Central Highlands. 
The rainy season (or monsoon) rice crop is planted in June-July and harvested in October-
January.  Almost all rainfed rice production occurs during this season.  With irrigation,
however, a rainy season crop can be part of a double-rice cropping system, as is commonly
done in the Red River Delta.   
  This is based on 1995 output of 12.8 million tons of paddy, a milling ratio of 66 percent, and4
estimated losses of 14.5 percent.
  Much of the description of rice marketing channels is based on a national survey carried out5
by the International Food Policy Research Institute in 1995-96.  The sample included 850
farmers, 853 millers, 850 traders, and 30 state-owned enterprises. 
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2.2.5. Marketing channels
Throughout the country, the paddy harvest is accomplished by hand, using a sickle.  Threshing
may be done by manual rotating threshers or (particularly in the south) threshing machines that
are brought to the fields.  Typically farmers dry paddy under the sun on flat surfaces such as
farm yards or roadsides, using cement and brick yards, plastic sheets, or bamboo mats. 
Much of the paddy never enters the marketing system.  Farmers pay small mills to convert their
harvest into rice to be stored and consumed at home.  The proportion retained for own
consumption varies from more than two thirds in the rice deficit areas to just one quarter in the
Mekong River Delta. 
The channels by which rice moves from the farmer to the consumer are complex and vary
according to region.  A survey of rice farmers, traders, millers, and state-owned enterprises
carried out by the International Food Policy Research Institute sheds some light on these
patterns (IFPRI, 1996).  Because the two deltas account for almost 70 percent of Vietnamese
rice production, the focus of our description is on these two regions.  
The marketing system in the Mekong River Delta handles an enormous volume of rice. 
Mekong farmers produce about 7.1 million tons of rice, of which an estimated 5.1 million tons4
pass through the marketing system.  As in other regions, over 96 percent of the farmers report
selling to a private assembler.  Two-third of the volume handled by assemblers is sold in5
paddy form to millers, predominantly medium and large millers.  Over half of the sales of rice
millers goes to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) who, in turn, export rice and ship it to the
deficit regions within Viet Nam.  Although this assembler-miller-SOE route is the most
important marketing channel, no more than one third of all marketed rice follows this path. 
Assemblers also have paddy milled on a contract basis and sell rice to wholesalers and, to a
lesser extent, state-owned enterprises and retailers.  Millers also sell rice to wholesalers who
supply other wholesalers (including those in other regions), state-owned enterprises, and
retailers.  
In the Red River Delta, the marketing channels are somewhat different.  As in the Mekong
Delta, farmers sell the vast majority of their surplus to private traders.  But unlike their Mekong
counterparts, assemblers in the Red River Delta generally have the paddy milled into rice on a
contract basis before selling the rice to wholesalers.  Over 90 percent of assembler sales are
in the form of rice rather than paddy.  Almost two thirds of the rice sold by wholesalers goes to
other wholesalers.  Much of this trade may be from rural wholesalers to their counterparts in
Hanoi.  Wholesalers also sell rice to retailers, who in turn sell to consumers.  Unlike in the
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Mekong River Delta, neither assemblers nor millers nor wholesalers report significant sales to
state-owned enterprises.
In the other five regions of Viet Nam, the most distinctive aspect of the rice marketing system
is large inflows of rice.  Production is about 4.2 million tons of rice, but consumption is roughly
6.3 million tons, implying an inflow of over 2 million tons.  As in the Red River Delta,
assemblers buy paddy from farmers have it milled on a contract basis.  About two-thirds of
assemblers' rice sales go to wholesalers, who in turn sell it to other wholesalers and to
retailers.  The flows of locally produced rice are supplemented by inflows from the Mekong
Delta and, to a much smaller extent, from the Red River Delta.  Part of the inter-regional trade
is carried out by state-owned enterprises.  However, the infrequency with which traders report
purchases from state-owned enterprises indicates that a significant proportion of this trade is
undertaken by wholesalers. 
2.3. RICE MILLING INDUSTRY
2.3.1. Technical aspects of rice milling
Harvested paddy consists of the rice grain, germ, and bran, covered with a shell or hull.  Its
moisture content is generally 18-25 percent.  Broadly defined, rice milling consists of five
steps: drying, cleaning, removing the hull, removing the bran layers, polishing, and sizing. 
Each step is described as follows:
C Paddy is dried to 12-14 percent to avoid deterioration and improve milling efficiency. 
This may be accomplished by spreading the paddy out in the sun, by using a
mechanical drier, or by some combination of the two.  
C Cleaning to remove stones, dirt, and other foreign material serves to increase the value
of the final product and avoid damage to milling equipment.  This is accomplished with
a variety of vibrating screens that separate by size and density.
C The rice hull can be removed by hand pounding, but more commonly it is accomplished
with a hulling (or shelling) machine. These machines use rotating disks, steel rollers, or
rubber rollers to separate the hull and part of the germ.  
C The next step is milling (narrowly defined), which is removing the outer bran layers
using machines that create abrasion.  The degree of milling is variable.  Less milled rice
has more bran, making it more nutritious.  At the same time, less milled rice is chewier,
darker, takes longer to cook, and has a shorter shelf-life.  As a result, white rice is
generally preferred by consumers.  The conversion ratio between paddy and rice
ranges 60 to 70 percent if we include broken grains, or 40 to 62 percent of whole grains
(Brown, 1991).
C Polishing is the removal of the innermost layer of bran (also called polish).  This stage
is optional, depending on consumer preferences and willingness to pay for whiter rice. 
C Grains may be separated according to size using two machines.  Rough sizing can be
done with vibrating screens with different sized holes, similar to those used for other
  It is likely that this is an underestimate of the number of rice mills in the country.  The 19946
Agricultural Census collected information on agricultural machinery owned by rural households
and counted 106,000 rice mills.  Presumably, this estimate excludes the larger state and
private rice mills.  
  In the extreme, if all rice were processed by two mills, then the average throughput of rice7
mills would be twice the ratio of rice production to rice mills.  
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grains.  Finer sizing can be done with screens with thousands of small indentations to
pick up individual kernels.  As the screen is tilted to become vertical, the longest grains
are the first to fall out.
Not all rice mills carry out all of these processing activities.  Smaller mills usually focus on
either shelling or milling (bran removal).  Medium-size mills may clean, shell, and mill, but do
not polish or grade by size.  Only the largest mills typically perform all of these tasks.   
2.3.2. Structure of the rice milling sector
Vietnamese statistics on the number of mills include everything from large miller-polishers that
produce export quality rice to small shellers that can be moved from one field to another.  The
number of rice mills (under this broad definition) has grown rapidly over the last ten years, from
less than 16 thousand in 1985 to almost 80 thousand in 1995, as shown in Table 2.5.  This6
represents a 17.7 percent annual growth rate.  The growth rate was relatively slow (7.3
percent) from 1985 to 1989, but following trade liberalization and exchange rate depreciation in
1989, the growth in rice mills accelerated to 25 percent.  
The growth in the number of rice mills exceeds the growth in rice production, which was 4.6
percent annually over the same period.  In other words, the ratio of rice production to rice mills
has actually declined from 562 to 173 tons/mill.  At the same time, we know that the dramatic
expansion of rice production and exports in Viet Nam has stimulated investment to modernize
the rice milling sector and build new large-scale rice mills, particularly in the Mekong Delta.  
Two explanations can be offered for these apparently contradictory trends.  First, the rapid
growth in the number of rice mills is primarily outside of the Mekong Delta.  In the Mekong
Delta, the number of rice mills grew just 3.1 percent per year, while rice production in this
region expanded at 6.4 percent annually over the same period.  In other words, the volume of
rice per rice mill has increased in the Mekong Delta, as large mills have been installed to
process rice for export.  The other regions have seen a proliferation of privately-owned mini-
rice mills (including shellers), which are eroding the market share of larger state-owned rice
mills.  
The second explanation is that there is a trend toward the use of mini-rice mills located near
the production zones to carry out rough processing, removing the hull and some of the bran. 
The brown rice is then transported to the cities and towns where large-scale rice mills process
the rice further, either for local consumption or for export.  Since two mills process the same
rice under this system, the implication is that the ratio of rice production to rice mills
underestimates the average throughput of rice mills. 7
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The geographic distribution of rice mills, shown in Table 2.6, highlights the differences in the
rice milling sector across regions.  If we assume that the proportion of rice milled by two mills is
the same across regions, then the average size of rice mills in the Mekong River Delta is
approximately ten times the average size of rice mills in other regions.  This is a reflection of
the importance of the rice export market in the Mekong River Delta which requires more
sophisticated milling equipment.  
Rice mills can be classified by size.  Small mills handle less than 1 ton/day.  They are almost
always privately-owned and located in rural areas near production zones.  Typically, these mills
remove the husk and part of the bran, but do not have facilities for cleaning, drying, sizing, or
polishing.  Medium mills process 1-10 tons/day.  Many of these are privately owned and some
are managed by local authorities.  They are generally able to mill and may have equipment to
carry out other tasks.  Large mills have capacities of over 10 tons/day.  These mills are likely to
have a wider range of equipment for drying, cleaning, milling, and sizing.  In addition, there are
specialized polishers that reprocessed milled rice for export.  Finally, a few of the largest
millers are miller-polishers, able to process paddy into export-quality rice.
In the Mekong River Delta, there are at least 68 rice mills operated by central and provincial
state-owned enterprises.  Most of these mills are large, with capacities of 30 tons/day or more. 
These mills are usually fully integrated, carrying out the full range of processing activities from
shelling to polishing.  In addition, there are 112 rice mills managed by district authorities. 
These mills tend to be smaller than the central and provincial mills, and only some of them
have polishing equipment (IFPRI, 1996, p. 362).  
The privately owned rice mills in the Mekong Delta probably number around 6000.  Almost all
of these are small mills.  They generally produce rice for domestic consumption, although an
increasing number are supplying brown rice or roughly milled white rice to large millers that
reprocess for export.  There is also a small but growing number of medium and large private
rice millers.  
In the Red River Delta, there are 22 large rice millers with capacities of over 15 tons/day.  The
four largest of these can process 60 tons/day.  Another 57 rice mills have capacities of around
5 tons/day, making them medium-sized (IFPRI, 1996, p 361).  As shown in Table 2.6, there are
around 20 thousand mills owned by Red River Delta households, almost all of which are
presumably small mills.  Most of the large and medium rice mills are managed by state-owned
enterprises, while almost all of the small mills are privately owned.  
Furthermore, the number of rice mills continues to expand.  For example, in February and
March of this year, the Sinco Machinery Company of Ho Chi Minh City signed 19 contracts to
supply rice milling machines for companies in the south.  The owner had thought that the
demand for rice mills was saturated, but the recent increase in the pace of rice production and
exports stimulated more investment (Saigon Daily Times, 26 March 1998).
  The 1992-93 Viet Nam Living Standards Survey, with a sample of 4800 households, found a8
similar figure: 156 kg per capita.
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2.4. RICE CONSUMPTION
2.4.1. Domestic demand for rice 
Virtually every Vietnamese household consumes rice.  According to the 1994 Household
Survey covering 91,000 households, the average consumption was 153 kg of rice per capita. 8
This is equivalent to 11.8 million tons of total rice consumption or roughly 70 percent of the
1997 rice harvest.  
As shown in Table 2.6, rice consumption patterns vary according to both income level and
region.  Across income groups, rice consumption tends to rise initially and then decline.  Part
of this pattern is due to the fact that urban household eat less rice than rural ones do, and the
higher income groups contain more urban households than lower income groups.  However,
even within urban and rural areas, this pattern can be found. 
Across regions, rice consumption also varies.  Per capita rice consumption is above 160 kg in
the Red River Delta and the Northern Uplands, compared to just 133 in the Southeast.  The
low level of rice consumption in the Southeast is presumably due to the large urban population
with relatively high incomes in Ho Chi Minh City.  The two delta regions together account for
almost 44 percent of total rice demand in Viet Nam. 
A rough idea of the historical trends can be obtained by calculating apparent rice consumption,
defined as production (adjusted for milling and losses) minus exports divided by the
population.  This is an approximate measure because it does not take into account changes in
stocks, smuggling, and changes in milling efficiency.  Table 2.8 reveals that apparent rice
consumption was around 145 kg per capita in the late 1980s.  When rice exports first began in
1989-1990, apparent rice consumption fell to around 135 kg per capita.  Since then, apparent
rice consumption has risen steadily, surpassing 170 kg per capita in recent years.  The
implication is that, except for the first two years, Viet Nam’s dramatic appearance on world
markets as a leading rice exporter has not occurred at the expense of domestic consumers.  In
fact, consumers have benefits from the rapid rate of growth in rice production facilitated by the
liberalization of agricultural and export markets.
2.4.2. Rice export markets 
World rice production has grown at an average rate of 2.7 percent per year since 1961,
surpassing 500 million tons of paddy in the early 1990s.  Most of this expansion has been the
result of yield growth of around 2 percent per year.  In recent years (since 1990), production
and yield growth have slowed somewhat, but the growth in the traded volume has increased. 
This is partly due to supply factors, namely the emergence of India and Viet Nam as major rice
exporters.  In addition, demand factors have played a role, as countries such as Indonesia and
the Philippines have largely abandoned their attempts to achieve rice self-sufficiency through
import controls.  As a result of these trends, the traded volume of rice has recently risen from
12 million tons in 1990 to over 20 million tons in recent years.  The largest exporters are
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Thailand, Viet Nam, the United States, India, Pakistan, and Burma.  These six countries
account for over 80 percent of the exported volumes of rice on the world market.  
Thailand exports around 5 million tons of rice annually, giving it a 20-25 percent share in world
rice trade.  The marketing and milling industry in Thailand is very sophisticated and responsive,
allowing it to compete with the United States for the long-grain high-quality market and with
India and Viet Nam in the lower-quality markets.  
After several years as the third largest exporter, Viet Nam became the second largest exporter
in 1997.  Although it was considered a low-quality and an unreliable exporter in the early
1990s, investments in milling and infrastructure, along with increased experience in dealing
with importers, have improve both quality and reliability.  Nonetheless, remaining problems
contribute to a discount for Vietnamese rice compared to similar grades of Thai rice.  
The United States is often the second largest exporter, serving the high-quality end of the
market.  It has a reputation both for very high quality control and flexibility in the grade, variety,
and packaging.  These attributes give rice from the United States a US$ 30-50 premium over
the same grade of rice from Thailand.  
India was for many years a food deficit country, exporting only small quantities of high-value
aromatic rice such as Basmati.  In 1995, after a series of good harvests during which the
government accumulated stocks, India suddenly exported to 3.0 million tons.  It is expected to
remain among the world’s leading exporters for some years, although the quality of its exports
is low. 
Pakistan exports both long-grained high-value aromatic rice to the Middle East and medium-
grain rice to south and southeast Asia.   The rice sector in Burma is less developed than in Viet
Nam, so it tends to supply low-quality rice to the world market.
Importers are usually divided into consistent importers and occasional importers.  Consistent
importers include the Middle East, Latin America (particularly Brazil, Peru, Cuba, and Mexico),
Europe, Africa (particularly Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nigeria), and parts of Asia (Hong Kong
and Malaysia).  
Occasional importers enter the markets when there are shortfalls in domestic production. 
These include Indonesia, the Philippines, and China.  The occasional demand for imports by
these countries is a major source of price instability in world rice markets.
Importers can also be distinguished according to the types of rice that they tend to import,
based on preferences and purchasing power.  For example, Canada, Western Europe, Saudi
Arabia, and South Africa generally import high-quality long-grain rice.  Latin America, the
Caribbean, and the rest of the Middle-East are more price-sensitive, switching between high-
and medium-quality depending on prices and domestic conditions.  
Perhaps the most distinctive characteristics of world rice markets is that it is unstable in the
sense that the volumes and directions of flows vary from year to year.  Rice prices also tend to
be somewhat more volatile than the prices of other grains.  There are several reasons for this.  
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C First, 90 percent of rice production is in Asia, so that weather-related supply shocks
tend to be positively correlated across rice producing countries.  In other words, a poor
rice harvest in Thailand is likely to coincide with a poor harvest in Viet Nam,
exacerbating the shortfall.  
C Second, only a small percentage (4-5 percent) of world rice production is traded.  Thus,
a small percentage change in production can result in a large percentage change in
traded volume.  Combined with “friction” in international trade, this contributes to
instability in world prices.  
C Third, because of the importance of rice as a basic staple, Asian governments have
traditionally tended to shield domestic consumers and producers from international
price fluctuations.  By making traded volumes less sensitive to price changes, policies
to stabilize internal prices have the unintended effect of exacerbating international price
instability.  The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the trend toward
less interventionist trade policies have reduced this third effect, but it still plays a role in
world rice markets.
This instability in rice flows is reflecting in the list of major importers of Vietnamese rice.  Table
2.9 shows the largest buyers of rice from Viet Nam in 1995, but the list changes every year.  In
fact, nine different countries have appeared among the top four importers over the four year
period 1992-95.  This fact highlights the dynamic nature of world rice markets and the
importance of closely monitoring changes in international markets and responding quickly to
those trends.  
2.5. PROSPECTS AND POLICY ISSUES
2.5.1. Prospects for production growth
According to most of the standard methods for forecasting production, Viet Nam must be
reaching its capacity in terms of rice production.  Over half of all the agricultural land and the
vast majority of irrigated land in Viet Nam is cultivated with rice.  The area available for rice
production is shrinking in the Red River Delta due to urbanization and agricultural
diversification.  In the Mekong Delta, the area for expansion is considered very limited. 
Furthermore, the cropping intensity in the two deltas is already high: 1.8 in the Red River Delta
and 1.6 in the Mekong Delta.  Finally, yields are higher than in any other major rice producing
developing country, with the exception of China.  
Before accepting this pessimism, it is important to recognize that a number of international
organizations have expressed doubts about the potential for further growth in rice production,
only to be contradicted by continued expansion.  A 1993 World Bank study examined trends in
production, consumption, and world prices, concluding that exports would reach 1.4 million
tons in 1997 and would then slip to 1.1 million tons in 2000 (World Bank, 1993).  Similarly, an
analyst at the United State Department of Agriculture prepared a report in 1995 suggesting
that production constraints and growing local demand would prevent export growth beyond
then-current levels of 2 million tons (Valdecanas, 1995).  Finally, researchers from the
International Rice Research Institute published a paper identifying various production
constraints, concluding that exports above 2.0 million tons would be difficult to achieve (Pingali
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et al, 1998).  In fact, exports reached 3.6 million tons in 1997 and appear likely to attain a
similar level in 1998. 
On the demand side, these studies have overestimated the growth in demand by not
recognizing the slowing of population growth and the fact that per capita demand is reaching a
saturation point, as discussed below.  On the supply side, Viet Nam has surpassed the
expectations of most observers primarily in yield growth.  Yield growth is accounting for an
increasing share of the overall rice production growth.  For example, since 1995 yield growth
has accounted for over 80 percent of the increase in output, compared to 62 percent for the
period 1985-1995 (see Table 2.2).  The critical role of yield growth in maintaining rice
production growth highlights the key role of agricultural research and extension in the rice
sector.  
2.5.2. Prospects for domestic rice markets
The prospects for continued growth depend, in part, on changes in the domestic demand. 
Since 70-75 percent of the demand for Vietnamese rice is from Vietnamese consumers, even
small changes in the domestic demand can have relatively large effects on the exportable
surplus.  
The most important determinants of long-term changes in rice demand are population growth,
urbanization, and income growth.  The trends in each of these variables and its likely impact
on rice demand is discussed below. 
C With regard to population growth, projections by the World Bank and the United
Nations indicate that the population growth rate will fall to between 1.2 and 1.6 percent
for the period 2005-2010 and 1.2 percent for 2015-2020.  
C Econometric analysis of household budget data from the Viet Nam Living Standards
Survey indicate that the income elasticity of rice demand is approximately 0.35,
implying that per capita rice demand should rise at one third the rate of per capita
income, other things being equal.  Based on the consumption trends discussed earlier,
we can expect per capita rice consumption to continue rising slowly for a number of
years, to stabilize, and then eventually to decline with further increases in income.  This
pattern is not unique to Viet Nam.  Countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
have already reached the point where rice consumption has declined substantially.  For
example, per capita rice consumption in Japan peaked at 141 kg in the 1930s and had
declined to 71 kg by 1988 (Tsutsumi, 1991). 
C Urbanization tends to reduce per capita rice demand since urban households tend to
have more diversified diets, consuming less rice than rural households.  Huang and
David (1993) argue that urbanization is a major factor in the decline in per capita rice
consumption in Asia.  Nonetheless, the impact of urbanization on rice demand in Viet
Nam has probably not been very large.  Although per capita rice consumption is lower
in Vietnamese cities than in the rural areas, the increase in the share of the population
living in urban areas has been relatively slow.
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As a result of trends in all three of these factors, we can expect the growth in rice demand to
slow and possibly stabilize over the coming decade.   Since apparent rice consumption is
already over 170 kg per capita, one of the highest levels in the world, we expect per capita
demand to peak within the next 5-10 years. 
2.5.3. Prospects for rice export markets
In the short term, the biggest factors affecting Viet Nam’s rice export markets are 1) the Asian
currency crisis and the devaluation of the Thai baht in particular and 2) the weather effects of
El Nino.  The devaluation of the baht should, other things being equal, have a dampening
effect on world rice prices.  In theory, the devaluation means that Thai farmers get a higher
baht return for each ton of rice they export, encouraging them to expand production and
exports which puts downward pressure on world rice prices.  In fact, the baht price of rice in
Thailand rose 27 percent between 1996 and 1997.  Thai export volume, however, grew by only
2 percent, so the effect on world prices has been negligible.  Given the lags in agricultural
supply response, it is possible that the full effect of the devaluation has not yet taken place.  
Any effect of devaluation on rice prices has been more than offset by El Nino, which has
adversely affected Indonesian rice harvests.  The resulting shortfall is being met through rice
imports, putting upward pressure on world rice prices.  
A number of trends will affect Viet Nam’s rice export markets in the longer run.  First, under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Korea and Japan are obliged to begin
opening their rice markets.  Both countries have had self-sufficiency policies that involved
essentially banning rice imports and maintaining domestic prices far above international prices. 
The most immediate beneficiaries will be the United States and Thailand, because they are the
only countries that can meet the quality requirements of consumers in these countries. 
Because the schedule for opening their rice markets is quite gradual, Viet Nam may have time
to upgrade its processing and milling capacity to meet this demand.  Even if it does not,
however, Viet Nam should benefit indirectly because of the overall increase in rice demand.  
Normalization of the international trade of Iraq would also benefit Viet Nam.  Viet Nam has
exported to Iraq through government-to-government contracts under the United Nations
sponsored food-for-oil program.  Further normalization would create a new large market for
Vietnamese rice.  
Another trend with consequence for Viet Nam is the growth in rice demand within the United
States associated with the image of rice as healthier than many substitute foods.  Rising
demand for rice within the United States erodes its ability to export.  Since the United States
only exports high-quality rice, the main beneficiary of this trend is Thailand, but Viet Nam and
other rice exporters benefit indirectly.  
2.5.4. Quality issues
Rice quality is a function of several variables.  Perhaps the most important factor is the
percentage of broken rice grains.  Rice that is 5 or 10 percent broken is considered high
quality, while 35 percent broken is poor quality.  In addition, the length of the grain is important. 
Long-grained rice is considered preferable in most countries.  The aroma and color are
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considered important quality criteria, with highly aromatic varieties such as basmati
commanding a premium. 
As a result of investments in rice milling, including a rapid expansion of the private milling
sector, the quality of Vietnamese rice exports has improved dramatically.  The proportion of
high quality rice (10 percent broken or less) has risen from less than 2 percent in 1989 to 55
percent in 1995.  Over the same period, the proportion of low quality rice (35 percent broken or
more) has fallen from 88 percent to less than 4 percent (IFPRI, 1996, p. 241).  
Further improvement is possible, however.  The 100% B grade exported by Thailand is 100
percent whole grain or 0 percent broken.  Achieving this level of quality economically would
require varietal purity, more even drying, and improved milling.  Varietal purity refers to having
an entire batch of rice of the same variety, a standard that is difficult to achieve when millers
are receiving rice from numerous small farmers.
In addition, broken percentage is not the only quality criteria.  For example, only a handful of
the largest rice mills in Viet Nam have color sorters that would allow exporters to ensure that
off-color rice grains are excluded.  Similarly, machinery to sort rice by size is not common in
Vietnamese mills.  It is important to recognize that the constraint is not just having more
modern machinery.  For example, to become a major exporter of long-grained rice, it would be
necessary to make complementary investments in agricultural research to select appropriate
long-grain varieties for local conditions and improve the grading system.  The current grading
system in Viet Nam only distinguishes between rice of different broken percentage.  Contracts
between importers and exporters often specify other quality characteristics, but without a well-
defined and administered grading system to codify these characteristics, enforcement is
difficult.  In contrast, the Thai grading system distinguishes incorporates grain length, broken
percentage, and other quality characteristics.  
2.5.5. Size of the export quota 
Rice exports have been controlled by a quota system since Viet Nam began exporting rice. 
The concern was that excessive exports would leave the country with insufficient supplies to
meet domestic demand.  In a well-functioning market, this would be avoided automatically
since domestic shortfalls would push up the domestic price and eventually eliminate the
profitability of exports.  Nonetheless, policymakers were unfamiliar with market mechanisms
and, perhaps correctly, suspected that the market might not function smoothly initially.
The rice export quota remained in the range of 1.5 to 2.0 million tons in the early 1990s. 
However, the quota policy came under criticism for reducing the farm-gate prices of rice
growers.  A study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (1996) estimated that in
1995, the export quota was equivalent to a 23 percent tax on exports.  The results, first
presented in October 1995, suggested that the food security impact of quota removal would be
neutral or mildly positive, since 90 percent of the poor live in rural areas and many of these
would benefit from higher paddy prices.  Change in the quota policy was further catalyzed by
concern over the low level of Mekong paddy prices.  The quota was raised to 3.1 million tons in
1996, 3.5 million tons in 1997, and 4.0 million tons in 1998.  Some market observers believe
that Viet Nam will not be able to export 4.0 million tons this year, implying that the export quota
is non-binding.  
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A binding export quota has two adverse effects.  One is to reduce the price that farmers get for
their rice.  Although there are some benefits for consumers, particularly those in urban areas,
the costs to farmers exceed the benefits to consumers (IFPRI, 1996).  The other is to restrict
competition in the export sector.  State enterprises, which may or may not be the most efficient
or experienced exporters, are guaranteed a portion of the rice export business.   
2.5.6. Allocation of export quotas
Another aspect of export policy is the allocation of the export quotas.  In 1989-90, any state-
owned enterprise could export provided certain procedures were followed.  Inexperience with
international trade led some of them to sign disadvantageous contracts with low prices, some
of which were abrogated by government or SOE decision.  This gave Viet Nam a reputation as
an unreliable exporter, a reputation which lingers today to a lesser extent.  This experience
also convinced the government that excessive competition among exporters resulted in lower
export prices.  In response to this perceived problem, the government allocated the bulk of the
export quota to VINAFOOD 2, the general food corporation in the south.  In 1997 and 1998,
this policy was reversed, allocating a majority of the export quota to rice surplus provinces in
the Mekong Delta.  Table 2.10 shows the allocation of 3.6 million tons of export quota for the
first nine months of 1998.
Fears that a large number of exporters will reduce the FOB export price appear to be
mistaken.  If exporters contract to sell rice at a low price, it is the result of inexperience and not
an excessive number of exporters.  Furthermore, the losses they make from such transactions
will be a strong incentive to avoid them in the future.  
2.5.7. Role of state-owned enterprises 
Since Viet Nam began to export in 1989, only state-owned enterprises have been allowed to
export rice.  When the quota is binding (as has generally been the case), the quotas are
valuable and the SOEs have been the favored beneficiaries.  For example, the IFPRI study
estimated that, in 1995, the quotas may have been worth US$ 64 per ton.  Even when the
quota is not binding (as may be the case in 1998), the reservation of a portion of the export
business for these enterprises constitutes a restriction on the degree of competition among
exporters.  This restriction is likely to reduce the prices that farmers receive for their rice. 
The SOE monopoly on rice exports is defended by arguing that the private millers are too
small and too inexperienced to be able to export.  Allowing them to export, the argument goes,
would reduce the export price received by the country and damage the countries reputation for
reliability and quality.  However, the state-owned enterprises have experienced some of these
same problems.  In 1989, when Viet Nam was first entering the world markets, a number of
SOEs made unprofitable contracts and/or abrogated contracts.  Furthermore, the expansion in
the number of provincial SOEs authorized to export resulted in a number of inexperienced
SOEs losing money on contracts by offering a price too low.  
Many private millers are indeed too small to participate in exports, but a number of private
millers are large and have developed contacts among importers.  In many cases, they arrange
the export contract with the importer and the SOE is only brought in as the “formal” exporter.  
26
Furthermore, private enterprises have an even stronger incentive to avoid loss-making
contracts since they cannot resort to budget support to cover their losses. 
A strength of private enterprises, mentioned frequently in interviews by both private and state
enterprises, is that they can respond more quickly to opportunities and problems.  Without the
need to justify their decisions and obtain approval from political authorities, they are able to
make decisions more quickly.  Given the unstable nature of the world rice markets discussed
above, this responsiveness is a valuable trait.
Finally, competition with the private exporters would probably improve the performance and
efficiency of the state-owned enterprises.  Experience in other countries has shown that
external market discipline from competition, combined with restructuring of internal incentive
systems, is the key to reforming commercial state-owned enterprises (Muir and Saba, 1995).  
Perhaps in response to some of these arguments, the government announced in January
1998 that private millers would be allocated 10 percent of the 4.0 million ton rice quota for
1998.  When the 3.6 million tons of quota for the January-September period were allocated,
however, all the recipients were state-owned enterprises.  One of the private millers being
considered for direct export rights believes that his application may be approved later this year. 
2.5.8. Port infrastructure 
Port infrastructure has an obvious effect on the cost of loading and unloading.   Data collected
by IFPRI (1996) indicate that the port fees, loading costs, and other related costs for Saigon
port (which handles most of Viet Nam's rice exports) are about US$ 40,000 for a ship with a
capacity of 10,000 tons.  By contrast, the comparable cost in Bangkok is about one half of this
amount.  In addition to the port charges, the loading rates are low: about 1000 tons/day
compared to 6000 tons/day in Bangkok.  Delays in docking and loading are typically charged
US$ 6000 per day.   
Although these charges are nominally paid by importers, they are indirectly "paid" by the
Vietnamese economy, and rice farmers in particular, in the form of a lower FOB price.  Given
identical rice quality and FOB price, importers would rather buy from Thailand because of the
lower port costs.  Thus, importers are not willing to buy from Viet Nam unless the Vietnamese
FOB price is lower than the Thai FOB price in order to compensate them for the higher port
and demurrage costs. 
One important opportunity to improve rice exports is the development of the port facilities in
Can Tho.  Can Tho is located in the heart of the Mekong Delta where virtually all the export
rice is grown.  There is a port in Can Tho but the river is shallow, allowing only smaller ships
(under 5000 tons) to load there.  After long consideration, the government has decided to
proceed with the expansion of the Can Tho port, including the dredging of the Mekong River. 
Transporting rice from Mekong rice farmers to Can Tho would cost US$ 6-10 per ton less than
transporting rice to Saigon Port.  Since (in the absence of an export quota) domestic prices are
largely determined by world prices minus the cost of transportation to the port, the
development of the Can Tho port could eventually raise the producer price of rice by US$ 6-10
per ton. 
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2.5.9. Market coordination 
In early 1998, the Ministry of Trade announced that it was developing plans to create a Rice
Export Transaction Center.  According to the Viet Nam News (17 March 1998), the Center will: 
be in charge of promoting and signing rice export contracts between Vietnamese and
overseas enterprises... be responsible for guaranteeing fair competition between rice
exporters... will organize rice export transactions in the form of bidding and allow
selected rice exporters to sign specific contracts with foreign customers.
It is difficult to evaluate the plan without having more details, but the proposal is much less
innocuous that it may appear.  The concept of a central clearinghouse for rice transactions
sounds reasonable and the description of bidding and a “trading floor” sounds modern. 
However, it is worrisome that, unlike a commodity trading board, it does not appear to be
voluntary.  Importers and exporters would be obliged to use the center whether or not it was
found to be useful.  The fact that the center would “allow selected rice exporters to sign
specific contracts” implies that the center would not just facilitate contracts but actually approve
them.  This could be cumbersome at best and an invitation to irregular transactions at worst.  
The concept of a commodity market with anonymous buyers and sellers works only when the
quality of the product can be very precisely defined and the contracts are easily enforceable. 
Under these circumstances, buyers and sellers do not need to worry about the capacity or
reputation of the other party; only the price and the terms of the contract matter.  Rice
commodity markets have never developed in the United States or elsewhere largely because
rice is too heterogeneous.  In Viet Nam, the additional problem of enforcing contracts means
that the reputation of the exporter is even more important.  In rice markets, importers have
good reason to care who they are buying from and are not likely to accept a system in which
their suppliers are selected by government officials.  
On the other hand, there is a need for a more transparent system for rice exports.  Under the
current system, market participants (including the government) do not know the volumes that
have been committed for export until they are loaded on the ship.  This makes it difficult for the
government and market participants to know the pace of exports commitments.  To deal with
this problem, the United States Department of Agriculture publishes an agricultural export
report which provides a weekly accounting of export commitments.  All exporters are obliged to
report on a weekly basis the volumes contracted and are entitled to receive a copy of the
publication.  By improving the flow of information, such a publication can make the market
function more smoothly and allow the government to make policy on the basis of better
information.  
2.5.10. Effect of trade liberalization
Trade liberalization under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) will almost certainly have
a positive effect on the Vietnamese rice sector, including the rice milling industry.  Significant
imports of rice are impossible because of the strong comparative advantage of Viet Nam in
rice.  At the same time, the AFTA, to the extent that opens the doors of neighboring southeast
Asian nations to Vietnamese rice, should benefit the sector.  In particular, AFTA will make it
more difficult for importers such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to restrict
  Devaluation refers to a government decision to increase the value of foreign currency in9
terms of local currency, when the rate is fixed by the government.  Depreciation refers to a
market-driven increase in the value of foreign currency in terms of local currency, when the
exchange rate is determined by market forces.  
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Vietnamese rice imports.  Their interest in doing so is based on the idea that they can develop
their rice production sector by protecting it from competition for lower-cost producers such as
Viet Nam.  
Because rice milling is a bulk-reducing process, transportation costs are minimized by locating
processing facilities as close to production zones as possible.  Unlike some manufacturing
processes, where different stages of production can be located in different countries, rice
milling must be located in or very near the production zones.  As a result, there is no risk of
AFTA resulting in the loss of rice milling competitiveness. 
In the longer run, the reduction in import barriers to rice trade under AFTA and the GATT will
also have the effect of reducing the volatility of rice prices.  As mentioned earlier, when
countries use trade policy to stabilize domestic prices relative to international prices, they
prevent the price signals from reaching domestic consumers and producers.  As a result, those
producers and consumers do not respond as fully to price changes, making exports from or
imports to that country less responsive than it would be under freer trade.  The cumulative
effect of making traded volumes less responsive to price changes is that larger price changes
are needed to adjust to a given shock.  For example, the increase in Indonesian demand due
to El Nino would result in a larger price increase if other countries do not allow the full price
increase to be transmitted to their domestic producers and consumers. 
2.5.11. Effect of the exchange rate 
The exchange rate and export policy probably have a larger effect on the returns to rice
production and processing than does AFTA.  Even though most rice is marketed domestically,
the price of rice (particularly in the south) is determined by the world price of rice and the
amount that the government allows to be exported.  The effect of devaluation (or
depreciation) of the Vietnamese dong on the rice milling industry depends on the rice export9
policy.  
C If a binding quota is in place, then devaluation would have little effect on rice farmers
and rice millers.  Devaluation would, however, widen the gap between the world price
of rice and the domestic price of rice, making the value of the quota higher and creating
windfall profits for those companies who hold quota rights.  It would also increase the
incentives for smuggling rice out of the country.
C If a binding quota were not in place, then a devaluation of the dong would raise the
dong price of rice within the country, thus stimulating rice supply and suppressing rice
demand.  The combined effect would be to increase the exportable surplus in the next
crop cycle.  The rice milling industry would benefit from an increase in throughput as a
result of the policy.  This benefit would be partially offset by the higher cost of fuel and
imported machinery.  The effect would be more adverse for the larger rice millers who
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tend to use more sophisticated imported milling machinery.  By increasing the
incentives to purchase local machinery, however, it would favor domestic
manufacturers of milling equipment.
2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The most important constraint on the growth of the rice processing subsector is the
sustainability of rice export growth.  Vietnamese rice exports have expanded rapidly as a result
of decollectivization of agriculture and the improved incentives to use fertilizer and modern
seed varieties.  However, it is very unlikely that rice export volume can continue to grow at the
same pace that it has over the past decade.
An increasing share of rice production growth is due to yield growth.  The cultivated area of
rice lands has not increased since the mid-1980s.  Production growth has been due to rising
cropping intensity and higher yields.  Further increases in cropping intensity are probably
limited, as evidenced by slowing growth in recent years.  Thus, yield growth is becoming the
only avenue for expanding rice output.
The government should strengthen its support for rice research.  The rate of return on
investment in agricultural research is probably high, particularly given the importance of
continuing to raise rice yields.  This investment could be in the form of better salaries and more
funds for equipment and operating costs. 
Raising the unit value of rice exports requires improvements in port facilities, reliability, and rice
quality.  This conclusion generates several recommendations for government action: 
The government should improve Saigon Port facilities, focusing on reducing the delays in
loading which depress the FOB price.  Furthermore, developing the Can Tho port would
reduce the cost of moving rice to the port, thus raising the producer price.  
The government should avoid policies that result in exporters abrogating existing rice export
contracts.  The costs of such policies are not visible, but by damaging the reputation of Viet
Nam as a reliable exporter, they reduce the FOB price that the country will receive in the
future.  
The government should implement a system for reporting rice export commitments.  This
would allow policymakers to limit the volume of rice exports for food security reasons without
causing exporters to abrogate their contracts.  It would also generate information useful for
monitoring rice markets.  
The government should allow private rice millers to participate in rice exports.  A more
competitive export sector will benefit farmers without reducing the price Viet Nam receives for
its rice exports.  In addition, based on international experience and the experience of other
food processing sectors in Viet Nam, private exporter are more likely to seek out and exploit
market niches for specialty rices.  
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Table 2.1 Trends in rice production in Viet Nam
Year Sown area Yield Production
(thousand hectares)(tons of paddy per hectare)(million tons of paddy)
1985 5,704 2.8 15,875
1986 5,689 2.8 16,003
1987 5,588 2.7 15,103
1988 5,726 3.0 17,000
1989 5,896 3.2 18,966
1990 6,028 3.2 19,225
1991 6,303 3.1 19,622
1992 6,475 3.3 21,590
1993 6,559 3.5 22,837
1994 6,598 3.6 23,528
1995 6,766 3.7 24,964
1996 6,924 4.2 29,100
1997 (est.) 7,000 4.4 30,600
Source: General Statistics Office, 1996, p. 61 for data up to 1995.  
Viet Nam News, 27 December 1997, for 1996 and 1997.
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Table 2.2 Contribution of area, yield, and intensity to rice production growth
Component Level Annual growth Contribution
1985-95 of each factor
1985 1995
Cultivated area (1000 ha) 4,297 4,204 -0.2% -4.7%
Cropping intensity (ratio) 1.32 1.61 2.0% 43.3%
Yield (tons/ha/crop) 2.78 3.69 2.9% 62.0%
Interaction 0.0% -0.6%
Production (1000 tons) 15,874 24,964 4.6% 100.0%
Source: Calculated from data in General Statistical Office, 1996.
Table 2.3 Geographic distribution of rice production
Region Total Sown Paddy Paddy production
area paddy area yield
(1000 ha) (1000 ha) (tons/ha) (1000 tons) (% of national
production)
North Uplands 10,297 808 2.79 2,254 9.0
Red River Delta 1,258 1,042 4.44 4,623 18.5
North Central Coast 5,118 682 3.14 2,141 8.6
South Central Coast 4,518 518 3.38 1,749 7.0
Central Highlands 5,618 173 2.48 430 1.7
Southeast 2,339 352 2.66 935 3.7
Mekong River Delta 3,956 3,191 4.02 12,832 51.4
Viet Nam 33,104 6,766 3.69 24,964 100.0
Source:  General Statistical Office, 1996: 14-15, 18-19, 62-67.
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Table 2.4 Geographic patterns in rice surplus (1996)
Region Rice Consumption Population Consumption Apparent
production per capita (millions) (mill. tons) rice surplus 
(mill. tons) (kg/person/yr) (mill. tons)
Northern 2.11 170.5 13.1 2.23 (0.13)
Uplands
Red River Delta 2.31 177.7 15.4 2.74 (0.43)
N. C. Coast 1.38 160.1 10.8 1.73 (0.35)
S. C. Coast 1.13 144.5 8.5 1.23 (0.10)
Cen. Highlands 0.27 171.8 3.1 0.53 (0.26)
Southeast 0.59 140.9 9.2 1.30 (0.70)
Mekong Delta 8.26 160.9 16.9 2.72 5.55
Total 16.08 162.0 77.0 12.47 3.60
Source: Rice production calculated from paddy production in 1996 from GSO (1997)
assuming 65% milling ratio and 15% disappearance in seed, feed, and losses.  Per
capita consumption from the 1994 Household Survey (GSO, 1998), with amounts
scaled up by 5.9 percent to reflect consumption growth and make totals balance. 
Total consumption calculated as per capita consumption multiplied by population. 
Apparent surplus calculated as rice production minus rice consumption.
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Table 2.5 Trend in the number and size of rice mills
Year Rice mills Paddy production Rice production Rice production per mill
(thousands) (1000 tons) (1000 tons) (tons/mill)
1985 15.6 15,875 8,771 562
1986 16.9 16,003 8,842 523
1987 18.4 15,103 8,344 454
1988 19.2 17,000 9,393 489
1989 20.7 18,966 10,479 506
1990 25.4 19,225 10,622 418
1991 33.0 19,622 10,841 329
1992 35.5 21,590 11,928 336
1993 52.1 22,837 12,617 242
1994 76.3 23,528 12,999 170
1995 79.9 24,964 13,793 173
Annual 17.7% 4.6% 4.6% -11.1%
growth
Source: GSO, 1996, p. 40-41.
Table 2.6 Geographic pattern in the number and size of rice mills (1995)
Region Rice mills Paddy production Rice production Rice production
(thousand tons) (thousand tons) per mill (tons/mill)
Northern Uplands 20,091 2,254 1,245 62
Red River Delta 20,688 4,623 2,554 123
N. C. Coast 12,718 2,141 1,183 93
S. C. Coast 9,605 1,749 966 101
Central Highlands 7,383 429 237 32
Southeast 3,280 935 517 157
Mekong Delta 6,173 12,831 7,089 1,148
Total 79,938 24,962 13,792 173
Source: GSO, 1996, p. 40-41 and 66-67.
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Table 2.7 Trends in production, consumption, and export
Year Paddy Rice Rice Apparent Population Apparent
production production export consumption (millions) consumption
(000 tons) (000 tons) (000 tons) (000 tons) per capita
(kg/person/yr)
1985 15,875 8,771 8,771 59.9 146.4
1986 16,003 8,842 8,842 61.1 144.7
1987 15,103 8,344 8,344 62.5 133.5
1988 17,000 9,393 9,393 63.7 147.4
1989 18,966 10,479 1,420 9,059 64.8 139.8
1990 19,225 10,622 1,624 8,998 66.2 135.9
1991 19,622 10,841 1,033 9,808 67.8 144.7
1992 21,590 11,928 1,946 9,982 69.4 143.8
1993 22,837 12,617 1,722 10,895 71.0 153.5
1994 23,528 12,999 1,893 11,106 72.5 153.2
1995 24,964 13,793 1,998 11,795 74.0 159.4
1996 29,100 16,078 3,003 13,075 75.5 173.2
1997 30,600 16,907 3,600 13,307 77.0 172.8
Annual 5.6% 5.6% 12.3% 3.5% 2.1% 1.4%
growth
Source: Paddy output from GSO (1996).  Rice output assuming 65% conversion and 15% losses. 
Exports from GSO(1996).  Apparent consumption calculated as rice output minus exports. 
Population from GSO (1995).
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Table 2.8 Domestic demand for rice
Household type Per capita rice Population in Total rice Percent of
consumption 1997 consumption national
(kg/person/yr) (million) (million demand
tons/year)
Average 153.1 77.0 11.8 100.0
Income group
  Poorest 20 % 143.5 15.4 2.2 18.7
  2 158.9 15.4 2.4 20.8
  3 160.8 15.4 2.5 21.0
  4 157.2 15.4 2.4 20.5
  Richest 20% 145.2 15.4 2.2 19.0
Region 
  Northern Uplands 161.0 13.1 2.1 17.9
  Red River Delta 167.8 15.4 2.6 21.9
  N. C. Coast 151.2 10.8 1.6 13.8
  S. C. Coast 136.4 8.5 1.2 9.8
  Central Highlands 162.2 3.1 0.5 4.2
  Southeast 133.1 9.2 1.2 10.4
  Mekong River Delta 151.9 16.9 2.6 21.8
Source: 1994 Household Survey, cited in GSO, 1998, p. 847-850.
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Table 2.9 Trend in rice exports
Year Rice exports Rice exports Total exports Value of rice exports
(000 tons) (million US$) (million US$) as a percentage of
total exports
1991 1,033 234.5 2,087 11.2%
1992 1,946 417.7 2,581 16.2%
1993 1,722 361.9 2,985 12.1%
1994 1,893 424.4 4,054 10.5%
1995 1,998 530.0 5,449 9.7%
1996 3,003 856.0 7,256 11.8%
1997 3,600 885.0 8,700 10.2%
Annual growth 23.1% 24.8% 26.9%
Source: General Statistics Office.
Table 2.10 Rice exports by destinations (1995)
Country Volume Percentage of total
(000 tons)
Indonesia 511.9 25.6%
China 463.8 23.2%
Cuba 200.1 10.0%
Malaysia 147.8 7.4%
Philippines 104.5 5.2%
Others 571.9 28.6%
Total 2,000.0 100.0%
Source: Calculated from Ministry of Trade data.
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Table 2.11 Allocation of 1997 rice export quota
Exporter Quota Percentage of total
(000 tons)
An Giang province 450 12.5%
Can Tho province 330 9.2%
Dong Thap province 330 9.2%
Long An province 210 5.8%
Vinh Long province 250 6.9%
Kien Giang province 130 3.6%
Tien Giang province 270 7.5%
Tra Vinh province 150 4.2%
Soc Trang province 120 3.3%
Bac Lieu province 70 1.9%
Ca Mau province 30 0.8%
Ben Tre province 20 0.6%
Thai Binh province 40 1.1%
Ho Chi Minh City 120 3.3%
  Sub-total for provinces 2,520 70.0%
Southern Food Corp. 620 17.2%
Northern Food Corp. 300 8.3%
Gedosico Imp.-Exp. Co. 100 2.8%
Central Agri. Material Corp. 30 0.8%
Grain Imp.-Exp. Co. 30 0.8%
  Sub-total for central SOEs 1,080 30.0%
Total 3,600 100.0%
Source: Circular No. 01/1998 TM/XNK dated 14 February 1998 by 
Ministry of Trade.  Cited in Vietnam Business 8 (6) 16-31 Mar. 1998.
Note: The 3.6 million ton quota is for the period January-September 1998.  Another 0.4
million tons is to be allocated for the final three months of the year, pending
information on the size of the harvest. 
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3. COFFEE PROCESSING
3.1 BACKGROUND
Coffee was introduced into Viet Nam by French missionaries in 1857.  Coffee plantations were
established in the North Midlands in the late 1800s and in the North Central Coast in the early
20  century.  In the 1920s, suitable coffee growing areas were discovered in the Centralth
Highland region.  By 1945, Viet Nam had about 10 thousand hectares of coffee, most of which
was in the central region.  Because of the low yields (around 0.5 tons/ha), production was just
4500 tons, most of which was exported to France (DSI, 1998).  
During the period when Viet Nam was divided (1954-1975), the north took over French
plantations and formed 24 state cooperatives.  Production reached close to 5000 tons in 1968,
but declined subsequently.  In the South, coffee production reached a similar level in 1973. 
Following reunification and peace, coffee production more than doubled to reach 12 thousand
tons in 1980 (DSI, 1998).   This expansion was facilitated by policies to relocate people from
the densely populated north and coastal areas toward the thinly populated Central Highlands. 
Although ethnic minorities predominated in the region, almost all of the immigrants and most of
the new coffee farmers were ethnic Vietnamese (kinh).  The government has tried to redress
some of the resentment resulting from this immigration by establishing coffee schemes for
ethnic minority households in the Central Highlands.  
Between 1980 and 1985, coffee area and production were stagnant and yields were low
(around 1 tons/ha).  For reasons discussed below, coffee production has expanded
dramatically since 1986.  Coffee exports now account for 6-12 percent of the total value of
exports, making it the second most important export crop after rice. 
3.2. COFFEE PRODUCTION
3.2.1. Crop characteristics
Coffee is a perennial tree that grows in the tropics (between 25E N and 25E S) where the
temperature ranges from 20 to 25E C.  Coffee trees takes three to five years to begin
producing.  The lifespan is around 40 years, but maximum yield occurs in trees between five
and fifteen years old. 
The two main types of coffee are arabica and robusta.  Arabica coffee is grown at higher
altitudes (1200 to 2000 meters), has a milder flavor, and fetches higher prices on world
markets.  Robusta is normally grown at lower altitude (below 1200 meters) and is easier to
process than arabica (Brown, 1991). 
The flowering of the coffee tree is generally triggered by rainfall, and the tree produces coffee
cherries 6-9 months after flowering.  The cherries ripen at different rates in the same field and
even in the same tree.  Harvesting is done by hand and is quite labor-intensive.  Strip-picking
involves removing all the cherries from the tree at one time.  This method of harvesting is more
common with the lower-priced robusta coffee.  Sel ctive picking involves selecting the ripe
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cherries for harvesting over the course of several picking sessions.  This method is more often
used with arabica coffee, particular when the wet processing method is used (see section
3.3.1).  
3.2.2. Production trends
Starting in 1986, the doi moi reforms allocated cooperative land to farm households, legalized
private ownership of productive assets, deregulated agricultural marketing and prices, and
devalued the exchange rate.  These reforms resulted in better farm-level prices for coffee and
stimulated private farmers to expand coffee cultivation.  At the same time, many of the state
coffee farms began allocating plots to workers, converting them from members of a
cooperative to tenants or renters who were responsible for the production of a given parcel of
land.  These two trends reduced the proportion of coffee area under state farm management
from 75 percent to perhaps 10-20 percent today.  
The results of these policy changes have been dramatic.  Over the period 1986-96, coffee
producing area grew at 21 percent annually, while yields have grown almost 6 percent
annually.  As a result, coffee production has expanded 12 fold.  Coffee exports have come to
account for 6-12 percent of the total value of Vietnamese exports (see Table 3.1).  On the
world market, Viet Nam has become the fourth largest coffee exporter.
3.2.3. Geographic and seasonal patterns
The coffee harvest takes place between November and February.  Because the harvest
occurs during the dry season, the cherries can be dried outside by spreading them out on the
ground.  As will be discussed later, this method is inexpensive but results in lower quality
coffee. 
Coffee production is concentrated in the Central Highlands (80 percent) and the Southeast (16
percent).  The province of Dac Lac alone produces about 58 percent of national coffee output,
with Dong Nai and Lam Dong contributing 13-16 percent each (see Table 3.2).  The average
yield is 1.8 to 2.0 tons per hectare.  There is some regional variation in yield, with the most
important coffee producing regions having higher yields than the rest of the country.  For
example, the yields in the Central Highlands and the Southeast are around 1.9 tons/ha
compared to less than 1.1 tons/ha in the other regions.  
Over 90 percent of the coffee produced in Viet Nam is robusta.  However, the government is
promoting the expansion of arabica areas, particularly in the North Uplands region.  The
French development assistance agency is helping to expand arabica area by 40,000 hectares
in the north.
3.3.3. Production systems 
Coffee is grown under a wide range of production systems, including small farms of less than
one hectare and state farms with more than 1000 hectares.  Around 85-90 percent of the
  The exact figure is difficult to obtain, partly due to different definitions of coffee area10
(planted vs. harvested) and partly because state farms have allocated plots to households,
blurring the line between the two production systems.  
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coffee area is cultivated by small farmers. These farm households may receive credit or10
fertilizer from a buyer, but they own their own land and operate it as an independent business. 
A survey of coffee farmers in the Central Highlands revealed that the average coffee farmer
had 1.2 hectares of land, of which just 0.7 hectares was planted with coffee.  If we accept
these figures as representative, then there are around 300 thousand households growing
coffee.  Furthermore, the survey indicates that these households obtained over 90 percent of
their income from coffee.  The average income of these coffee farmers was about US$  225
per capita (Binh, 1997).  This is about 25 percent higher than the national average income and
50 percent higher than the rural average income, according to the Survey on Households of
1994 (GSO, 1998: 823).
At the other extreme are state farms, accounting for 10-15 percent of coffee area.  This
includes state farms managed by the Viet Nam Coffee Corporation (VINACAFE) and state
farms under provincial control.  VINACAFE has state farms with 22 thousand hectares of
coffee, accounting for about 10 percent of the 1996 planted area.  Seven of these farms are in
Dak Lak province, operating under the name Viet Duc.  In addition, the government is
promoting arabica coffee production by establishing state farms in the North Mountain and
Midlands region with the idea of eventually allocating plots to farmers.  In addition, there are a
number of state farms under provincial management.  For example, Dak Lak has at least five
such state farms (see Table 3.4).
Some of the state farms were originally private coffee plantations that were abandoned during
the war and converted into state farms soon after the war.  Others were started in the 1980s to
fulfill the export agreements with the east bloc countries.  And a third group have been formed
since the doi moi reforms as a way to promote coffee production and to generate revenue for
the province or the central government.  As part of the d i moi reforms, most of the land has
been divided into plots for cultivation by individual farm households.  The state farm retains
ownership of the land and the trees and provides a variety of inputs and services to the farmer:
irrigation, fertilizer, credit, and so on.  In some cases, the households are similar to tenant
farmers, paying a proportion of their output to the state farm management for the use of the
land and trees, as well as for fertilizer, water, and services provided by the management.  In
other cases, the household are renters, paying a fixed amount each year for the use of the
land, the trees, and any additional inputs provided by the state farm.  Some state farms split
the cost and profits of coffee production in a joint-venture-like arrangement.  Most farms use a
combination of these different organizational forms.  For example, the Phuoc An State Farm in
Dak Lak has 2000 ha of centrally managed coffee and 1000 ha produced in “joint-venture” with
farm households.  The Thang Loi State Farm, also in Dak Lak, 700 ha of centrally managed
coffee land and 1300 ha in two different types of joint venture arrangements.   
  The terminology is somewhat confusing, particularly since the Vietnamese term for coffee11
cherries translates as “green coffee”.
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3.4. COFFEE PROCESSING AND MARKETING
3.4.1. Technical aspects
Coffee processing can be divided into two parts.  Primary processing involves the conversion
of harvested coffee cherries into green coffee beans and is always done in the producing11
country.  Secondary processing involves the transformation of green coffee beans into final
consumer products such as roasted beans, ground coffee, and soluble (instant) coffee. 
Secondary processing is almost always carried out in the consuming country for reasons
discussed later.  Thus, the vast bulk of international trade in coffee is in the form of green
coffee beans.  
There are two types of primary processing, known as the dry method and the wet method. 
The first, the dry method, is generally used with robusta coffee.  It involves harvesting the
coffee cherries and drying them to reduce the moisture content from 25-60 percent to 10-15
percent.  The drying may be done by spreading the cherries out in the sun for 5-10 days, by
mechanical drying, or by some combination of the two.  The purpose of drying is to loosen the
inner green bean from its husk.  After drying, hulling machines are used to removing the husk,
leaving the green bean.  The huller usually involves a large, helically pitched screw that turns
inside a matching concave chamber.  The friction among the beans causes the husk to be
rubbed off.  The quality of the green bean can be further improved by cleaning, sorting, and
grading.  Particles of different size are separated using a stack of three to five screens with
different sized holes that is made to vibrate.  Particles of different density are separated using
either a vibrating slanted surface or jets of air that come up through many tiny holes in a table. 
Finally, particles of different color can be separated using a color sorter, which uses an
electronic “eye” to sense the color of each bean passing through a set of parallel shoots.  The
devise is connected to a mechanical switch that diverts off-color beans to another channel. 
Color sorters are the most expensive and sophisticated elements of coffee processors and are
only found in a handful of processing plants in Viet Nam.  A series of bucket elevators and
conveyor belts move the beans from one machine to the next.  
The second type of primary processing, the wet method, is generally used for arabica coffee. 
First, the coffee cherries are fed into a pulping machine that removes the soft outer layer,
leaving the green bean and a sticky covering.  The beans are then put in tanks of water for 6-
72 hours.  During this time, the sticky covering ferments, allowing it to be removed by repeated
washing.  Finally, the green beans are dried, cleaned, and sorted as in the dry method.
Secondary processing includes decaffeination, blending, roasting, grinding, and transformation
into soluble (instant) coffee.   Decaffeination is a five-part procedure involving the use of
chemical solvents to remove caffeine and the use of steam to remove the solvents.  Blending
involves mixing different coffee varieties (often arabica and robusta varieties) to achieve a
mild, consistent flavor.  Roasting involves cooking the beans using hot air for a period of 5 to
20 minutes.  Grinding converts the roasted beans into a powder for use with various types of
filter coffee machines.  Producing soluble (instant) is a complex and capital-intensive
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procedure involving the extraction of soluble solids, filtering, and spary- or freeze-drying. 
Robusta coffee is preferred for making soluble coffee because it retains more of its original
flavor in the process (Brown, 1991).
3.4.2. Marketing channels
In the past, almost all coffee in Viet Nam was robusta and most of it was grown on state farms. 
The harvested cherries were dried and delivered to the state farm processing plant.  State
farms  processing plants generally have capacities of around 3000 tons, making them
appropriate for farms of around 1000 to 1500 hectares.  The green beans would then be
delivered to the port for export under a government-to-government contract.  
Since doi moi, the marketing channels have become much more complex.  Farmers associated
with a state farm generally sell their output to the state-farm processing plant, though they
have the option of selling some outside provided fulfill their financial responsibilities to the state
farm.  This option has created problems for some state farms, because farmers can more
easily avoid repaying debts to the farm management.
Independent farmers may sell the dry cherries to a private trader, to an agent of a processing
plant, or directly to a processing plant.  An increasingly common pattern, however, is for the
farmer to pay a small coffee processor to hull the dry cherries, retaining ownership of the
green beans.  These small processors are privately-owned locally-made hullers with capacities
of less than 1000 tons/year.  Many of them are mobile, allowing them to be moved from one
production area to another during the harvest season.  The resulting green beans are not very
clean and need to be reprocessed for export.  On the other hand, the beans (unlike the dry
cherries) can be stored for up to two years, giving the farmer the option of holding the coffee in
expectation of a high price.  In addition, these small processors reduce the weight of the coffee
by 40-44 percent, reducing the cost of transporting the coffee to a larger processing facility. 
One researcher estimates that about one half of all coffee is processed in this way.  
The green bean are eventually sold to a trader or an agent of a larger processing plant.  State-
owned enterprises with processing plants, including both state farms and specialized
processor-exporters, are allowed to export directly.  Until March of this year, private processing
plants, even large ones, did not have the right to export directly.  Instead, they were forced to
export through state enterprises, most often the specialized processor-exporters. 
A small portion (perhaps 18,000 tons or 8 percent of 1996 production) of the green coffee
beans are consumed within the country.  Most of this is sold to consumers as roasted beans. 
One VINACAFE factory in Bien Hoa (Dong Nai province) makes ground coffee and soluble
(instant) coffee.  The volume is quite small: the use of green coffee beans is 600 tons/year,
from which less than 150 tons of soluble coffee and 50 tons of ground coffee are produced.  
3.4.3. Structure of coffee processing and export sector 
Official statistics on the processing capacity or volumes of coffee processors do not appear to
be available.  This section uses information collected from interviews in Dak Lak, which
represents about 60 percent of national production.  
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As is generally the case, the smallest processors are the most numerous.  The number of
small first-stage coffee processors in Dak Lak is estimated to be several hundred, with an
average capacity of less than 1000 tons.  As mentioned above, these plants may process half
of the output, but the resulting beans cannot be exported without further processing.
In addition, it is estimated that Dak Lak has 10-15 private processors in the range of 1000 to
2000 tons per year.  These plants have not exported directly, partly because as private
enterprises they were not allowed to.  But there is some question as to whether they are large
enough to establish and maintain contacts with importers and achieve the quality needed for
direct export.
The processing plants on state-farms are usually medium sized with capacities of 3000 tons
per year.  There are about 14 processing plants associated with state farms in Dak Lak. 
VINACAFE has seven processing plants in Dak Lak which are supplied by the seven state
farms that are part of the Viet Duc Coffee Company.  In addition, there are processing plants
on the provincially-managed state farms such as Thang Loi, Phuoc An, and the Thang 10
(October) Coffee Farm in Dak Lak.  
The larger processing plants (those with capacities of at least 5000 tons) tend to be owned by
companies that specialize in processing and export.  Most of the processing plants this size
are owned by state enterprises.   Some of the largest processor-exporters make use of several
processing plants.  For example, INEXIM has three plants with capacities of 5000, 7000, and
10,000 tons per year.  The largest single processing plant is the one of Dak-Man, a joint
venture between DALIMEXCO (a Dak Lak state enterprise) and E.D.& F. Mann, a German
company.  This plant has a capacity of 15-20 thousand tons.  
There are three private companies that have capacities of 5000 tons or more in Dak Lak.  The
largest is Hiep Phuc Trading Company, which processes around 8000 tons.  Since private
exporters have not been allowed to export, Hiep Phuc exports through SIMEXCO.  Lien Phat
Coffee Company and Doan Ket Coffee Company each process about 5000 tons per year. 
These companies report exporting through SIMEXCO, INEXIM, and others.  
The structure of exports is more concentrated than processing, though the number of
exporters is large and increasing.  There are currently around 100 companies that export
Vietnamese coffee, almost all of which are also coffee processors.  The exports of the 15
largest companies account for 60 percent of the total.  The remaining companies export less
than 2000 tons each, with some exporting only a few hundred tons.  The number of exporters
will probably increase as private processors are allowed to export, although it is unclear how
many of them will have the resources and expertise to export directly. 
3.4.4. Costs and competition 
The costs of coffee processing are difficult to specify, partly because of the variety of
marketing channels, the different sizes and locations of the coffee plants, and seasonal
variation.  Because of the growing importance of two-stage processing, involving a small huller
near the farm and a larger reprocessor, Table 3.5 presents the approximate costs for this type
of marketing channel.  
  Note that all prices are expressed in terms of the value per ton of processed green bean. 12
The farmgate price of dry coffee cherries per tons of dry cherries would be about 56 percent of
the figure in the table, based on the conversion ratio between the two forms.
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The most striking aspect of this table is the small size of the margins between the farm-gate
and the FOB price.  The cost of hulling is $ 36 per ton of green beans, the cost of12
reprocessing is about US$ 30 per ton, compared to an FOB price of close to US$ 1800. 
Transportation costs from the farm to the plant and from the plant to Ho Chi Minh City add
another US$ 20 per ton.  Overall, the cost of transportation, hulling, and processing account
for less than 5 percent of the FOB value.  This tight margin highlights the importance of buying
good quality cherries or green beans at a good price.  Since the FOB price is largely outside of
the control of the processor-exporter, small errors in buying can have large consequences on
the profit margin.  
Another interesting aspect of the table is that the labor costs are only US$ 5 per ton.  This
figure should be interpreted in context however.  For a plant that processes 5000 tons per
year, this would imply a payroll of roughly US$ 25,000.  Given that the average monthly wage
for workers is about 700,000 VND or US$ 54, this implies that the plant generates about 460
person months of employment per year.  
The opinions of processors was quite consistent in recognizing that the increase in the number
of traders and processors had increased the level of competition to buy the farmers’ product. 
Several interviewees noted that farmers now have a good idea of the daily changes in the
price of coffee on the London commodity exchanges.  Many of the coffee buyers subscribe to
Reuter’s wire service, giving them up-to-date information on the prices which they use in
negotiation with farmers.  In addition, the London coffee prices are broadcast on local
television news shows.  
Because the margin is so small, it is even possible for the green coffee bean buying price to
exceed the FOB price.  This is possible because the buying price is also affected by
expectations of changes in coffee prices and the exchange rate over the next month or two.  If
traders or processors expect prices to rise or the exchange rate to depreciate, they will be
willing to buy at prices above the FOB price.  Indeed, some processors argued that this was
currently the case (as of April 1998).
Virtually all processors recognized that extending direct export rights to private coffee
processors would further increase the competition, giving farmers better prices.  Some of the
state enterprises expressed the view that inexperienced processors would try to export low-
quality coffee, thus damaging the reputation of Vietnamese coffee in general.  However, some
of the private processors, such as Hiep Phuc and Doan Ket, noted that they have already
developed contacts among importers and have developed a reputation for quality as a result of
their indirect export contracts.  
  Apparent consumption is calculated as production minus exports.  Because of stocks held13
over from one year to the next, apparent consumption fluctuates from year to year so this
figure is based on the average over recent years.  
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3.5. COFFEE CONSUMPTION
3.5.1. Domestic coffee consumption 
Viet Nam is traditionally a tea-drinking country.  Coffee consumption is quite modest in per
capita terms, according to different sources.  In recent years, apparent consumption of gree13
coffee is about 20 thousand tons, or 9 percent of production.   Most of this is purchased in the
form of roasted coffee, either as beans or ground, rather than soluble (instant) coffee.   There
are several brands of roasted coffee, all of them Vietnamese, and VINACAFE appears to
dominate this market.  However, it is likely that most roasted coffee is purchased in bulk
without packaging or brand, particularly outside the major cities.
The Bien Hoa coffee factory in Dong Nai, owned by VINACAFE, produces about 150 tons of
soluble coffee per year, equivalent to about 400 tons of green coffee.  Instant coffee produced
by Vinacafe is under strong competitive pressure from brands from Singapore and Indonesia,
including Nescafe, MacCoffee, and Eagle King.  Casual inspection of retail outlets suggests
that Vinacafe has a minority position in the domestic instant coffee market. 
Analysis of the patterns in coffee consumption across income categories using the VLSS
suggests that coffee consumption will rise at approximately the rate of income growth.  If this
pattern holds over time and Viet Nam continues to maintain its current pace of economic
growth, we would expect per capita coffee demand to rise by 6 to 8 percent per year. 
3.5.2. International coffee market and consumption 
Every year, over 4 million tons of green (unroasted) coffee is traded.  The largest coffee
importers are the United States, Germany, and Japan, followed by other European countries. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the largest markets for Vietnamese coffee are the United States
(24 percent) and Germany (17 percent).  Seven other European countries and Japan make up
the ten largest importers of coffee from Viet Nam.  This pattern is relatively new, however. 
Until recently, the embargo on Vietnamese exports meant that most Vietnamese coffee was
exported to Singapore where it was reprocessed and exported. 
The largest coffee exporters are Brazil and Colombia.  Brazil produces medium to low-quality
coffee in a production system that includes many large-scale coffee plantations.  In contrast,
Colombia produces high-quality arabica coffee, due largely to the fact that Colombian coffee is
grown by small farmers who invest more labor in selective harvesting and other quality-control
measures (see Box 3.1).  The high quality and good reputation of Colombian coffee results in
a higher price in world markets.  
Coffee producers in Asia and West Africa generally grow robusta coffee rather than arabica
because robusta is easier to process and it grows better in warm climates.  Robusta coffee
receives a lower price on world markets than arabica because it is less mild and less aromatic
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than arabica.  On the other hand, robusta coffee beans are more resistant to the percolation
and dehydration involved in making soluble coffee.  Thus, robusta is used for instant coffee
and for blending with higher price arabica.
The international coffee market tends to go through “boom and bust” cycles as a result of two
factors: 1) the largest coffee exporter, Brazil, has occasional frosts and 2) there is a lag in the
supply response to coffee price changes.  A significant part of Brazil’s production area is far
enough south to experience coffee-damaging frosts every ten years or so.  Any reduction in
Brazilian exports (or indeed the expectation of reduced supply) pushes coffee prices up on the
world market.  Coffee farmers elsewhere respond to the higher price by planting new coffee
trees.  There is a 3-5 year period between planting new trees and harvesting them, so it takes
several years for the supply of beans to respond to the higher price.  During this time, farmers
continue to plant new trees.  When the newly planted trees begin to produce, the price returns
to normal.  But for several years new trees continue coming into production, pushing coffee
prices below the long-term average.  When this happens, farmers in marginal areas may
neglect coffee trees, decline to harvest them, or actually uproot trees.  Eventually, the market
stablizes until the next frost in Brazil.
In 1962, the International Coffee Organization was formed to support and stabilize world
coffee prices.  Under the ICO, a series of International Coffee Agreements were signed
establishing export quotas, buffer stocks, and “trigger prices”.  The ICAs did not succeed in
eliminating the boom and bust cycles, however.  In 1975 and again in 1985, Brazilian frosts
drove world coffee prices up, only to have then collapse later.  Like any cartel, the ICA created
strong incentives to “cheat” (to export more than the quota amount), particularly for exporters
with foreign exchange shortages.  Increasing hostility to international commodity agreements
by the United States and other importers led to the demise of the system in the early 1990s.  
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Box 3.1: Coffee Industry in Colombia
Coffee was introduced to Colombia in 1732 by Spanish Jesuit missionaries.  Commercial production
and exports began in the mid-19th century and by the 1890, coffee represented 70 percent of
Colombian exports.  Coffee production continued to expand in the 20 century, although its share ofth
total exports has declined as the economy has diversified and industrialized.  In recent decades,
coffee exports have grown from 240 thousand tons in 1960 to 840 thousand tons in 1995, all of which
is arabica coffee.  In the past several years, exports have fallen to 600 thousand tons, but Colombia
remains the second largest coffee exporter in the world after Brazil.
Coffee is grown by 300 thousand small and medium-sized farmers with an average of 3 hectares
each.  The production areas are on the slopes of the Andes Mountains at 1200 to 1600 meters above
sea-level.  These areas are characterized by rich volcanic soil, cool temperatures all year (17-22° C),
and enough rainfall (1500-2500 mm per year) to make irrigation unnecessary.  
Coffee farmers in Colombia practice “selective picking,” in which only the ripe coffee cherries are
harvested on each pass. As a result, the coffee trees are typically harvested 6-8 times per season. 
Growers themselves carry out much of the processing, using the “wet processing” method.  The first
step is to remove the pulp with a pulping machine.  Next, the beans are put in a tank of water for 12-
24 hours to allow the sticky coating to ferment.  Third, the beans are washed with clean water to
remove the coating.  Finally, the beans are dried, either by sun or in mechanical dryers.  The green
coffee beans are then sold for further cleaning and selection.  The processing and export industry is
composed of both private companies and coffee cooperatives.  Although Colombia does produce
soluble coffee, virtually all of its exports are in the form of green (unroasted) beans.
The Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros Colombianos (the National Federation of Colombian Coffee
Growers or FEDECAFE) has played an important role in developing the coffee sector.  With revenues
generated from a small export tax, FEDECAFE funds coffee research at various centers, an effective
extension system, and a coffee inspection service.  It also funds projects to improve infrastructure and
social services in coffee-growing areas and to diversify income among small farmers.  FEDECAFE
also sponsors a successful world-wide advertising campaign to maintain Colombia’s reputation as a
high-quality producers.  The advertising campaign is only successful, however, because it is backed
up by efforts to ensure coffee quality.  Colombia defines six grades of export-quality Excelso coffee
based on seven criteria: humidity, aroma, color, bean size, defects, foreign material, and taste. 
Coffee that does not meet Excelso standards cannot be exported by law and is marketed
domestically.
3.6. PROSPECTS AND POLICY ISSUES
3.6.1. Prospects for the domestic market
Given continued growth in per capita income in Viet Nam, we can expect three trends in
domestic demand for coffee.
C The per capita demand for coffee will rise somewhat more quickly than per capita
income.  This follows from the fact that the income elasticity of coffee demand is
greater than one.  For example, if income growth is 6 percent and the elasticity is 1.5,
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we would expect 9 percent growth in per capita coffee demand.  At this rate, per capita
demand would double in eight years.
C The demand for soluble coffee will rise more quickly than the demand for ground coffee
and coffee beans.  This is because soluble coffee is more expensive, but also more
convenient.  As incomes rise and a premium is put on convenience, consumers will
slowly shift to soluble coffee.
C The demand for roasted coffee will shift from bulk coffee beans to packaged and
ground coffee and to branded coffee.  This is related to the convenience factor
mentioned above and to the quality assurance associated with brands.  
These trends will have little effect on the overall demand for coffee beans because domestic
demand is such a small portion of total.  They will, however, create a larger market for
VINACAFE’s Bien Hoa coffee factory.  On the other hand, the government has recently
approved a joint venture with Nestle to build a second soluble coffee factory in Dong Nai.  This
plant will provide stiff competition for the Bien Hoa factory, particularly given that the Nescafe
brand is already well-established in Viet Nam.   At the same time, the joint venture, with its
name brand and international expertise in management and marketing, will stand a much
better chance of competing against imported soluble coffee.
3.6.2. Prospects for export markets 
In some ways, the prospects for Vietnamese coffee exports are bright.  The demand for coffee
is strong, as reflected in relatively high world prices.  Coffee demand continues to grow,
although at a modest rate.  Furthermore, Viet Nam still accounts for a relatively small share of
world exports so that increases in output do not have a noticeable effect on world prices.  And
there is a growing interest in coffee, particularly higher quality coffee, in Western countries. 
One sign of this is the greater availability of different types of coffee beans in supermarkets. 
They are labeled both by the country of origin and by the roasting method.  Another indication
is the rapid growth in the United States of coffee shops selling premium coffee in the medium
and large cities, the most notable example being the successful Starbucks chain.  
At the same time, Viet Nam faces a number of issues in developing its coffee sector.  First,
although the taste of Vietnamese coffee beans is considered good for robusta, it does not
fetch as high a price as Indonesian coffee on the world market.  Second, the system for
carrying out research and extension in coffee production and processing is weak and
underfunded.  Third, the world market for coffee is notoriously unstable and prices will
probably fall over the next few years.  Fourth, virtually all of Viet Nam’s coffee exports are
robusta, but arabica coffee has a higher price and probably better growth prospects.  Fifth,
often it is argued that Viet Nam must carry out more processing in the country, particularly
secondary processing.  Sixth, VINACAFE faces conflicts between its role as a commercial
processor-exporter than must cover its costs and its developmental role which, while socially
beneficial, are not profitable to the enterprise.  Finally, Viet Nam’s entry into the ASEAN-
sponsored ASEAN Free Trade Agreement will have consequences for the coffee industry. 
These issues are discussed below.  
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3.6.3. Coffee quality 
As shown in Table 3.7 the Vietnamese system for classifying green coffee beans for export
has three grades based on four criteria.  According to interviews with SIMEXCO, one of the
largest processor-exporters in the country, only 2 percent of Vietnamese coffee exports satisfy
the strict requirements of Grade 1.  And yet, on international markets Grade 1 coffee beans
are worth US$ 50 to 60 per ton more than Grade 2 and US$ 100-120 per tons more than
Grade 3. 
The first and most commonly cited explanation for Viet Nam’s relatively low quality is the drying
procedures used by Vietnamese coffee farmers.  As Brown (1991) notes:
Drying is critical to both wet and dry processing.  Flavor, bean color, and other quality
factors are materially affected at this stage.  Production of high-quality beans requires
the correct combination of temperatures, duration of heat, ventilation, and light. 
Many of the state farms use brick drying yards and some farmers have invested in concrete
yards or plastic sheeting, but the overall capacity is limited.  According to one source, Viet Nam
has just 0.8 hectares of suitable drying ground per 100 hectares of producing coffee,
compared to the optimal level of 3 hectares per 100 hectares of coffee (VET, 1998, p 36).  
The remainder of the coffee is dried on the ground or even in roads.  This practice introduces
stones, dirt, and other foreign material.  Some of this foreign material can be removed in
processing, but at a cost.  Off-color beans can also be removed in processing, but this requires
laborious hand selection or expensive color sorting machinery.  The effect of drying on flavor
cannot be corrected in processing.
A related problem is that occasionally it rains during the drying season.  If the beans remain
wet for too long, mold will develop with serious implications for the taste and consequent value
of the green coffee beans.  The long-term solution to these problems involves farm-level
mechanical driers and/or storage facilities.  
The second most commonly cited problem is processing facilities.  Coffee processing is not a
very complex procedure.  As described earlier, it involves vibrating screens with different sized
holes to separate particles of different sizes, vibrating surfaces to separate according to
density, and a series of bucket elevators and conveyor belts to move the beans from one
machine to the next.  The most expensive piece of machinery in a coffee processing plant is
the color sorter.  Not only does it cost as much as the rest of the machinery combined, but
calibrating the color sorter is a complex and skilled task.  
Although there is little doubt that the machinery used in Vietnamese coffee processing plants
is relatively simple, this does not necessarily imply that capital investment should be the
highest priority.  More detailed and technical evaluation of the processing facilities would be
necessary to make this judgement.  It should be noted that there is a tendency of company
directors and plant managers to attribute all problems to inadequate machinery, perhaps in the
expectation that the interviewer will facilitate the approval of loans for capital investment.  This
is partly a reflection of the problems of Vietnamese financial markets in which investment
decisions are largely determined by the government using political criteria rather than by banks
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using financial ones.  It is also a reflection of the engineering approach which dominated in the
pre-reform era, in which production was seen as a technical rather than an economic problem.
3.6.4. Research and extension 
The research and extension system for the coffee suffers from the general neglect of
agricultural research in Viet Nam, compounded by the fact that the coffee sector has grown so
quickly that the supporting institutions to maintain the sector have not been able develop in
tandem.  VINACAFE operates the EAKMAT Coffee Research Institute in Dak Lak province. 
The research activities are being supported by a GTZ-funded coffee project.  Nonetheless, the
allocation of financial and human resources to coffee research is inadequate given the
importance of the coffee sector and the high returns that agricultural research yields.  Three
areas deserve particular attentions.
C The first is farm-level post-harvest technology.  More attention needs to be given to
developing low-cost methods for drying and storing coffee in order to avoid problems of
foreign materials, mold, and uneven drying.  Coffee farmers have generated relatively
high incomes over the past few years, but they lack information on how to invest in their
coffee processing in ways that will increase the price they receive for their coffee.  
C The second area is coffee disease.  Because coffee is a relatively new crop, disease
has not been a problem.  But as the area planted to coffee grows, the risk of an
outbreak increases.  This is particularly true given the concentration of coffee
production in Dak Lak province and the fact that the coffee is grown under irrigated
conditions, thus facilitating the spread of soil-born diseases.  An early warning system
for such diseases depends crucially on farmers’ ability to recognize symptoms and
report it to the appropriate authorities.  
C The third area for research is water resources.  Viet Nam is somewhat unusual in
growing coffee under irrigated conditions.  The El Niño-related drought this year
highlights the importance of water for the coffee sector, but the problem will not
disappear with the end of the drought.  Roughly 30 percent of the water used to irrigate
the coffee in Dak Lak is ground water and the rate of water extraction may exceed the
maximum sustainable yield.  The evidence of this is that the water table appears to be
falling.  The sustainability of the coffee sector is dependent on finding ways to reduce
ground water use to a sustainable level.  The solution will probably require more
research into the size and nature of the problem, investments to make more effective
use of surface water resources, the development of recommendations for reduced
water use in coffee production, and some system for pricing or taxing water use to
generate the appropriate incentives for conservation.  
The key issue is how to fund coffee research and extension efforts.  Perhaps the most reliable
funding method would be through a small tax on coffee exports.  Even a tax of $15/ton (about
1 percent of the F.O.B value) would generate US$ 4.5 million dollars per year.  In Colombia,
the National Federation of Coffee Growers (FEDECAFE) is funded this way and has been a
major force in coffee research, extension, and community development in coffee growing
areas (see Box 3.1).  It is important to establish a method for feedback to ensure that the
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organization caters to the needs of coffee farmers.  One approach would be to subject the tax
to a referendum among coffee growers every few years. 
3.6.6. International price volatility 
As discussed above, the international coffee market is subject to volatility due, in large part, to
supply shocks in Brazil combined with the lag between price changes and supply response. 
There are no easy solutions to this problem, although there are some policy options.
Some participants in the coffee sector propose a buffer stock, in which the government would
buy coffee when prices are low and sell when they are high.  The government might make a
profit in these transactions, but it is unlikely unless the government has better information
about future trends in world supply and demand than specialized coffee traders that work in
the commodity exchanges of New York and London.  Because Vietnamese exports are small
(less than 8 percent) relative to world trade, the operations of a buffer stock are unlikely to
influence world markets.  And because competition will maintain farmgate prices close to world
prices, the buffer stock would not have much influence on domestic prices.  Thus, a buffer
stock is not likely to address the problem of volatile prices and could be expensive to the
government.
Another option is to use a v riable levy, an export tax that varies depending on world prices. 
In principle, an export tax would be imposed when world prices are high and the revenue
would be used to pay for a subsidy when world prices are low.  This would moderate the price
variability within Viet Nam relative to the variability in world prices.  The experience in other
countries is not promising, however.  In one case (Cameroon), the export tax revenue was
spent on the over-expansion of the state enterprise managing coffee exports so that no
assistance was available when world prices fell.  In another case (Rwanda), the tax revenue
was invested in state tin mines that eventually failed.  Again, the funds were not available
when world coffee prices fell. 
A third option is to provide farmers with information to allow them to anticipate and prepare for
price volatility.  A study of a coffee boom in Kenya showed that farmers were more likely to
save the temporary windfall associated with the boom than the government was.  Thus, coffee
farmers may be better protected by allowing them to receive the higher price and prepare
themselves for the eventual decline.  Although Vietnamese farmers are quickly learning about
world coffee markets, they have less experience than coffee farmers in Kenya and other
traditional coffee growing countries.  For this reason, coffee extension services should
emphasize the volatility of coffee prices and encourage farmers to be prepared for price
declines.  In Colombia, the National Federation of Coffee Growers has programs to help small
farmers diversify their income sources to maintain food security in the event of lower coffee
prices (see Box 3.1).
3.6.7. Arabica promotion
Arabica coffee accounts for less than 5 percent of coffee area in Viet Nam.  Although arabica
has a higher price on world markets, the “wet” process used for arabica is more complex. 
Coffee berries need to be picked selectively to get those of the right maturity.  The berries are
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then depulped, soaked in a tank, allowing the sticky coating to ferment, and then washed. 
Finally, the berries are dried, cleaned, and sorted.  In Colombia, the depulping, soaking,
washing, and drying is done at the farm level, thanks to many decades of experience with
coffee and an effective extension service (see Box 3.1)
Currently, the French development agency is helping to plant 40,000 hectares of arabica
coffee in the north of the country.  The idea of exploring the viability of arabica coffee
production is certainly a good one.  However, it is worth raising two concerns with regard to
this project.
First, even though arabica coffee gets a higher price than robusta on world markets, this does
not necessarily make it profitable for Viet Nam.  The profitability of arabica production in Viet
Nam depends largely on the yields that can be obtained under local growing conditions, the
additional costs of arabica processing, and level of quality than can be achieved.  These
factors can only be determined by pilot programs and careful cost-benefit analysis.  It is not
clear whether the project has invested sufficiently in background research to verify the
economic viability of arabica coffee production in Viet Nam.
Second, arabica coffee is being promoted using a centralized production system in which
Vinacafe builds a processing plant, grows the trees, and “rents” the plots to farmers to
manage.  This may be useful as a transitional phase, but the objective should be to establish
independent coffee growers that are able to carry out the “wet method” processing.  This is
another case where the commercial role of Vinacafe as a processor-exporter may conflict with
the developmental role of Vinacafe as the promoter of a stronger coffee sector.
3.6.8. Secondary processing
Some observers have argued that Viet Nam should carry out secondary processing (roasting,
grinding, decaffeination, etc.) instead of exporting green coffee beans.  The argument is that
by processing the coffee further within the country, the domestic value added, employment,
and income effects of the coffee sector would be enhanced.  Although this argument is
intuitively appealing, it is not necessarily true.  The price difference between green coffee
beans and soluble coffee generally corresponds to the processing costs in countries that are
currently producing soluble coffee.  Assuming that quality is not an issue, Viet Nam can
increase its value added only if it can produce soluble coffee at a lower cost than other
countries.  If Viet Nam’s costs are higher, whether due to lack of domestic packaging materials,
smaller plant size, or any other reason, the value added will be negative.  Thus, processing
investments must be subject to case-by-case evaluation of costs and benefits.  A priori
arguments and the experience of other countries are only useful to identify areas that deserve
further study. 
In the world coffee market, secondary processing is almost always done in the consuming
country.  In 1995, world exports of green (unroasted) coffee beans were 4.2 million tons, while
exports of roasted coffee were just 220 thousand tons, less than 5 percent of total coffee
exports (FAO Agrostat).  One reason is that secondary processing usually involves blending
arabica and robusta coffee to produce a consistent smooth flavor.  This would not be possible
currently in Viet Nam because of the lack of arabica coffee.   Even in countries like Colombia
  The internal rate of return is the annual interest rate that a project could repay and still14
break even, based on the flow of costs and benefits generated by the project.  
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that produces 600 thousand tons of high quality arabica coffee and has an international
reputation in coffee, virtually all its coffee exports are in the form of green coffee beans.   
Another factor is that roasted coffee is a highly differentiated product, with consumer
preferences varying sharply across countries, particularly the high-income countries that form
most of the world demand for coffee.  In Europe, international trade in roasted coffee is limited
because consumers will rarely accept coffee roasted in another country.  For example,
German  consumers buy almost exclusively coffee that has been roasted in that country
because of the specific taste that their processors give it.  
One possibility would be to produce roasted or soluble coffee for low-income, relatively
undiscriminating markets.  In the end, however, this is a commercial decision that should be
made by investors on commercial grounds, not by policymakers.  It is difficult to identify an
economic argument for promoting or subsidizing such an investment.  
3.6.9. Role of VINACAFE
VINACAFE fulfills a variety of roles in the coffee sector.  On the one hand, it is responsible for
the promotion of the coffee industry in general.  This includes implementing government policy
regarding the expansion of arabica areas, research, extension, quality certification, and
representing Viet Nam at international coffee fora.  On the other hand, it is a competitor within
the coffee industry, accounting for perhaps 10 percent of coffee production and around 25
percent of coffee exports.  Mr. Khai, President of VINACAFE, believes that his company
should concentrate on coffee processing and export.   This response is understandable from
the point of view of a commercial organization that is saddled with unprofitable functions such
as research and extension.  It illustrates the tension created by forcing a state enterprise to
cover its own costs and fulfill a social function.  
Although the social functions of quality control, research, and extension are not profitable to
VINACAFE, they are almost certainly “profitable” from the point of view of the economy as a
whole.  Numerous studies of agricultural research and extension (over 100 have been
published) demonstrate that the internal rate of return for these investments is 25-50%, far
higher than many alternative investments.  I  is more difficult to measure the benefits of14
establishing grades and providing quality certification, but the consensus is that these activities
are socially profitable.  The public good characteristics of quality standards, new varieties, and
improved cultivation practices make it impossible for the institute to charge the full value for
these services.  Thus, subsidization of research, extension, and quality control activities is fully
justified by both economic theory and empirical evidence.
On the other hand, it is generally accepted the commercial functions of state-owned
enterprises are performed more efficiently when the SOE is subject to internal incentives for
efficiency and external discipline from the market.  Among the elements of external discipline is
that the enterprise be forced to compete against other enterprises without any government-
provided advantages such as subsidies.  
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Thus, VINACAFE, like many state-owned enterprises, has a mandate to pursue social
objectives that should be funded by the government because of their public good
characteristics as well as commercial objectives that should not be subsidized in order to
impose market discipline on the enterprise.  Because of this conflict, one of the principles in
reforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is that commercial and social functions should be
separated.  A report on improving state enterprise reform expresses the idea this way:
A critical element contributing to the poor performance of many SOEs has been the
diverse, ill articulated and often conflicting roles set by [the government] for the
management of these enterprises (Muir and Saba, 1995).  
International experience with SOE reform suggests two solutions to this problem.  The first is to
ensure that the non-commercial functions of the SOE are clearly identified and separated in
terms of the accounting of the enterprise, allowing the government to subsidize or fully fund
those activities.  If performance can be quantified, performance contracts should be
considered.  The second solution is to separate the two functions in different institutions, one
for the social objectives and the other operating as a commercial enterprise.  
3.6.10. Effect of trade policy
Trade liberalization under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement will take the form of phased
reduction of tariffs on goods imported from the members of the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN).  This trend will generally be either neutral or positive for the coffee
sector in Viet Nam, although it may adversely affect the secondary coffee processing industry.  
Currently, the tariff rate on unroasted (green) coffee beans is 20 percent.  Eliminating this tariff
would not adversely affect the coffee sector.  Because of climate, natural resources, and labor
costs, Viet Nam has a comparative advantage in coffee production so that movement toward a
more liberalized trade regime in the area can only benefit coffee farmers.  Three
characteristics of primary processing virtually require that it be carried out near production
areas.  First, the farm-level product (dried cherries) is more perishable than the processed
product (green beans), creating incentives for processing to take place near the producing
area.  Second, processing reduces the bulk of the product, so that transportation costs are
minimized by processing as close to the farm as possible.  Third, the economies of scale are
not very great.  There appear to be little or not cost advantage in processing plants above
10,000 tons per year.  Processing plants with large capacities generally just install multiple
copies of the machinery under one roof.  These characteristics explain the tendency of new
plants to be established in Dak Lak rather than Ho Chi Minh City.  They also suggest strongly
that even in a free trade environment, primary processing of Vietnamese coffee will continue to
take place in the coffee zones of Viet Nam.
The tariff rate on both soluble and non-soluble roasted coffee is now 50 percent, representing
a significant level of protection for the Bien Hoa coffee factory and other coffee roasters.  In
the case of soluble coffee, imports from Singapore and Indonesia already have seem to have
a majority of the domestic market.  Thus, eliminating or reducing the tariff would further
weaken, and possibly eliminate, VINACAFE’s position in the domestic soluble coffee market. 
Reducing the tariff will benefit coffee consumers at the expense of soluble coffee processor(s),
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but there would be no effect on coffee farmers because local soluble coffee is a negligible
portion of the demand for Vietnamese coffee.
With regard to roasted nonsoluble coffee, it is likely that domestic roasters would not be
affected by the elimination of the 50 percent tariff.  The packaging and transportation cost of
imported roasted (non-soluble) coffee would probably not allow it to compete with locally
roasted coffee, except for the high-income market.
3.7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The increase in the number of coffee processors and traders has reduced coffee marketing
margins and improved the prices received by farmers.  Although information on margins over
time is not available, this is the conclusion of almost all coffee processors (including state and
private).  
Recent policy decisions to allow private coffee processors to export will have a modest effect
initially, but a large effect over the coming years.  Initially, few private processors will have the
expertise, contacts, and liquidity to export, but the incentives for direct exporting will encourage
private processors to develop the expertise, make contacts, and seek credit.  
One of the main threats to sustained coffee exports is the depletion of groundwater resources
in the Central Highlands.  The current drought has highlighted the dependence of coffee on
water, but the problem will not disappear with the return of normal rainfall.  
Another threat to sustained coffee exports is the risk of an outbreak of disease.  Coffee
production has expanded more quickly than the institutional capacity to deal with outbreaks of
disease.  The use of irrigation increases the risk of disease.
The government should not limit the number of companies that are allowed to export coffee,
nor set minimum export prices.  Greater competition in the export sector will improve the prices
received by farmers without lowering the export price.  Importers will prevent inexperienced or
under-capitalized processors from exporting, although it might be useful for the government to
"certify" some exporters as qualified.
The government should invest more in coffee research and extension, focusing on disease,
post-harvest practices, and water conservation.  As a result of the risks described above,
research in the issue of sustainable water use, Arabica production, and disease is needed, as
are extension efforts to establish a system for monitoring and reporting diseases.
The government should consider a small export tax to fund coffee research and extension
activities. This would ensure that research funds are available on a sustained basis to support
the coffee sector.  The example of FEDECAFE in Colombia should be studied as a model,
though initially a Vietnamese institute should pursue a more modest agenda.
The government should separate the commercial and public service roles of VINACAFE.  State
enterprises should not be given public services functions and expected to cover all their costs. 
Nor should the public service functions of VINACAFE be neglected in the interest of state
enterprise reform.  Commercial activities should be self-financing, while public service activities
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(research, extension, inspection, etc) should be fully funded by the government or by taxing
the coffee sector.
The government should evaluate the economic returns to arabica coffee production.  The
expansion of arabica coffee production in the north appears to be following an accelerated
schedule, and it is not clear whether there have been adequate studies of the agronomic and
financial aspects of this investment.
The government should study the issue of groundwater depletion in the Central Highlands in
order to design policies to ensure the sustainability of coffee production in this region.  Such a
study would examine the extent of depletion and the mechanisms that the government could
use to reduce water use and/or increase water supply.
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Table 3.1 Trends in coffee production
Year Planted area Harvested area Yield Production
(000 ha) (000 ha) (tons/ha) (000 tons)
1986 65.6 19.1 1.00 19.1
1987 92.0 23.4 0.99 23.1
1988 111.9 32.3 1.04 33.7
1989 123.1 43.3 0.99 43.0
1990 119.3 61.9 1.57 97.4
1991 115.1 73.2 1.51 110.6
1992 103.7 81.8 1.93 158.1
1993 101.3 82.1 2.11 173.6
1994 123.9  99.9 2.08 208.2
1995 186.4  99.9 2.07 206.5
1996 127.5 1.82 231.5
1997 300.0
Annual growth 20.9% 6.1% 28.3%
Source: GSO (1996, p 166) for 1986-1995.  Binh (1997) for 1996.  
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Table 3.2 Geographic distribution of coffee production (1996)
Region or province Yield Production Percent of total
(tons/ha) (000 tons)
North Mountain & Midlands 0.99 4,443 1.9%
Red River Delta - - 0 0.0%
North Central Coast 1.09 2,486 1.1%
South Central Coast 0.86 1,618 0.7%
Central Highlands 1.88 185,895 80.3%
  Dac Lac 2.09 134,815 58.2%
  Lam Dong 1.49 37,690 16.3%
  Gia Lai 1.59 11,457 4.9%
Southeast 1.83 37,056 16.0%
  Dong Nai 1.87 29,894 12.9%
Mekong River Delta - - 0 0.0%
Total 1.82 231,498 100.0%
Source: GSO, cited in Binh (1997).
Table 3.3 Trends in coffee processing
Year Value (billion VND) Ratio of value
added to gross
outputGross output Value added
1991 33.8 1.8 5.4%
1992 46.2 2.4 5.2%
1993 71.4 3.7 5.2%
1994 82.6 4.3 5.2%
1995 119.7 6.0 5.0%
1996 138.0 6.9 5.0%
1997 151.0 7.6 5.0%
Annual growth 23.5% 21.9%
Source: General Statistics Office.  (Data obtained by DSI/MPI).
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Table 3.4 Characteristics of medium and large coffee processors in Dak Lak
Processor Ownership Production Number Processing Export
(tons/year) of plants capacity volume
(tons/year) (tons/year)
INEXIM province 0 3 22,000 45,655
SIMEXCO province 0 - - - - 42,934
Viet Nam Coffee Co. central 0 1 - - 34,052
Phuoc An province 4,500 1 12,000 13,701
Dak Lak Trading Co. province  0 - - - - 13,307
Thang Loi Coffee Co. province 5,000 1 8,000 12,912
Viet Duc central yes 7 15,000 11,611
Hiep Phuc private  0 1 8,000 0
Dak-Man JV 0 1 15,000 8,182
Doan Ket Coffee Co. private 800 1 5,000 0
Lien Phat private 0 1 5,000 0
Imp.-Exp. Transp. Co. province 0 - - 4,182
October Coffee Farm province yes - - 2,396
Buon Ma Thuot Coffee province yes  - - 2,175
Mountain Area Dev. central 0 - - 1,368
Co.
Duc Lap Coffee Farm province yes - - 828
Total 193,303
Source: Export data from Department of Planning and Investment, Dak Lak.  Production and
processing data from interviews.
Note: The production and processing data should be considered indicative since only seven
of the processors were interviewed and there were conflicting reports on some of the
numbers.  
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Table 3.5 Cost structure of coffee processing
Item Cost Cost Percent of Percent of
(VND/kg of (US$/ton of total costs processing
green bean) green bean) costs 
Dry coffee cherry 22,036 1,695 95.2%
  Labor for hulling 170 13 0.7% 36.6%
  Petrol for hulling 59 5 0.3% 12.7%
  Hulling machine 195 15 0.8% 42.0%
  Other hulling costs 40 3 0.2% 8.6%
Total hulling costs 464 36 2.0% 100.0%
Green bean (cherry+hulling) 22,500 1,731 97.2%
Transport to reprocessing plant 60 5 0.3%
  Labor for reprocessing 60 5 0.3% 15.4%
  Electricity 10 1 0.0% 2.6%
  Sacks 100 8 0.4% 25.6%
  Depreciation and profit 200 15 0.9% 51.3%
  Tax to province 20 2 0.1% 5.1%
Total reprocessing cost 390 30 1.7% 100.0%
Transport to HCMC 200 15 0.9%
Total (FOB price) 23,150 1,781 100.0%
Source: Hulling costs from Binh (1997), Table 12.  Additional processing costs from interviews
with Manager of INEXIM Plant No. 1 and others.
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Table 3.6 Trends in coffee exports
Year Coffee Coffee Coffee Total exports Coffee as a
export export price export value (million US$) percentage
volume (US$/ton) (million US$) of total
(000 tons) exports
1985 9.2
1986 18.6
1987 25.6
1988 33.8
1989 57.4 871 50.0 1,946 2.6%
1990 89.6 859 77.0 2,404 3.2%
1991 93.5 816 76.3 2,087 3.7%
1992 116.2 787 91.5 2,581 3.5%
1993 122.7 903 110.8 2,985 3.7%
1994 176.4 1,872 330.3 4,054 8.1%
1995 248.1 2,411 598.1 5,449 11.0%
1996 239.0 1,410 337.0 7,256 4.6%
1997 355.0 1,208 429.0 8,700 4.9%
Annual 25.6% 4.2% 30.8% 20.6%
growth
1989-1997
Source: For 1985-1990, GSO (1996, p 9) and Binh (1997). 
For 1991-1997, General Statistics Office (data provided by DSI/MPI).
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Table 3.7 Coffee quality standards
Criterion Standards for each grade
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
Humidity 12% 12% 13-15%
Foreign material 0.5% 0.5% 1.0%
Broken beans 2-3% 2-3% 4-5%
Bean size 7 mm 6-7 mm 5 mm
Source: Interview with Vice-Director of SIMEXCO, Dak Lak. 
Table 3.8 Import tariffs on coffee products
Code Description Import tariff
#090111 Unroasted (green) coffee with caffeine 20%
#090112 Unroasted (green) coffee without caffeine 20%
#090121 Roasted coffee with caffeine 50%
#090122 Roasted coffee without caffeine 50%
Description Minimum price for
calculating tariff
(US$/kg)
#0901 Instant coffee from Switzerland and G7 countries 15.00
#0901 Instant coffee from ASEAN countries 10.00
#0901 Powdered coffee from Switzerland and G7 10.00
countries
#0901 Powdered coffee from ASEAN countries 7.00
#0901 Decaffeinated coffee 3.00
Source: Tariff rates from Decision 280/TTg of 28 May 1994 and minimum price from Decision
No. 975 TC/QD/TCT of 29 October 1996, as reprinted in Statistics Publishing House
(1997, p. 23 and 315).  
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4. FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PROCESSING
4.1. BACKGROUND
During the 1970s and 1980s, Viet Nam’s membership in the the Council on Mutual Economic
Association defined its export opportunities in most sectors.  As one of the few CMEA
members with a tropical climate, Viet Nam was called upon to supply the east bloc countries
with fruits and vegetables.  Farmers were organized in cooperatives and were obliged to sell
their output to state enterprises, thus facilitating procurement for food processors.  Trade was
negotiated between governments, so the only task of the food processors was to meet their
production targets. 
With the collapse of the CMEA and the liberalization of agricultural markets, fruit and vegetable
processors found themselves in a very different environment.  Now, they had to compete with
traders and other processors for the farmers' harvest, requiring them to be attuned to market
prices and quality issues.  In addition, they could no longer count on the government to
arrange export agreements for them and were forced to learn how to contact importers,
negotiate contracts, and arrange for delivery.  The early 1990s were difficult years for many of
the state-owned fruit and vegetable processors, with the value added in fruit and vegetable
processing and the value of exports falling by over half.  The sector started to recover in 1994,
based on the expansion of exports.  By 1997, the value added of fruits and vegetables was
more than double the 1990 level.  
Viet Nam’s low wages, varied climate, and proximity to large growing markets in east Asia
suggest that fruit and vegetable processing exports have the potential to expand further. 
Government assistance will be required to overcome weaknesses in the production and
marketing system in order to take full advantage of this potential.  
4.2. FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING
4.2.1. Product characteristics
Fruits are generally colorful fleshy parts of a tree or bush that contain the seed(s), while
vegetables are a diverse category that includes a variety of other parts of the plant including
the roots (e.g. potatoes, carrots, and onions), stalks (e.g. celery and rhubarb), and leaves (e.g.
lettuce, spinach, cabbage).  The definitions used in everyday terminology, however, are
cultural rather than botanical.  For example, tomatoes and squash fit the botanical definition of
fruit, but are generally considered vegetables because they are not sweet and they are
consumed like vegetables (cooked or in salads) rather than like fruit (as desert).  
Unlike many other food commodities that are processed, almost all fruits and many vegetables
can be eaten in their original fresh state.  Thus, the motive for processing fruits and vegetables
is not to convert the commodity into an edible form, as it is with rice and coffee.  Rather the
main motivation is to preserve them so they can be consumed far from the place of harvest
and throughout the year.  Perhaps one of the most distinguishing characteristics of fruits and
vegetables is their perishability in the fresh state.  Although the root vegetables such as
  GSO tables refer to “oranges”, but the statistics cover include orange, mandarin, lemon, and15
grapefruit.
  Growth in production is less than the sum of growth in area and yield in GSO statistics. 16
Presumably, area refers to planted area, whereas yield is calculated on the basis of producing
area.  
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potatoes and onions can last four to nine months without refrigeration, most fruits and
vegetables will spoil within two or three weeks.  
4.2.2. Production patterns 
The economic reform process in Viet Nam has stimulated the production of fruits and
vegetables in three ways.  First, by raising the production and domestic availability of rice, rural
households are able to allocate part of their land to fruits and vegetables with some assurance
of purchasing the rice needed for household consumption.  Second, by expanding domestic
incomes, the reforms have increased the demand for fruits and vegetables as consumers seek
to add diversity to their diets.  The two largest cities are particularly important as sources of
demand for fruits and vegetables.  Because of the perishability of fruits and vegetables, the
production zones to supply the city are often located relatively close to the cities.  Third, by
establishing a realistic exchange rate and liberalizing exports, the reforms have created new
outlets for fruit and vegetable processors.   The reforms have not been without costs, as a
number of processors have faced costly adjustments to the new, and more demanding, export
markets.  
As shown in Table 4.1, the area planted with fruit trees grew 71 percent between 1985 and
1995, equivalent to a rate of 5.5 percent per year.  This growth has been equally shared
between the north and the south of the country.  Citrus area has grown even more rapidly15
than other fruits and now accounts for 17 percent of the total fruit area.  Banana area is large
but stagnant, so its share of fruit area has declined to 26 percent.  Pineapple area declined in
both absolute and relative terms between 1990 and 1995 for reasons discussed below. 
Mango area has grown at the same rate as total fruit area, maintaining its share at 6 percent. 
These four fruit crops account for over half (57 percent) of the fruit area in Viet Nam.  
Production data reveal that citrus production increased 14 percent per year period 1985-1995,
but almost all of this growth has occurred in the second half of this period.  The annual growth
rate over 1989-1995 was close to 25 percent.  Most of this growth is attributable to a four-fold
increase in planted area since 1990, but yields have also risen by more than 25 percent over
this period.  The data for banana production is limited to the first half of the 1990s, but shows16
little trend upward or downward.  Pineapple production grew steadily in the second half of the
1980s and then fell abruptly by over 35 percent in 1992.  This drop was caused by the sharp
reduction in production in just two provinces, Kien Giang and Minh Hai, presumably due This
drop is apparently related to the abandonment of plantations the result of reductions in both
yield and sown area of pineapple.  Vegetable output has increased 4.8 percent per year.  
The geographic patterns in fruit and vegetable production are shown in Table 4.3.  With regard
to fruits, the Mekong Delta accounts for over two thirds of the output of citrus, pineapple, and
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mango.  Banana production is somewhat more dispersed, with important production in the
Mekong Delta, Southeast, and the Red River Delta.  
Concerning vegetables, the Red River Delta has the largest production, accounting for 29
percent of the national output.  This is the result of its good soils, cooler climate, and access to
the Hanoi market.  Temperatures are cool enough in the October-February period to grow
temperate vegetables such as cabbage, onions, tomatoes, turnips, and cauliflower.  The
Mekong Delta is the second most important region, representing 13 percent of national output. 
Dalat, in the Central Highlands, has specialized in the production of fruits and vegetables both
for export and for domestic consumption. 
4.2.3. Marketing channels
The marketing channels vary depending on the product and the eventual consumer.  It is
estimated that about half of vegetable production is marketed, largely for domestic
consumption.  In the simplest case, fruits and vegetables are harvested and brought to town in
bamboo baskets by bicycle or bus and sold to stall-based retailers at the marketplace.  For
longer distance internal trade, the farmer may sell his produce to a wholesaler who arranges
transport into the city.  Transportation is readily available, although it is rarely refrigerated,
limiting the distance it can be shipped.  Private traders in the Dalat area have organized
overnight truck services to ship vegetables into Ho Chi Minh City some 250 km away to be sold
the following day (World Bank, 1993, p. 65).
Processors use a variety of methods to procure their raw materials.  Pineapples for canning
are usually produced on state farms in the north.  The state farm may be vertically integrated
with the processor-exporter.  For example, the Dong Giao Export Foodstuff Company (a
central SOE) obtains pineapples for its canning factory both from its own farm with 2000
cultivated hectares and from other state farms in the area (DSI, 1998).  In the south, there are
fewer state farms so procurement from farmers is more common.  For example, the Tan Binh
Foodstuff Export Company purchases pineapples for canning from farmers using agents in the
provinces.  Another system is for pineapples to be purchased through contracts with
communal authorities.  The authorities agree to sell a given volume to the plant and organize
selected households in the commune to fulfill the contract. 
4.3. FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PROCESSING
4.3.1. Technical aspects 
Fruit and vegetable processing can be defined broadly to include sorting, grading, and
packaging of fresh produce.  It can also be defined more narrowly to include only the
transformations of fruits and vegetables to preserve them and to reduce preparation time. 
Preservation methods include canning, freezing, drying, and pickling.  Processing to increase
convenience include combining different ingredients, removing inedible parts, and carrying out
other steps that consumers would otherwise do in the home.  
The vast majority of fruits and vegetables in the world are consumed in fresh form, but
processing has become more important over time.  With rising incomes, consumers become
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more willing to pay to have their favorite fruits and vegetables available in the off season and
far from the production areas.  In addition, they become willing to pay for semi-prepared foods
that require less preparation time.  
Canning increases the shelf life of fruits and vegetables to 1-3 years, depending on the
product.  After cleaning the produce, it is peeled using air pressure, chemicals, or abrasion. 
Next, the produce is blanched, which involves raising the temperature to 95-100° C for a brief
period to wilt the product, remove bubbles of air, and inactivate enzymes.  The cans are filled,
air at the top of the can is “exhausted” by heating, and the can is sealed.  The cans are then
sterilized by heating them to a specified temperature (usually 85-115° C) for a time sufficient to
kill micro-organisms.  The criteria vary depending on the size of the can, the acidity of the
product, and other factors.  Spoilage is usually caused by leakage, corrosion, or inadequate
heating.  
Because of the chemical reactions involved in canning, the fruit and vegetable varieties that
are good for fresh consumption may not be suitable for canning.  For example, tropical
tomatoes often have a high level of acidity which results in a bitter and discolored product after
canning.  Similarly, the best varieties of pineapple for fresh consumption are not necessarily
best for canning.
Drying preserves food by reducing the water content below the level needed for micro-
organisms to survive.  Normally, 95 percent of the water content is removed.  Fruits and
vegetables are peeled and prepared, removing inedible portions and making even slices to
facilitate uniform drying.  Next, in the case of most products, preservatives are applied.  The
drying may be accomplished in sun or shade, though contamination by dust or insects is a
problem.  Alternatively, a variety of kilns, vacuum trays, and air chambers are used to dry fruits
and vegetables.  Dried goods usually have a shelf life of one year or so.
Freezing preserves food by making the water needed by micro-organisms unavailable.  In
order to avoid water loss in the initial cooling period, it is necessary to freeze fruits and
vegetables relatively quickly.  Freezing methods include, in order of increasing cost and
effectiveness, still-air freezing, air blast freezing (where fans accelerate the cooling), liquid
immersion freezing, and cryogenic freezing. 
4.3.2. Structure of the fruit and vegetable processing sector 
The fruit and vegetable processing industry in Viet Nam is dominated by state-owned
enterprises.  Although this is true in other subsectors as well, the degree of SOE control over
fruit and vegetable processing appears to be greater than in rice, coffee, and seafood.  
The Vegetables and Fruits General Corporation (VEGETEXCO) is a centrally-managed state-
owned enterprise under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.  VEGETEXCO has
14 fruit and vegetable processing companies with capacities from 600 tons/year to 10,000
tons/year.  In 1997, the company produced 11,000 tons of processed fruits and vegetables,
their main products being canned pineapple, other canned fruit, jarred pickles, fruit drinks, and
canned vegetables.  VEGETEXCO has entered into a joint venture with Dona Newtower, Ltd
of Hong Kong to produce fruit juice in Dong Nai under the “Nature” label.  The exports of
VEGETEXCO were US$ 22 million in 1997, but only half of this was in fruits and vegetables. 
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Thus, VEGETEXCO represents about 7-8 percent of Viet Nam’s US$ 140 million export sales
of fruits and vegetables.  
There are also an estimated 22 provincial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in fruit and
vegetable processing.  The capacity of these companies ranges from 500 to 10,000 tons/year. 
One of the largest of these is a joint venture between a Malaysian company and a Dong Nai
provincial SOE to produce fruit juice under the “Wonderfarm” label.  Finally, there are 17
private fruit and vegetable processors.  Another example is the Vegetable and Fruit Company
of Ho Chi Minh City (VEGFRUCO) which processes and exports a wide variety of products
including lychee, red dragon fruit, Chinese cabbage, and garlic.  VEGFRUCO sells several
thousand tons of fresh and frozen goods to demanding markets in Japan, Taiwan, and
Europe.  
The structure of the fruit and vegetable processing sector appears to be changing, with the
provincial and private companies expanding at the expense of VEGETEXCO.  For example,
VEGETEXCO was said to be producing 30,000 tons of canned and frozen good in 1993,
compared to just 11,000 in 1997.  Much of the decline appears to be related to the loss of
pineapple export markets, particularly in the former eastern bloc.
4.3.3. Processing costs 
According the General Statistics Office, the cost of raw materials accounts for 72 percent of
the output value of fruit and vegetable processors.  Among the actual processing costs, labor
is the largest item, representing 10 percent of the value of output.
These figures should be treated with some caution, however, since the structure of costs
varies widely depending on the product and the type of processing.  Interviews with pineapple
canners suggested that raw material were only 40 percent of the final value and that the
packaging (mostly the cans) represent another 40 percent.  The remaining 20 percent was
divided among labor, depreciation, and other operating costs.  These figures indicate that the
economic viability of the canning industry is dependent on access to cans at a reasonable
price.  Since the metal for the cans is imported, the price of cans is sensitive to changes in the
exchange rate.  
4.4. FRUIT AND VEGETABLE DEMAND
 
4.4.1. Domestic demand for fruits and vegetables 
Vietnamese households consume an average of 52 kg of vegetables per person per year,
according to the 1994 Household Survey.  As shown in the Table 4.6, per capita vegetable
consumption rises with income but tends to level off at middle and higher incomes.  The table
also reveals a regional pattern in which vegetable consumption tends to be higher in the north
than in the south.  At the extremes, the per capita vegetable production is almost twice as high
(64 kg) in the Northern Uplands as it is in the Mekong River Delta (34 kg).  This pattern
presumably represent, in part, differences in price and availability, since production per capita
is much higher in the Northern Uplands and Red River Delta than in the south.  
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Information on the consumption patterns for fruit alone is not available, but we expect the
income pattern to be similar.  Econometric analysis of the 1992-93 Viet Nam Living Standards
Survey suggests that the income elasticity for fruits and vegetables as a group is close to 1.0. 
This means that per capita consumption will rise at approximately the same rate as per capita
income.  With regard to the regional demand for fruits, it is probably higher in the south due to
the concentration of production of the four major fruits in the Mekong Delta and Southeast.  
Little information exists on the consumption of processed fruits and vegetables.  Informal
surveys of retail shops in the urban areas reveal some general patterns, however.  First,
canned fruits and vegetables can be found in most shops, even small shops that carry only a
few dozen products.   Among canned fruits, lychee is the most important, followed by
rambuttan, pineapple, and mixed fruit.  In lychee and rambuttan, Vietnamese brands such as
VEGETEXCO and Foli compete with numerous Thai brands such as Twin Elephants.  One
large supermarket in Ho Chi Minh City carried 10 Thai brands of canned lychee.  In most
stores, the imported brands appear to dominate, at least as measured by shelf space.
In pineapple, VEGETEXCO and Tuyen Ky brands are the most important, with little import
competition.  In mixed fruit, the Ligo brand, containing fruit from the United States and South
Africa, dominates with no local competition. 
Fruit preserves (jam) is available only in the medium and large food stores, suggesting that the
demand is limited to high-income households.  The main brands are from Holland and Spain,
with some competition from a less expensive Thai product sold under the Best Foods brand.  
There are two Vietnamese brands of canned fruit juice, Wonderfarm and Nature, one or both
of which are available in most medium-sized and large stores.  Each produces juices from 4-5
fruits, as well as coffee and herbal drinks.  In the supermarkets, one can find Taiwanese herbal
drinks and “fruit teas”, but these are less widely available. 
In canned vegetables, the most widely available products are mushrooms, baby corn, peas,
and sweet corn.  In mushrooms and baby corn, local brands such as VEGETEXCO, Tuyen Ky,
and Topwell appear to be the most important.  Canned peas and corn are primarily imported
from the United States under the Crystal brand.  Other vegetables such as green beans and
mixed vegetables, are available only in the larger supermarkets and are imported. 
Pickled vegetables are not common in smaller stores, but one large supermarket had a wide
range of pickled vegetables produced by a number of Vietnamese companies.  Frozen
vegetables are not sold in Viet Nam, even in the larger supermarkets.  
4.4.2. Export demand for fruits and vegetables 
More than the other three food sectors in this report, the fruit and vegetable industry was
severely affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the shift from central planning to a
market economy.  As one of the few tropical countries within the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA), Viet Nam was an important supplier of off-season vegetables and tropical
fruits to the Soviet Union and eastern Europe.  In 1985, Viet Nam exported almost 12
thousand tons of fresh bananas and 3.5 thousand tons of fresh pineapple, but these exports
had fallen to one third of this level by 1990 (GSO, 1996, p 9).  In the late 1980s, the Tan Binh
Foodstuff Export Company (part of VEGETEXCO) exported 7 thousand tons of canned and
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frozen produce to the east bloc through government-to-government contracts.  In 1990-91,
these markets virtually disappeared and the company “lost” two years finding new export
markets.  Only in the last few years have they established new markets for their goods in
Japan, Taiwan, and the United States.  
These patterns are reflected at the national level in Table 4.7, which shows a sharp decline in
fruit and vegetable exports in 1991, a long trough, and then a recovery starting in 1995.  The
recovery has been rapid and 1997 exports were US$ 140 million, 170 percent above the 1985
level.  Data from the Food and Agriculture Organization, shown in Table 4.8, do not show a
sharp drop in exports but confirm that growth has accelerated in the past few years. 
Differences between the two sets of figures may be related to differences in the definition of
fruits and vegetables.  
Detailed information on the composition of fruit and vegetable exports is not available, but it
appears there is a trend toward higher-valued and more diversified fruit and vegetable exports. 
According to FAO statistics, in 1985 dry beans and canned fruit (largely pineapple)
represented two thirds of the value of fruit and vegetable exports.   During the 1980s, the
average value of fruit and vegetable exports ranged from US$ 250 to US$ 390 per ton during
the 1980s, averaging US$ 323 per ton for the decade (see Table 4.8).  By contrast, 1996
exports include dry beans, onions, fresh mushrooms, canned mushrooms, bananas, mangoes,
and canned pineapple, none of which account for more than 10 percent of the total value. 
Furthermore, starting in 1991 Viet Nam began to export higher value fruits and vegetables. 
The average value of fruit and vegetable exports over 1990-1996 was US$ 507 per ton, 57
percent higher than the average value during the 1980s.  
Although VEGETEXCO continues to try to revive canned pineapple exports to the east bloc,
newer smaller competitors have been opening markets in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore.  In addition, interviews with processors give the impression that much of the new
fruits and vegetable exports to Asia are fresh and frozen goods rather than canned.  
4.5. PROSPECTS AND POLICY ISSUES
4.5.1. Prospects for the domestic market
As mentioned above, analysis of household survey data indicates that the income elasticity of
fruits and vegetables is close to 1.  This implies that as incomes rise, the per capita demand
for fruits and vegetables should rise at roughly the same rate.  Given the budget share of food
falls with higher incomes, this means that an increasing portion of the food budget of
Vietnamese households will be spent on fruits and vegetables.  
In 1993, a World Bank report noted that “there is as yet almost no internal market for canned
or frozen vegetables and only a luxury market for canned fruit”.  This may still be true, but one
suspects that the domestic market for canned goods has increased.  Five years later, canned
fruit can now be found in even the smaller retail food outlets in the cities, and canned
vegetables are not uncommon in such stores.  Pineapple, lychee, and baby corn are some of
the more common canned products in food stores.  Nonetheless, given the general preference
for fresh ingredients in Vietnamese cooking, it seems that the domestic demand for canned
fruits and vegetables will grow slowly.
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4.5.2. Prospects for export markets
Given the high transportation costs of fruits and vegetables, either in fresh or processed form,
fruit and vegetable exporters are only successful when they have some advantage over
domestic producer in the importing country.  Three types of advantages have been identified
(Jaffee, 1992): 
C One type of advantage is lower costs of production of the exported product.  In
principle, this could be lower costs of processing or lower costs of commodity
production.  In practice, because the raw material represents a large share of the total
cost, the exporter must be a lower cost producer of the commodity.  In a study of
successful agricultural export industries, five of the six fruit and vegetable cases were
based at least in part on lower costs of commodity production.  Lower processing costs
was not seen to be an advantage in any of the six cases.  
C A second type of advantage for fresh fruit and vegetable exporters is supply during the
off-season.  For example, fruit and vegetable exporters in Chile, South Africa, and New
Zealand have taken advantage of their ability to ship fresh products to the large
markets in the northern hemisphere (see Box 4.1).  In addition, tropical countries such
as Kenya and Mexico have made use of their warmer climates to ship fruits and
vegetables north during the winter (see Box 4.2).
C A third type is to provide a differentiated product or service associated with the product. 
For example, Mexican tomato producers were able to provide vine-ripened tomatoes to
the US market, which were preferred by consumers to the artificially ripened variety
produced domestically.  The provision of tropical fruits to temperate climate countries is
another example.  Other exporters may gain an advantage by being able to supply a
broad range of fruits and vegetables or in establishing a more economical method of
shipping.
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Box 4.1: Chile fruit exports
Chile has become an important supplier of temperate fruits, primarily table grapes and
apples, to North America.  Exports took off in the mid-1970s following devaluation, trade
liberalization, and other economic reforms.  Fresh temperate fruit exports have risen from
less than 50 thousand tons in 1974 to almost 900 thousand tons in 1989, generating over
US$ 700 million in export revenue (Jaffee, 1992).  Currently, fruit and vegetable exports
from Chile are worth US$ 1.6 billion per year, of which table grapes represent US$ 429
million (FAO Agrostat). 
Trade policy reform provided the initial stimulus for the fruit export industry.  Its growth was
sustained by a number of other factors, however.  First, the labor costs in Chile are
significantly lower than those of other southern hemisphere fruit exporters such as New
Zealand and Australia.  Second, improvements in quality and yield have been made
possible by the large number of Chileans who have obtained graduate degrees at
universities in California, bringing improved methods and technology back to Chile when
they returned.  Over time, Chilean universities and Fundacion Chile, a semi-public institution,
have developed local capacity to train agricultural scientists.  Agricultural research has not
only increased yields, but it has introduced new varieties that extend the season over which
Chile can export fresh fruit.  Third, banking sector reforms in the 1970s allowed a 30-fold
increase in the disbursement of long-term credit over the period 1974-80.  
Although Chile's initial growth has been based on the grape and apple exports to North
America, it is now diversifying into other markets, such as Europe and the Middle East, and
into other temperate fruits.  For example, apple and grape exports represented two thirds of
fruit and vegetable exports in 1985 but only 42 percent by 1996. 
Fruit production in Chile involves a large number of medium and large-scale growers. 
According to Jaffee (1992), the sector employs over 10 percent of the active labor force. 
Growers are organized in voluntary producer associations which facilitate the dissemination
of new seed and methods.  Coordination between growers and exporters is often
maintained through the use of production contracts.  Agricultural research is carried out by
pubic universities and Fundacion Chile.  The government supports the fruit industry by
providing information about export markets and trade policy in other countries, by organizing
and participating in trade fairs, and by providing product inspection and certification
services.  The government has also provided subsidies for irrigation development and
packing and processing facilities, but in general, it has adopted a policy of minimal
intervention in direct production and marketing activities, focusing its efforts on facilitating
market development.
The example of Chilean fruit exports demonstrates that, while comparative advantage based
on climate and cost of production are generally a necessary foundation for agricultural
exports, they are not sufficient.  Appropriate macroeconomic policy, research, and technical
skills are necessary to adapt to changing markets and meet quality standards, particularly in
the fresh fruit and vegetable export market.
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Box 4.2: Kenyan Fresh Vegetable Exports
Kenya has become an important supplier of fresh vegetables to the European market. 
These exports have grown from less than 2 thousand tons in 1970 to over 20 thousand tons
in the late 1980s (Jaffee, 1992).  Today, fruit and vegetable exports generate US$ 150
million per year in foreign exchange revenue (FAO, Agrostat).  
In the 1960s, Kenyan vegetable growers supplied lower-value less pershable vegetables
such as potatoes and onions to the domestic and regional market and higher-quality
vegetables to the European settler population and growing tourist industry.  In the 1970s,
fresh vegetable exports from Kenya to Europe began to take off.  Kenya became a leading
supplier to Europe for sweet peppers, courgettes, green beans, and a variety of specialty
vegetables catering to the Asian immigrant community (chilies, okra, etc.).  Several factors
contributed to this to growth.  First, the tourism industry resulted in a higher frequency of
direct air carrier service with Europe.  Second, the low labor costs made Kenya competitive
with European producers.  Third, its equatorial location and high-altitude production areas
made it possible to supply a wide variety of vegetables throughout the year.  Fourth, trade
was facilitated by business and family links between south Asian traders in Kenya and
Asian importers in the United Kingdom. 
Even after establishing itself as a leading “niche” producer of specialty vegetables, Kenya
was not immune from competition.  In the 1980s, Kenya lost its European market for
peppers and courgettes to Mediterranean suppliers.  It was able to offset this loss, however,
by expanding its exports of fresh green beans to Europe.
Vegetable production was initially carried out by larger farmers.  Over time, production
shifted to thousands of small farmers, many of whom grow vegetables on contract,
receiving seed, inputs, and technical assistance from the buyer-exporter.  The government
facilitated the growth of the industry by providing market information, quality inspection
services, and cold storage facilities at the airport.  It also controlled air freight rates,
although this was not a major factor in Kenya's cost competitiveness.   It was not involved in
production or marketing of vegetables, and export promotion played only a minor role (see
Jaffee, 1992 for more details). 
This case study demonstrates the potential of creating a niche as a supplier of a wide
variety of fresh vegetables to high-income markets.  It also shows that even a high-quality
specialty-good exporter is subject to competition from other suppliers.  There are no safe,
permanent export markets, but adaptability and flexibility in production and management
are critical skills for dealing with this uncertainty. 
Viet Nam should be able to export initially on the basis of its lower costs of production (related
to lower wages and land values) for export to high-wage markets such as Europe, North
America, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore.  In addition, Viet Nam has
climate-based advantages for exporting fruits and vegetables.  On the one hand, Viet Nam can
supply tropical fruits (processed or fresh) and fresh vegetables during the winter to temperate
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markets such as Europe, Russia, Japan, and North America.  On the other hand, it can supply
temperate vegetables produced in the Central Highlands and Northern Uplands to tropical
markets.  
The development of the third type of advantage will take more time and experience with
international markets.  Jaffee (1991) notes that agricultural exporters often start as low-cost
commodity exporters and later, building on this experience, become producers of differentiated
or value-added products for niche markets.  Thus, there is not a question of “choosing” a low-
cost based strategy or a high-value differentiated product strategy; rather, the experience and
reputation established as reliable low-cost supplier allows the evolution of differentiated
product exports. Some of the main obstacles faced by the fruit and vegetable processing
industry include problems with product quality, dispersed production, financial constraints in
traditional markets of the former east bloc, and reduced export demand associated with the
Asian currency crisis.  
4.5.3. Quality issues
Under the old system, exports were arranged by government-to-government contracts and
product quality was rarely an issue.  Fruit and vegetable processor-exporters became
accustomed to the idea that whatever was produced would be exported, regardless of quality. 
With the new market orientation of domestic and international trade, fruit and vegetables
processor-exporters have had to raise quality standards in order to compete.  
Product quality is a function of varieties, production methods, transportation, and processing. 
Nonetheless, fruit and vegetable processors are almost universal in their complaints about the
fruit and vegetables varieties in Viet Nam.  For example, in pineapples a major obstacle to
greater exports is that the main variety grown in Viet Nam, Queen Victoria, is small, low-
yielding, and more appropriate for fresh consumption than canning.  Although the taste is very
good, it is woodier and not as juicy as consumers in high-income markets have come to
expect.  Citrus and bananas are other examples in which the current varieties have served the
domestic market well, but their size, yield, and taste characteristics  prevent them from being
major export products.  Addressing this problem would require agricultural research to identify
appropriate varieties, credit for farmers to replace existing tree crops, and technical assistance
to improve cultivation methods.   
The quality of packaging and labeling is an issue as well.  Both of the joint ventures to produce
canned fruit juice have installed equipment to allow the labels to be printed directly on the can. 
In addition, the graphics and labels are of export quality.  Many of the canned fruit and
vegetable products, however, have labeling which appear dated and do not contribute to
international marketability. 
Processors also identify outdated canning technology as a constraint.  One example cited by
officials from VEGETEXCO is that the equipment in Viet Nam seals cans using a tin strip. 
Health concerns about this method are making it less acceptable in the industrialized
countries, calling for investment in equipment to seal cans with electric welding.  In general,
however, food processing enterprises (particularly state owned ones) appear too willing to
believe that larger and more modern machinery is the solution to what are really complex
institutional and marketing problems.  
  Although canned goods are not mentioned by name, they seem to be included in category17
#200500 described as “Other vegetables treated or stored by all without vinegar and acetic
acid; but not frozen”.
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4.5.4. Processed vs. fresh fruit and vegetable export 
It is often assumed that exporting processed commodities is more advantageous for a country
than exporting unprocessed commodities.  Thus, for example, some argue that exporting
canned or frozen fruits and vegetables will be more profitable than exporting fresh fruits and
vegetables because of its higher value added.  There are two flaws with this argument.
First, although the gross revenue from exporting processed goods is generally greater than
that of exporting unprocessed goods, the profitability of processing a commodity is determined
by a comparison of the additional revenue and the additional cost of processing.  Since the
difference in the world price of unprocessed and processed goods is closely related to the cost
of processing in competing countries, the question is whether the exporting country can
process the commodity at a lower cost than competing countries can.  It is not possible to
answer this question in general; rather it can only be answered on a case-by-case basis after
careful cost-benefit analysis.  
Second, fresh fruits and vegetables have a high value on world markets, sometimes even
higher than some types of processed fruits and vegetables.  For example, Chile is an important
exporter of fresh table grapes and apples (see Box 4.2).  The unit value of these two exports in
1996 was US$ 836 per ton and US$ 504 per ton, respectively.  By comparison, the unit value
of canned pineapple exports is US$ 677 per ton.  The explanation is that exporting fresh fruits
and vegetables is an operation requiring careful timing of harvest, packaging, cold storage, air
freight, and marketing.  Exporters need skills to deal with the risk of 
4.5.5. Effect of trade policy
The effect of joining the Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) will be to lower the barriers for
Vietnamese products in the other countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), as well as lowering the barriers in Viet Nam to products from those countries.  The
effect of this policy depends on the current import restrictions and the degree to which they will
be reduced.  Import restrictions can be classified into two groups: tariff barriers and non-tariff
barriers.  
C Tariff barriers for fruit and vegetable products vary between 20 and 40 percent.  As
shown in Table 4.9, the import tariff on most fresh and dried vegetables is 20 percent,
while the tariffs on all fresh and dried fruit is 30 percent.  Table 4.10 shows that the
tariff rates for pickled and canned fruits and vegetables have tariff rates of 40 percent.17
C Non-tariff barriers consist of a system of import permits and import quotas that limit the
import of goods already produced in the country.  According to an official at
VEGETEXCO, which is involved in imports as well as exports, the non-tariff barriers
have been a more important barrier than the tariffs.   
  The exempted goods are petrol and oil, fertilizer, construction steel, cement, paper,18
construction glass, sugar, and liquor. 
  One discrepancy is that the official reported that the quotas were removed in 1997, but the19
decree is dated January 1998.  Either a separate decision was made earlier for fruits and
vegetables, or the implementation of the quota was relaxed in 1997 in anticipation of the policy
change. 
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In an important but relatively unpublicized move, the government has issued a decision to
drastically reduce non-tariff import barriers.  Except for a specified list of goods, the decision18
states that 
Enterprises that have been granted a license to export or import a particular good shall
be allowed to import such goods depending on their own demand and shall pay import
duties in accordance with existing laws.  Quota and permission on import of consumer
goods is hereby abolished...  (Decision No. 11/1998/QD-TTg of 23 January 1998)
An official at one of the VEGETEXCO subsidiaries noted that earlier their main competition
was from other domestic canners because of the import quotas.  Now, with the quotas
eliminated, the company faces more competition from imported canned fruits and vegetables,
particularly from Thailand.19
As mentioned earlier, imported goods represent a substantial share of the canned fruits and
vegetable products in local retail outlets.  Whether or not these goods are smuggled into the
country, the removal of import tariffs will increase the market share of foreign canners in
Vietnamese markets.  If the imported goods are entering officially and paying the 40 percent
tariff, then eliminating the tariff will sharply reduce domestic prices of canned goods.  If the
imported goods are entering illegally, the effect may be less dramatic but we would still expect
an increased volume of imports and lower domestic prices.  This is because smuggling
involves additional risks, such as confiscation, and additional costs, such as those associated
with shipping goods in small lots to avoid detection.  
This policy may be behind the reported increases in imported fresh fruit in Ho Chi Minh City in
recent months.  According to press reports, about 7000 tons of fruit was imported in all of
1997, but 2500 tons was imported in the first three months of 1998.  Although imported fresh
fruit used to be rare at the city market, it now accounts for roughly half of the fruit sold there,
according to press reports.  The market offers a wide variety of imported fruit including
Chinese apples, pears, citrus, grapes, and plum form Thailand, Singapore, and Australia  (Viet
Nam News, 20 April 1998).  
4.5.6. Effect of exchange rates
The Asian currency crisis is putting pressure on the dong in two ways.  First, capital inflows to
Viet Nam have been slowed, partly due to a loss of confidence in the region among investors
and partly due to domestic problems of Asian investors, particularly those from South Korea. 
With smaller capital inflows, the availability of foreign currency in Viet Nam is tighter, putting
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upward pressure on the exchange rate.  Second, the devaluation of other currencies, notably
those of Thailand and Indonesia, make it more difficult for Vietnamese exports to compete
against exports from those countries.  
In addition, it is possible that the Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) will put pressure on the
Vietnamese dong.  AFTA will probably raise imports from ASEAN countries to Viet Nam, as
well as stimulating Vietnamese exports to ASEAN members.  If Viet Nam’s trade barriers are
higher than those of the other ASEAN countries, then trade liberalization may worsen the trade
deficit, possibly resulting in devaluation.  Thus, it is worth examining the effect of devaluation
on fruit and vegetable processing.
On the one hand, devaluation would alleviate some of the pressure on fruit and vegetable
processors caused by imported goods.  For example, 10 percent devaluation would cause the
Vietnamese dong price of Thai oranges to rise by 10 percent (assuming that Thai exporters
maintain a constant margin).  This would make it easier for local citrus producers to compete. 
On the other hand, devaluation would raise the price of imported machinery and inputs,
making it more difficult to replace and upgrade machinery.  The net result of these two effects
is complex, but a first approximation can be obtained by comparing the share of costs going to
imported goods and the share of output that is exported.
In general, it is safe to say that the fresh fruit and vegetable sector would benefit from
devaluation.  Producers for the domestic market would face less competition from imports, and
exporters would receive higher dong prices for their sales.  Furthermore, the costs of
machinery and imported goods is a small part of their costs.
The canning industry is more vulnerable to devaluation.  Although it is more dependent on
imported machinery, capital costs are a very small portion of total costs.  More important is
their dependence on cans.  Because cans are made with imported metal, their price will rise
with a devaluation.  Cans are a relatively large component of costs of canned fruits and
vegetables.  As mentioned earlier, in canned pineapple production, cans represent almost 40
percent of the costs of production.  
At the same time, devaluation helps canneries on the revenue side.  A company such as the
Tan Binh Foodstuffs Export Company (a branch of VEGETEXCO), for which exports make up
95 percent of sales and for which imports make up less than 50 percent of costs, will generally
benefit from devaluation.  Since export revenue exceeds the cost of the cans, the net effect of
devaluation would be positive.  A canner that produces for the domestic market will receive
more protection from imported cans, since the latter are made more expensive by the
devaluation.  Thus, although the result is less assured than for fresh fruit and vegetable
producers, fruit and vegetable canners should also benefit from devaluation.
4.6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The fruit and vegetable export processing subsector is the least developed of the four
subsectors.  This is partly because, unlike the other three commodities, fruits and vegetables
do not need to be processed (transformed) in order to be edible.  Furthermore, virtually all of
the domestic market and some of the export market is for fresh fruits and vegetables. 
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Furthermore, fruit and vegetables exports are small compared to rice, coffee, and seafood
exports.
More than the other export food processing sectors, fruit and vegetable export processors
were adversely affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union than the other three subsectors. 
Rice was not an export crop in the 1980s.  Similarly, coffee exports were minimal in the mid-
1980s and have grown during the economic reform process.  Seafood exports were large
during the 1980s, but even then they were oriented toward Japan and other market
economies.  
Fruit and vegetable processors are recovering by seeking new markets and developing new
products.  The new markets include Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and to a lesser
degree the United States and other southeast Asian nations.  The traditional exports of dry
beans, bananas and pineapples have declined, while a variety of fresh and canned products.  
The average value of fruit and vegetable exports has been 57 percent higher during the 1990s
than it was in the 1980.  This is the result of the economic reforms that have provided
incentives for smaller private and provincial processor-exporters to seek out high-value
markets.  
The subsector is overly focused on canned fruits and vegetables, in spite of the fact that the
more rapidly growing markets are in fresh fruits and vegetables.   Too often the assumption is
that exporting canned and frozen fruits and vegetables is more profitable and beneficial for the
economy than exports of fresh fruits and vegetables.  But demand growth is higher in fresh
produce and, because of the skills required to market fresh produce the returns can be high. 
Some of the main opportunities in fresh fruit and vegetable exports are temperate fruits and
vegetables for Hong Kong and Singapore, and tropical fruits for Japan, Taiwan, South Korea,
and North America.  These patterns take advantage of the range of climatic conditions in Viet
Nam,
One of the main constraints on the fruit and vegetable export processing sector is the lack of
varieties that are suitable for processing and/or export.  For example, pineapple processors
consistently noted that the Queen Victoria variety grown in Viet Nam is too small and not juicy
enough for international markets.
The government should expand its investment in research to select and develop suitable
varieties of fruit and vegetable for domestic consumption and for export.  Citrus, pineapple,
and banana are some of the more obvious examples, but nearly every product would benefit
from the introduction of new varieties with higher yields and/or characteristics desired by
importing countries.
The government should facilitate the collection and dissemination of information about export
markets, particularly standards, health restrictions, prices, and demand patterns.  This would
make it easier for Vietnamese processors and exporters to become informed about foreign
markets and identify opportunities.  
The government should facilitate the formation of an association of fruit and vegetable product
exporters.  As mentioned earlier, the association should be voluntary and open to all interested
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parties.  It should not be involved in setting terms for dealing with farmers or with importers, but
rather should focus on information exchange, the identification of ways the government can
support the subsector, and assistance to the government in the establishment of grades and
certification.
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Table 4.1 Trends in fruit area
Year Citrus Banana Pineapple Mango Other fruit Total
Planted area (1000 hectares)
1985 12.7 33.1 202.5
1990 14.5 88.3 38.9 16.4 119.6 277.7
1995 59.5 91.8 24.0 21.1 150.0 346.4
Annual 16.7% 0.8% -3.2% 5.2% 4.6% 5.5%
growth
Percentage of total fruit area
1985 6.3% 16.3% 100.0%
1990 5.2% 31.8% 14.0% 5.9% 43.1% 100.0%
1995 17.2% 26.5% 6.9% 6.1% 43.3% 100.0%
Source: General Statistics Office, 1996, p. 109, 191, 197, 203, and 209.
Table 4.2 Trends in fruit and vegetable production (000 tons)
Year Citrus Banana Pineapple Mango Vegetables
1985 99.3 363.0 2,605.2
1986 112.0 374.9 2,938.1
1987 103.0 403.6 3,014.2
1988 103.1 420.5 2,909.1
1989 101.0 458.5 3,152.3
1990 119.2 1,221.4 467.9 173.0 3,224.9
1991 121.1 1,285.8 420.2 139.9 3,213.7
1992 160.1 1,365.5 264.2 112.1 3,304.9
1993 249.7 1,397.7 257.5 119.2 3,484.9
1994 285.6 1,375.1 235.0 135.5 3,783.8
1995 379.4 1,282.2 184.8 152.5 4,145.6
1996
Annual growth 14.3% 1.0% -6.5% -2.5% 4.8%
Source: General Statistics Office, 1996, p. 109, 191, 197, 203, and 209.
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Table 4.3 Geographic distribution of fruit and vegetable production in 1995 (000 tons)
Region Vegetables Citrus Banana Pineappl Mango 
e 
North Uplands 635 25 124 7 4
Red River Delta 1,200 24 270 16 0
North Central Coast 336 23 90 19 0
South Central Coast 230 22 128 9 24
Central Highlands 282 0 21 1 1
Southeast 512 3 325 1 22
Mekong River Delta 950 301 323 131 101
Viet Nam 4,146 379 1,282 185 153
Percentage of national production
North Uplands 15.3% 6.6% 9.7% 3.8% 2.6%
Red River Delta 28.9% 6.3% 21.1% 8.6% 0.0%
North Central Coast 8.1% 6.1% 7.0% 10.3% 0.0%
South Central Coast 5.5% 5.8% 10.0% 4.9% 15.7%
Central Highlands 6.8% 0.0% 1.6% 0.5% 0.7%
Southeast 12.3% 0.8% 25.4% 0.5% 14.4%
Mekong River Delta 22.9% 79.4% 25.2% 70.8% 66.0%
Viet Nam 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: General Statistics Office, 1996, p. 109, 191, 197, 203, and 209.
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Table 4.4 Trends in fruit and vegetable processing
Year Value (billion VND) Ratio of value added
to gross output
Gross output Value added
1991 74.1 12.8 17.3%
1992 101.3 17.4 17.2%
1993 156.7 26.9 17.2%
1994 181.1 31.1 17.2%
1995 262.6 44.6 17.0%
1996 300.6 51.1 17.0%
1997 331.3 56.3 17.0%
Annual growth 23.5% 23.2%
Source: General Statistics Office.  (Data obtained by DSI/MPI).
Table 4.5 Cost structure of fruit and vegetable processors
Item Proportion of all costs Proportion of costs other
than raw materials
Raw materials 71.9
Wages 10.2 36.3
Other labor income 2.1 1.8
Electricity 1.1 0.9
Fuel 2.4 2.1
Interest 2.0 1.8
Depreciation on capital 2.6 2.3
Taxes 1.2 1.1
Other 6.7 6.3
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: General Statistical Office.  Data for 1997.
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Table 4.6 Domestic demand for vegetables in Viet Nam
Household type Per capita Population Total consumption Percent of
consumption of (million) of vegetables total
vegetables (000 tons/year) demand
(kg/person/yr)
Average 52.1 75.0 3,906 100.0
Income group
  Poorest 20 % 46.1 15.0 691 17.7
  2 50.5 15.0 758 19.4
  3 53.3 15.0 799 20.5
  4 55.4 15.0 832 21.3
 Richest 20% 56.6 15.0 850 21.8
Region 
  North Uplands 65.5 12.8 835 21.4
  Red River Delta 74.2 15.0 1,112 28.5
  N. C. Coast 52.1 10.5 547 14.0
  S. C. Coast 39.0 8.3 322 8.2
  Central Highlands 49.1 3.0 147 3.8
  Southeast 46.9 9.0 422 10.8
  Mekong River Delta 34.4 16.5 568 14.5
Source: 1994 Household Survey (GSO, 1998, p. 847-850). 
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Table 4.7 Trend in fruit and vegetable exports
Year Fruit and vegetable Total exports Fruit and vegetables
exports (million US$) as a percentage of
(million US$) total exports
1990 52.3 2,404 2.2%
1991 33.2 2,087 1.6%
1992 32.3 2,581 1.3%
1993 23.6 2,985 0.8%
1994 20.8 4,054 0.5%
1995 56.1 5,449 1.0%
1996 110.0 7,256 1.5%
1997 140.0 8,700 1.6%
Annual growth 15.1% 20.2%
Source: General Statistics Office.  Data assembled by DSI/MPI.
87
Table 4.8 Trend in the unit value of fruit and vegetable exports
Year Volume Value Unit value
(thousand tons) (US$ million) (US$/ton)
1980 33.2 8.4 253.0
1981 44.7 17.6 393.7
1982 75.4 28.1 372.7
1983 51.2 19.0 371.1
1984 73.0 28.6 391.8
1985 104.6 35.5 339.4
1986 188.1 42.5 225.9
1987 167.4 44.5 265.8
1988 155.3 50.8 327.1
1989 139.8 40.6 290.4
1990 129.4 50.8 392.6
1991 81.4 41.2 506.1
1992 132.7 69.7 525.2
1993 117.5 55.7 474.0
1994 166.2 88.2 530.7
1995 179.6 99.3 552.9
1996 182.0 102.8 564.8
Average 103.3 31.6 323.1
in 1980s
Average 141.3 72.5 506.6
in 1990s
Source: Volume and value of fruit and vegetable exports from FAO, Agrostate database
(World Wide Web address: apps.fao.org/cgi-bin/nph-db.pl?subset=agriculture).  Unit
value calculated as value divided by volume.
Note: There are discrepancies between these data (from FAO) and the data presented in
Table 4.7 (from GSO).  This difference may be partly or entirely due to differences in
the definition of fruit and vegetable exports, such as whether or not cashews,
bananas, and canned goods are included.  
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Table 4.9 Import tariffs on fresh and dried fruits and vegetables
Code Description Import tariff
#070200 Fresh or frozen tomatoes 20%
#070300 Fresh or frozen bulb, onion, leek, garlic, etc. 20%
#070400 Fresh or frozen cabbage, kohlrabi, cauliflower, etc. 20%
#070500 Fresh or frozen salad, lettuce 20%
#070600 Fresh or frozen carrot, radish, and other edible tubers 20%
#070700 Fresh or frozen cucumber 20%
#070800 Fresh or frozen bean kinds 20%
#070900 Other fresh or frozen green vegetables 20%
#071000 Green vegetables (boiled or not), low frozen 20%
#071100 Contemporary treated vegetables not already eaten 20%
#071200 Dried vegetables, whole or bits, or powder 25%
#080300 Banana, fresh or dried 30%
#080400 Date-palm fruit, ananas, fig, Chinese pear, guava, 30%
mango, mangosteen; fresh or dried
#080500 Orange fruits, fresh or dried 30%
#080600 Fresh or dried grape 30%
#080700 Melon, watermelon, fresh papaya 30%
#080800 Fresh apple, pear 30%
#080900 Fresh apricot, peach, cherry, plum 30%
#081000 Other fresh fruits 30%
#081310-30 Dried apricot, red plum, and apple 30%
Source: Tariff rates promulgated in conjunction with Decree 54/CP of 28 August 1993, except
for last line which is from Decision No.848 TC/QD/TCT dated 1 November 1997.
Statistics Publishing House, 1997, p. 22-23, 472.
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Table 4.10 Import tariffs on fruits and vegetables products
Code Description Import tariff
#200100 Vegetables, fruits, nuts, and other edible plant parts 40%
treated or stored by acetic acid or vinegar
#200200 Tomatoes treated or stored by all without vinegar and 40%
acetic acid
#200300 Mushroom treated or stored by all without vinegar and 40%
acetic acid
#200400 Other vegetables treated or stored by all without vinegar 40%
and acetic acid low frozen
#200500 Other vegetables treated or stored by all without vinegar 40%
and acetic acid; but not frozen
#200600 Fruits, nuts, fruit shells, and other plant parts treated by 40%
sugar (extracted water, ice-frozen)
#200700 Confitures, fruit, agar-agar, sugar preserved fruits (of 40%
citrus fruits), fruit juices, filtered and concentrated, fruit
paste boiled, not or mixed sugar or other sweets
#200800 Fruits, edible plant parts stored treated by other ways, 40%
mixed or not sugar or other sweets, or alcohol; not
described elsewhere
#210320 Tomato mushroom sauces and other tomato sauces 40%
Source: Tariff rates promulgated in conjunction with Decree 54/CP of 28 August 1993, except
for last line which is from Decision No.848 TC/QD/TCT dated 1 November 1997.
Statistics Publishing House, 1997, p. 26-27, 472.
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5. SEAFOOD PROCESSING
The Vietnamese seafood subsector has grown rapidly: since 1985, the value of seafood output
has grown by an average of 5 percent per year.  The export performance of this sector has
been even more impressive, averaging 20 percent per year over the same period.  The value
of seafood exports reached US$ 776 million in 1997.  By comparison, rice exports in 1997
were around US$ 900 million.
For the purposes of this report, seafood is defined broadly as food derived from fish,
crustaceans, and other aquatic animals, whether from the ocean or from freshwater.  The
fisheries industry includes marine fisheries, marine (or coastal) aquaculture, freshwater
fisheries, and freshwater aquaculture.  Marine and freshwater fisheries are sometimes called
“capture fisheries” to distinguish them from aquaculture.
5.1. BACKGROUND
Unlike many of the export sectors, the seafood industry was not oriented toward supplying the
eastern bloc countries during the 1970s and 1980s.  Japan has been the main market for
Vietnamese seafood throughout this period and remains the most important outlet for seafood
exports today.  The seafood sector has, however, seen dramatic changes.  During the 1980s
and early 1990s, the only legal exporter of seafood was SEAPRODEX, a state-owned
enterprise (SOE) managed by the Ministry of Fisheries.  In the 1980, the government used
SEAPRODEX as an experiment in SOE reform.  Initially, SEAPRODEX was given greater
autonomy in its management and required to cover its own costs from the export revenue it
generated.  
In 1994, the reforms were extended by allowing other companies, private and SOE, to export
directly.  The number of exporters has grown to over 100 and a large number of new seafood
processors have entered the field.  Most of these new entrants have been provincial state
enterprises and private enterprises, particularly in the Mekong River Delta and the southern
coast.  The market share of SEAPRODEX in seafood exports has fallen sharply, reaching 17
percent in 1997.  The general impression among seafood processors is that the private sector
is growing faster than the SOE sector and that the competition for raw material has intensified
in the last several years.
5.2. SEAFOOD PRODUCTION AND MARKETING
5.2.1. Production trends 
Gross output of fisheries has risen from 0.82 million tons in 1986 to 1.6 million tons in 1997
(VEN, 1998).  This represents an annual growth rate of 6.2 percent, but even this figure
understates the growth in the economic importance of fisheries.  The value of exports has
increased almost eight fold since 1986, growing at 20 percent per year since that date.  Marine
capture fisheries account for about two third of the total volume, but the importance of
aquaculture is growing.  Fisheries researchers believe that marine capture fisheries may be
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close to the maximum sustainable yield, but aquaculture has the potential to continue its rapid
pace of expansion (ADB, 1996 and VEN, 1998).
5.2.2. Fisheries production
The national fishing fleet contains an estimated 93,600 boats.  About one third of these
(31,500) are not motorized.  These boats are used for near shore fishing using simple
technology and generating only modest returns for the fisherman.  The bulk of the fleet
(62,000 vessels) consist of larger motorized fishing boats, generally 10-20 meters long with 20-
40 hp inboard engines.  Only 100 vessels are equipped for deep-sea fishing.  These boats
have 500 hp engines and are often owned by state-owned enterprises.  The average boat and
engine size tends to be larger in the south than in the north.  About half of the fishing fleet is in
the South Central Coast, with Da Nang ranking as the largest marine fishing port (ADB, 1995,
p. 2-6).
The marine fisheries catch in 1995 was 929 million tons, compared to the estimated
maximum sustainable yield is 1.3 million tons per year.  The situation is not as favorable as
suggested by these figures, however.  To begin with, because of the small size of the majority
of the boats, much of the fishing activities are concentrated close to shore.  It is estimated that
86 percent of the catch comes from waters less than 30 m in depth.  In these areas, fishing
activity may be reaching or exceeding maximum sustainable yield.  Furthermore, the marine
catch is rising at 5 percent per year, so it may reach 1.3 million tons within five years.  
The marine fishing industry follows a distinct seasonal pattern.  In most regions, the main
fishing season occurs during the dry season (November to April), when fishing activity is
concentrated around the offshore islands.  During the rainy season, the boats move closer to
shore following as a number of species in their spawning migration.  The main species of fish
are tuna, bonito, sardine, mackerel, gizzard shad, and giant catfish.
There are also regional differences.  The marine fishing grounds of Viet Nam are usually
divided into four areas: the Tonkin Bay in the north, the central coast, the southeastern coast,
and the southwestern coast.  The Tonkin Bay fishing industry is relatively small, accounting for
just 13 percent of the marine fishing vessels and 12 percent of the annual catch.  The water is
less productive, and Vietnamese fishing boats face intense competition from Chinese and
Hong Kong boats.  The central coast boast the largest fishing fleet, with 50 percent of the
vessels, though it accounts for just 21 percent of the catch.  The continental shelf is very
narrow in this region, so the fishing industry tends to focus on large pelagic (deep sea) fish
rather than demersal (bottom-feeding) fish.  As in the north, fishing on the central coast is
disrupted annually by typhoons.
The southeast region is the most productive due to nutrients flowing from the Mekong River, a
wide continental shelf, and little international competition.  With just 16 percent of the vessels,
this region accounts for 43 percent of the catch.  The fishing boats in this region tend to be
somewhat larger and more powerful than those in the center and north.  The southwest region
involves fishing in the Gulf of Thailand, using ports in Kien Giang in the Mekong Delta.  It
accounts for 21 percent of the vessels and 23 percent of the catch (IFES, 1995).  
  One fish processor who does buy direct, does so by providing the credit, ice, fuel, and boat20
repair services needed by fishermen. 
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The output of aquaculture and inland fisheries was 409 thousand tons, representing about 31
percent of the total fisheries catch (see Table 5.1).  Inland fisheries are an important source
of income in some areas, but many of the main rivers are either overfished or environmentally
damaged.  The damage is related to the dyke systems that interfere with spawning patterns
and the run-off from agricultural chemicals.  Although statistics are hard to find, it appears that
inland fisheries produce less than aquaculture. 
Aquaculture production is complex and involves a variety of species and methods.  Coastal
aquaculture includes marine fish cages, pearl oyster production, lagoon-based extensive
aquaculture, brackishwater fishponds, and shrimp farming.  Near Danang, fish farmers buy
yellowtail fish fry from China, raise them in cages, and export the harvested fish to Japan.  In
the Mekong Delta, shrimp farms cover 200 thousand hectares and produce 80 thousand tons
of shrimp per year.  Freshwater fish culture is thought to produce 275 thousand tons of fish,
including 100 thousand tons from fishponds and 24 thousand tons from freshwater fish cages. 
There are an estimated 450 freshwater hatcheries producing 6 billion fish larvae and fish fry
each year.  The most common fish for freshwater aquaculture are the Chinese carp species
and the Indian carp species. 
5.2.3. Marketing channels
Given the numerous marketing channels for each type of fishery production, it is only possible
to provide the broad outlines here.  The inland fishery activity is mostly on a small scale, so
that the marketing is done through a local trader or directly by a member of the fisherman’s
family (often his wife).  Aquaculture activities are more likely to be commercial and sometimes
for export, most notably shrimp farming.  Normally, shrimp farmers sell to agents representing
wholesalers, who in turn sell to processors or processor/exporters.    
For the marine fishing industry, the first link in the marketing channel is the private trader.  The
relationships between the traders and fishermen are long-standing and complex, based on a
web of debts and obligations.  Traders provide credit to fishermen for ice, fuel, boat repairs,
and new equipment.  In exchange, the fishermen are bound to sell a portion of the catch to
that trader, sometimes at a fixed price.  The relationship need not be exclusive in that a given
fisherman may have relationships with more than one trader.  Traders sell to wholesalers or
one of their agents.  Unlike the traders who specialize in a set of fishermen and purchase a
variety of species, the wholesaler generally specializes in one product and perhaps one market
(e.g. restaurants, fish oil factories, export processing plants).  Seafood processors buy from
wholesalers and traders, but report that it is almost impossible to buy directly from fishermen
because of the fisherman-trader bond.  20
Perhaps 90 percent of the marine fisheries catch is consumed within Viet Nam, either in fresh
form, dried, or as fish sauce.  The remaining 10 percent is exported, usually in frozen form or
dried form.  Processors that export tend to be specialized in that area, selling 90-100 percent
of their output to other countries. 
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5.3. SEAFOOD PROCESSING
5.3.1. Structure of seafood processing sector 
As mentioned above, seafood processing plants tend to specialize in catering to either the
domestic market or the export market.  The ADB (1996: 4-14) estimates that there are more
than 350 processing plants producing fish sauce, fish paste, and dried fish for the domestic
market.  There are 40-50 fish sauce processing plants produce an estimated 150 million liters
of fish sauce.  Normally, the plants have capacities of 0.5-2 million liters, but some have
capacities of 6 million liters per year.  Dried fish production is often done on a small scale using
sun drying on simple racks.  Dried fish from the Mekong Delta is transported to fish sauce
plants in the north.
There are 214 seafood processors producing for the export market, although not all export
directly.  These processors are located in 33 provinces, primarily on the coast or in one of the
two main cities.  As shown in Table 5.4, Ho Chi Minh City has the largest number of seafood
processors serving the export market, with 51 processors or 24 percent of the total.   Other
provinces with large numbers of processors include Kanh Hoa (25), Ca Mau Bac Lieu (17), and
Ba Ria - Vung Tau (14).  These top four seafood processing areas account for half Viet Nam’s
seafood processors producing for the export market.  
Table 5.4 also shows the number and proportion of export seafood processors in each
province that were licensed to export to the European Union in late 1997.  Overall, 61 seafood
processors (28 percent) were licensed for export to the EU.  The proportion varies across
provinces, being highest in “Other Mekong Delta” provinces.  This category includes An Giang,
Tien Giang, Vinh Long, and Tra Vinh provinces.  The proportion of EU licensed processors is
50 percent in Hai Phong, Binh Dinh, and Can Tho.   
The same data is presented by region in Table 5.5.  This table highlights the concentration of
export-oriented seafood processors in the southern part of Viet Nam.  Fully 80 percent of the
processors and 91 percent of the EU-licensed processors are located in the three southern
regions.  
As of 1995, the proportion of state-owned export processors (including both central and
provincial) was 81 percent, the remaining 19 percent being private enterprises .  There are no
statistics on the proportion of production or exports generated by each type of processor.  On
the one hand, the state enterprises tend to be larger than the private ones, so we would
expect the SOEs share of output to be greater than 81 percent.  On the other hand, there is a
general perception among processors that the private sector is growing more rapidly than the
state sector.  
The largest seafood processor-exporter is SEAPRODEX.  Formed in 1978, SEAPRODEX
originally had responsibility for all seafood exports.  In the 1980s, it became one of the first
state-owned enterprises to be held responsible for covering its own expenses.  Its monopoly
on seafood exports was removed in 1994.  The number of seafood exporters rose quickly and
the market share of SEAPRODEX has declined to around 17 percent. 
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5.3.2. Processing margins
The processing margin for seafood varies depending on the product.  For frozen shrimp, the
cost of the raw material accounts for 80 percent of the value of the final product.  Labor and
depreciation are each roughly 10 percent in frozen shrimp processing.  Dried products vary
widely, but one company reports that raw materials represent 60 percent of the value of its
dried squid products.  Although the drying process is quite simple, laying the squid out to dry
and collecting them is a relatively labor-intensive process.  SEAPRODEX produces some
packaged consumer goods such as spring rolls for the Japanese market.  In this case, the raw
material costs are said to be just 50 percent of the ex-factory value of the final product.
These figures illustrate the importance of procurement skills for the competitiveness of
individual companies.  Small errors in purchasing can have large consequences in terms of the
profitability of seafood processing, particularly in the case of frozen shrimp production.  Indeed,
complaints about “excessive” competition for seafood raw material among processors were
almost universal among interviews with seafood processors.  
5.4. SEAFOOD CONSUMPTION
5.4.1. Domestic consumption
According to the 1994 GSO Household Survey, with a sample of 91 thousand households,
Vietnamese households consume an average 15 kg of fish and shrimp per person per year. 
Not surprisingly, consumption of these items rises with income.  Consumption of fish and
shrimp is 8.5 kg per capita among the poorest 20 percent of the households, rising to 21.4 kg
per capita among the richest 20 percent (see Table 5.7).  This pattern suggests that the
income elasticity of demand is close to 1.0 at low incomes but falls below that level at middle
and higher incomes.  
Fish and shrimp consumption show even greater variation across regions.  Households in the
South Central Coast and the Mekong Delta consume more than 20 kg per capita, while those
in the Northern Uplands and the Red River Delta consume less than 10 kg per capita.  This
presumably reflects regional differences in consumer preferences, prices, and availability.
By far the most commonly consumed processed seafood product is fish sauce.  According to
the 1994 Household Survey, the average consumption is 4.9 liters per capita.  Although
consumption rises somewhat with income, there is less variation with income than in the case
of fish and shrimp consumption.  The implication is that the income elasticity of demand for fish
sauce is lower than that of fish and shrimp demand.
Detailed information on the breakdown of seafood demand into different types (fresh, canned,
dried, frozen, etc.) is not available, but interviews with fishery industry participants and informal
visits to urban retail outlets suggests a number of patterns.  First, the bulk of seafood
consumption is undoubtedly in fresh form, being consumed near the place where it was
brought to land or harvested.  The inventory of retail food stores confirms that fish sauce is the
most important processed seafood product in the consumption basket of Vietnamese
households.  Fish sauce is sold in 750-1000 ml bottles in even the smallest retail food stores. 
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Furthermore, the importance of this product is reflected in both the shelf space allocated to it
and the large number of brands.  In one large supermarket, over 20 brands of fish sauce were
available.  All the brands were Vietnamese.
Another important processed seafood product is canned sardines, most commonly packed in
tomato sauce.  In this market, Vietnamese brands such as Saki, Sun-Up, and CANFOOCO
compete with Thai brands such as Three Lady Cooks and Pigeon, as well as other brands
from Indonesia, Taiwan, and Malaysia.  It appears that Vietnamese brands have a minority
position in this market.  The Three Lady Cooks brand, for example, can be found in almost any
retail food store and at sidewalk vending stands, whereas the Vietnamese brands are only
found in larger stores with a wider variety.  Canned tuna is a much smaller market than
sardines, but the competing brands are similar.  Canned fish and squid are even more rare,
being found only in the largest supermarkets. 
Frozen fish products are not available in small and medium food stores, but they are available
in supermarkets and in specialized seafood stores.  One fish store in Ho Chi Minh City had an
entire freezer full of about two dozen frozen seafood products produced including spring rolls
and various types of dumplings.  All the products were supplied by one company, Agrex
Saigon, a state-owned enterprise managed by the Ho Chi Minh City municipal government.  In
general, it seems likely that such prepared frozen foods are purchased only by high-income
urban households or for special events. 
  
5.4.2. Seafood export market 
Seafood exports from Viet Nam have shown remarkably high growth rates, sustained for more
than a decade.  As shown in Table 5.8, seafood exports have risen from US$ 90 million in
1985 to US$ 776 million in 1997, representing a 20 percent annual growth rate over the 12-
year period.  The table also shows that this growth is relatively broad based, with exports of
frozen shrimp, frozen squid, frozen fish, and dried products all growing at over 20 percent per
year over the period 1985-95.  Seafood exports account for 10-12 percent of total exports,
making seafood the third largest export after crude oil and rice.  
In the 1980s, SEAPRODEX had a legal monopoly over seafood exports.  In addition, Viet Nam
exported seafood to just three countries: Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.  Today, there are
over 100 exporters, and Vietnamese seafood is shipped to 28 countries.  Japan continues to
dominate the list of importers: in 1995, slightly more than half of Vietnamese seafood exports
were shipped to Japan.  Europe is a relatively new market for Vietnamese seafood.  Only
recently have Vietnamese seafood processors been licensed for export to the European
Union, passing strict hygiene standards.  The share of exports going to Europe may be
increasing: in 1997, Japan accounted for just 40 percent of Vietnamese seafood exports, while
exports to Europe represented 25 percent of the total.  
Seafood exports are dominated by frozen shrimp.  As shown in Table 5.9, frozen shrimp
represents 62 percent of the value and 52 percent of the volume of seafood exports.  Frozen
squid and fish represent 8 and 13 percent of the value of exports, respectively.  The
proportions of the different products demanded by different countries are relatively similar.  For
example, shrimp is the main item for almost all the main markets for Vietnamese seafood. 
One exception is Taiwan, which imports more fish than shrimp from Viet Nam.
  This survey was carried out in 1992-93 using a sample of 4800 households.  The income21
elasticity was estimated by regression the budget share of fish and seafood as a function of
total expenditure, local prices, and a variety of household characteristics.
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Data on export destinations for 1997 is available from SEAPRODEX, the largest seafood
exporter in Viet Nam.  As shown in Table 5.10, the exports of SEAPRODEX reflect the national
pattern, with Japan accounting for about half of exports.  This table also highlights the wide
variation in the unit value (average value per ton) of seafood exports.  As a general rule, unit
values are generally highest for exports to high-income countries.  SEAPRODEX exports to
the industrialized countries are generally above US$ 5,000 per ton.  
5.5. PROSPECTS AND POLICY ISSUES
5.5.1. Prospects for the domestic market
The most important determinants of food demand in the long run are income growth,
urbanization, and population growth.  Econometric analysis of demand patterns using the Viet
Nam Living Standards Survey suggests that the income elasticity of demand for seafood21
products is 1.05.  This implies that, other things being equal, the per capita domestic demand
on seafood can be expected to rise approximately at the rate of per capita income.  The
analysis also reveals that urban households consume somewhat less seafood than rural
households, presumably due to the proximity of the latter to sources of fresh seafood.  The
effect, however, is not large enough to make a noticeable difference, particularly given the
relatively low pace of urbanization in Viet Nam.  These results suggests that seafood demand
will follow the rate of population growth.  This rate is about 2 percent currently but is expected
to fall to close to 1.2-1.6 percent for the period 2005-2010.  
Although the per capita demand may not change much, we can expect the composition of
seafood demand to shift with higher incomes.  For example, we can expect a gradual shift
toward the more expensive types of seafood, including shrimp.  Currently, the demand for
frozen and semi-prepared seafood products is negligible.  As households freezer capacity
increases and as households change their shopping patterns to make purchases less
frequently, we would expect frozen seafood demand to rise, primarily in the largest cities. 
Furthermore, as incomes rise the convenience of semi-prepared items such as frozen spring
rolls and fish fillets will begin to outweigh the additional cost.  Given the very low base, this
process is expected to be gradual.
5.5.2. Prospects for export markets 
Japan is by far the largest market for fisheries products in the world, importing 3.3 million tons
worth almost $US 17 billion in 1994.  Only 2 percent of these imports come from Viet Nam,
suggesting that there is room for significant expansion provided that Viet Nam can compete
successfully with other suppliers.  The import demand from Japan appears to be stable,
showing neither growth nor contraction.  Seafood consumption is declining as a result of
“westernization” of food consumption patterns, including growing demand for bread, meat, and
dairy products.  This trend, however, is offset by declining fisheries production due to rising
labor costs and import competition.
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Japanese seafood consumers are considered very demanding and well informed.  They place
a high priority on cleanliness and hygiene and, for this reason, tend to prefer seafood caught
by Japanese fishing vessels.  Shrimp is the main product purchased from Viet Nam.  In this
market, Viet Nam represents less than 20 percent of Japan’s imports and competes with
Indonesia, Thailand, India, and China.  In Japan, fish is often consumed raw as sushi or
sashimi, importers place a premium on products that are fresh and completely free of bacterial
contamination.
Europe is a large and growing market for imported seafood.  Partly as a result of declining
domestic fisheries industries, the level of imports is rising.  The largest importers are Spain,
France, and Italy.   Current imports from Viet Nam are dominated by frozen shrimp, in part
because transportation costs are a smaller share of the high-valued products.  The
harmonization of seafood import requirements has benefitted seafood exporters such as Viet
Nam.  Although the licensing requirements for the European Union are strict, one approval
opens up the markets for the continent.  
The United States is also a very large market for seafood (imports are US$ 12 billion), a
market that Viet Nam has only started to exploit.  Seafood consumers in the United States are
considered less informed than those in Japan, since seafood has always played a smaller role
in US diets.  The demand for shrimp, the largest seafood import, tends to be in more
processed form, such as peeled and/or deveined.  With regard to fish, US consumers tend to
prefer fish that are white, bland, and have few bones. 
The main limitations on Vietnamese exports is meeting the sanitary requirements of the
importing countries and establishing a reputation with importers.  A major task of seafood
processors is to achieve certification to export to the large markets.  
5.5.3. Quality issues
In 1994, the National Fisheries Inspection Quality Assurance Center (NAFIQACEN) was
formed to establish standards, regulate seafood processors, and issue quality and health
certification to Vietnamese seafood processors.  NAFIQACEN was created in recognition of
the need for an independent body to regulate food quality and certify processors.  In doing so,
it reduces the transaction costs for importers by providing information about products they are
purchasing.  This is an example of a positive and constructive role for the government in
facilitating the economy in the new market mechanism.
Seafood inspection and regulations in all the industrialized countries are being revised in
accordance with a system called Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP).  HACCP is a
set of procedures for identifying, correcting, monitoring, and documenting possible sources of
contamination.  Once established, a HACCP system does not require much time but has been
shown effective in minimizing the risk of contamination.   Fisheries experts say that
Vietnamese legislation on seafood health and safety is sufficient, but the capacity to enforce
those regulations is weak. 
Importers have their own health and safety requirements, and they vary across importers.  In
Japan, the importer has primary responsibility for ensuring quality.  Generally, when working
with a new exporter, the importer will visit the processing plant, inspect the equipment, and
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examine the raw material available.  If these are acceptable, the importer negotiates a contract
and leaves a technician at the plant to monitor the processing.  Sometimes, a reference
sample of processed product is taken and later compared with the export shipment.  This
sample serves as a standard against which to compare the eventual shipment.  In subsequent
shipments, the importer reduces the level of monitoring.  Japanese importers are said to place
great weight on freshness, as determined by appearance, texture, and smell.  
Certification by the United States and by Europe tends to be based more on bacterial counts
and other scientific measures rather than smell and appearance.  The European Union (EU)
certifies a local organization (NAFIQACEN in this case) to monitor and certify local processing
plants following criteria set by the EU.  It may send EU inspectors to verify that certified plants
do indeed meet the required standards.  In early 1998, the EU announced that it would carry
out an inspection of Vietnamese seafood processors.  NAFIQACEN decertified a large number
of processors, apparently in order to protect its own reputation as a certifying agency.  This
has disrupted seafood exports to the EU, although it is hoped that many of these processors
will be recertified following the inspection.
The United States seafood quality is under the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).  The importer is held responsible for ensuring that the imported product meets FDA
health standards, subject to random inspections by the FDA.  A recent report by the General
Accounting Office (a U.S. government institute that evaluates the effectiveness of public
agencies) criticized the FDA for inspecting just 1.7 percent of shipments of imported seafood,
fruits, and vegetables.  The report argued that since imports now represent over half of the
seafood consumed in the United States, the FDA should be given authority and budget to
control the quality of imported food.  In particular, the report recommended that the FDA be
given the authority to require processors and exporters in other countries to adopt safe
practices for seafood, fruits, and vegetables shipped to the United States (Washington Post,
1998), 
5.5.4. Upgrading the seafood processing industry 
There are two areas where Vietnamese seafood processor need to upgrade their facilities and
skills: the improvement of hygienic conditions within the plant and the ability to produce value-
added products.  
In the area of plant hygiene, there are numerous steps.  First, there is a need for investment in
waste water treatment in the form of either settling ponds or filtration systems.  Second, the
surfaces in the plant need to be gradually converted to tile, stainless steel, and other surfaces
that can be cleaned more effectively.  Third, cleaning procedures themselves would be more
effective carried out with hot water under pressure rather than room-temperature tap water.  
Fourth, although all plants have a quality control section, the lack of laboratory supplies
hampers their ability to scientifically test samples.  Fifth, few seafood processing plants have
adequate facilities to chill raw material until processing.  And finally, the capacity of ice
production is below what is considered necessary by international standards.  
The second area of investment is in equipment and skills to produce so-called value-added
products.  This includes machinery for making fillets, spring rolls, dumplings, and other
consumer products.  This includes machinery for higher quality packaging. 
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It is not, however, the role of the government to provide these equipment out of the state
budget.  All of these are commercial investments that generate returns for the processor and
thus do not need to be subsidized.  The market incentives for installing health and safety
equipment comes from the advantages of certification for export to Japan, the EU, or the
United States.  Importers are in a better position than the government to help processors
decide the most cost-effective way to meet these requirements.  Similarly, investing in
machinery to produce consumer goods requires extensive information about the demands of
the market, the capacity of different machines, and the training necessary to operate them
efficiently.  All of these are more likely to come from a Japanese or Taiwanese importer than
from a planning official in Hanoi.  
5.5.5. Role of state-owned enterprises
There are about 200 seafood processors that produce for export.  As noted above, the
majority are state-owned enterprises, mostly owned by provincial People’s Committees.  This
pattern is the legacy of socialist central planning in which all medium- to large-scale
enterprises were managed by the state.  During the 1980s, SEAPRODEX had a monopoly of
seafood exports.  In the late 1980s, the state-owned seafood processors were allowed to
retain the foreign exchange they earned from exports.  Since the exchange rate was severely
overvalued, there was little incentive to sell the earnings back to the state.  Instead, the
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Box 5.1: Shrimp industry in China
By the 1970s, China’s marine shrimp resources were fully exploited at the same time that
world demand, and Asian demand in particular, was growing.  This created incentives for
private and public enterprises in China to invest in aquaculture shrimp production.  During
the 1980s, cultured shrimp production grew from less than 26 thousand tons to 200
thousand tons, while exports expanded from 22 thousand tons to 123 thousand tons.  
The government played a key role in starting the shrimp culture industry, creating a shrimp
SOE, providing low interest loans and tax benefits to producers and processors, and
creating a highly effective system of research and extension for aquaculture.  These policy
measures built on existing cost advantages related to China’s long coastline, low labor
costs, and an elaborate system of dykes that facilitates the creation of shrimp ponds.  On
the other hand, the relatively cool climate means that the growing season in much of China
is just 4-5 months.  The strongly seasonal production cycle creates a problem for
processors and exporters.  Although China has become a leading supplier of shrimp to the
United States and Japan, it is a low-quality producer of undifferentiated products, exporting
mainly 2-kg blocks of frozen shrimp. 
Of the 14 cases studies of successful expansion of a high-value agricultural commodity
studied by Jaffee (1992), the case of Chinese shrimp exports is the only one in which the
government took a leading role in direct production and marketing.  It is also one of the few
in which little progress has been made in moving to more differentiated value-added
product.  
earnings were used to import scarce consumer goods for resale.  This system was quite
profitable and generated a large increase in installed capacity among the state enterprises.  As
a result, there is a problem of over-capacity in the state-owned seafood processing sector.  
The fact that almost all the seafood processors are managed by the provincial authorities puts
a constraint on the development of the sector.  On the one hand, the management of the
processing enterprises is selected by the provincial People’s Committees.  In some cases, the
People’s Committees have brought in qualified managers from outside.  In other cases, the
managers are unqualified, having been selected on the basis of other criteria.  A related
problem is that, as a unit of the People’s Committee, these processors are often not able to
accumulate retained earnings for investment.  Instead, retained earnings are absorbed by the
People’s Committee.  This legal status also makes it difficult or impossible to obtain credit from
commercial banks.  As a result, the only source of capital for these enterprises is the People’s
Committee, that must approve and fund any capital spending by seafood processors.   
Seafood processors (both private and state) made a number of observations about the
differences between the two:
C The most common comment was that private enterprises are able to make decisions
more quickly.  State enterprises must get decisions approved by political authorities and
occasionally miss opportunities as a result of the delay.
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Box 5.2: Shrimp industry in Thailand
Like China, Thailand reached the maximum capacity of its marine shrimp resources in the
early 1970s.  Also like China, it benefitted from relatively low labor costs and a large
irrigated delta area where shrimp could be grown.  Mirroring the growth in Chinese shrimp
exports, Thai shrimp exports rose from less than 20 thousand tons to over 75 thousand tons
in the 1980s.  And finally, in Thailand (as in China), shrimp aquaculture was initially
characterized by low yields (under 300 kg/ha), but the adoption of larger varieties of shrimp
and more intensive management has resulted in yields of over 800 kg/ha (Jaffee, 1992).  
A major difference between the Chinese and Thai shrimp industries has been the role of the
government.  In Thailand, the government was not directly involved in production,
processing, and export.  Instead, it limited its involvement to aquaculture research and
extension, factory inspection and certification services, and some investment in cold storage
facilities.  The government also managed buffer stocks in an attempt to stabilize prices. 
Shrimp raising, processing, and export is carried out almost entirely by aquaculture farmers
and private enterprises.  
Another difference with China is that the Thai shrimp industry has developed a wide range
of value-added products for export, including cooked and peeled shrimp, peeled tempura,
battered and breaded shrimp, spring rolls, dumplings, and shrimp skewers.  These value-
added shrimp products are exported to Japan, the United States, and Europe.  According to
Jaffee (1992, p 97), “Thailand has developed the most diversified shrimp product mix and
market outlets of any of the Asian shrimp-exporting countries.”  It is tempting to conclude
that Thailand’s ability to diversify into value-added products is related to a more flexible
market-oriented processing and export industry.  
C State enterprises are less flexible in their labor management.  They are required by
statute to fill certain positions, regardless of the size of the enterprise.  Furthermore, it
is more difficult for state enterprises to lay off workers.  
C Another frequent comment was that a manager at a state enterprises must make a
profit on each transaction, at the risk of losing his job or (in extreme cases) being
arrested for misuse of state funds.  As a result, SOE managers may abrogate a
contract in order to avoid losing money.  By contrast, a private manager can decide to
lose money on one transaction if it is necessary to develop or maintain a reputation for
reliability.  In the long run, this is an advantage for private enterprises.
C Managers at state-owned enterprises argue that part of the profitability and success of
private processors is due to their ability to evade taxes and to smuggle products into
China.  By contrast, SOEs are required to obtain receipts for every purchase, even if
requiring a receipt means paying a higher price for the input (suppliers can more easily
avoid taxes if they do not provide an official “red receipt”.
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International experience suggests that private enterprises may be more likely to seek out and
take advantages of opportunities to export new products, particularly more differentiated
products with a higher value added.  The comparison of the shrimp industries in China and
Thailand illustrates this point (see Box 5.1 and 5.2).  
5.5.6. Effect of trade policy
Currently, there is a 20 percent import tariff on fish, crustaceans, and molluscs, whether live,
frozen, dried, or processed in any other way (Decree No. 82 of 13 December 1996, as cited in
Statistics Publishing House, 1997, p. 397).  Under the Asian Free Trade Agreement, this rate
would be reduced gradually toward zero.  In general, the seafood processing industry will not
be adversely affected by this import liberalization.  The existence of sizable exports of frozen
shrimp, frozen squid, and fish is a reliable sign that Viet Nam has a comparative advantage in
fisheries.  Furthermore, the perishability of unprocessed seafood products guarantees that
seafood processing will remain close to its source of raw material, that is in Viet Nam.  
To the extent that other southeast Asian countries reduce their import barriers, Vietnamese
seafood exports to some of its ASEAN neighbors could increase.  This effect is likely to be
limited, however, since many of the other members of ASEAN are already seafood exporters,
notably Thailand and Indonesia.  
There are two areas where import liberalization could erode the market share of Vietnamese
seafood processors.  The first area is canned seafood.  As noted above, Vietnamese seafood
canners already faces strong competition from Thailand and Indonesia in canned sardines and
tuna even within the country.  To the extent that these imports pay duties now and will pay less
under AFTA, consumers will benefit at the expense of domestic seafood canners.  It is worth
noting that domestic seafood canning is a relatively small portion of the demand for seafood in
Viet Nam.
The second area where import liberalization may allow increased import of processed seafood
is in specialty and convenience food.  Semi-prepared food, particularly that involving numerous
ingredients and some high-technology processing, may be imported more easily under the
AFTA.  The volumes will be quite small and concentrated in the larger cities.  Although seafood
processors may see this as a sign that import protection is needed, they should instead view it
as providing free information about the potential market for value-added products in the
domestic market.  
5.6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The seafood processing sector has grown rapidly on the basis of low wages, a long coastline,
and proximity to important markets in Asia, primarily Japan.  The adjustment of the seafood
subsector to the doi moi reforms was less painful than that of the fruits and vegetables
subsector because it was not closely tied to trade with the eastern bloc in the 1980s.  
The seafood processing sector is dependent on the continued availability of seafood at
reasonable prices.  Although Thailand has developed a tuna canning industry based on raw
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materials caught outside its waters, this is unusual.  In general, the success of the seafood 
processing industry is tied to the success of the fisheries sector, including aquaculture. 
The biggest threat to the subsector growth is the sustainability of marine seafood resources. 
Estimates of the maximum sustainable yield are not very accurate, but most studies agree that
Viet Nam is at or will soon arrive at the capacity of the coastal waters.  Spectacular collapses
of North Sea (Europe) and Grand Banks (North America) fish stocks demonstrate that under-
regulated fishing can result in the rapid disappearance of marine resources. 
Further growth in seafood production and exports will depend to an increasing extent on
aquaculture.  The process of switching to aquaculture as the basis of seafood processing and
export growth has already occurred in China and Thailand.  In both countries, the transition
was facilitated by strong support for aquaculture research and extension.  
The development of shrimp aquaculture is vulnerable to epidemic diseases.  A sizable
Taiwanese shrimp export subsector was completed undermined by problems related to
disease and pollution.  Smaller scale disease problems are already appearing in the
Vietnamese press.  
The government should increase its efforts to study and monitor the maximum sustainable
yield of different types of marine species and in different regions.  This information is vital in
order to design fishing regulations that protect the marine resources without unnecessarily
limiting the growth of the marine fisheries industry.
The government should strengthen its enforcement of existing regulations designed to protect
fishery resources.  Fisheries specialists believe that the current regulatory system is adequate,
given the limited information available, but that enforcement is weak and inconsistent. 
Although enforcement may be expensive, the costs are small relative to the value of the
resource being protected.
The government should increase its investment in research and extension in aquaculture.  At
least three areas should receive special attention.  First, shrimp yields are low by Thai and
Chinese standards and will need to be raised to maintain competitiveness.  Second, research
and extension efforts are needed in monitoring and controlling contagious diseases
(particularly in shrimp).  And third, the development of improved breeds would facilitate the
transition to a more aquaculture-based seafood subsector.
The government should facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on
seafood export markets, particularly in the area of health and safety regulations of importers. 
Health and safety regulations are tighter on seafood than any of the other three subsectors. 
Furthermore, the regulations vary widely from one importer to another.  Initially, information
could be collected and disseminated by a government institute, but eventually this function
should be taken over by a seafood exporters association.  
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Table 5.1 Trends in fishery production
Year Marine Aquaculture and Total fisheries Percent from
fisheries inland fisheries catch marine fisheries
(000 tons) (000 tons) (000 tons)
1986 570.5 234.9 805.4 70.8%
1987 611.8 242.2 854.0 71.6%
1988 630.6 233.1 863.7 73.0%
1989 626.7 247.1 873.8 71.7%
1990 641.5 300.8 942.3 68.1%
1991 699.4 341.0 1,040.4 67.2%
1992 696.6 356.1 1,052.7 66.2%
1993 798.1 368.0 1,166.1 68.4%
1994 890.0 397.2 1,287.2 69.1%
1995 928.9 408.8 1,337.7 69.4%
Annual growth 5.6% 6.4% 5.8% - -
Source: IFEP, 1997. 
Table 5.2 Geographic patterns in marine fisheries production
Region Percent of fishing Percent of fishing Percent of marine
vessels horsepower fisheries catch
North 13% 7% 12%
Central 50% 39% 21%
Southeast 16% 22% 43%
Southwest 21% 32% 23%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Source: IFEP, 1997, pages 27,29. 
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Table 5.3 Geographic patterns in inland fisheries and aquaculture
Region Potential Estimated area Used area as a 1995 production Share of total
area for used for percentage of of inland fisheries production
aquaculture aquaculture potential area and aquaculture
(000 ha) (000 ha) (000 tons) 
Northern Uplands 187.4 67.7 36.1% 24.1  5.9%
Red River Delta 145.7 62.4 42.8% 53.5 13.1%
N. C. Coast 101.5 32.9 32.4% 23.2 5.7%
S. C. Coast 119.9 15.9 13.3% 7.6 1.9%
Cent. Highlands 65.0 4.2 6.5% 5.6 1.4%
Southeast 140.5 61.5 43.8% 20.3 5.0%
Mekong Delta 619.0 301.4 48.7% 274.5 67.1%
Total 1,379.0 546.0 39.6% 408.8 100.0%
Source: Ministry of Fisheries, cited in IFEP, 1997, pages 35, 36. 
Table 5.4 Trends in seafood processing
Year Value (billion VND) Ratio of value added
to gross output
Gross output Value added
1991 1,514.9 248.4 16.4%
1992 2,070.1 335.4 16.2%
1993 3,202.1 518.7 16.2%
1994 3,701.4 599.6 16.2%
1995 5,365.3 858.4 16.0%
1996 6,143.1 982.9 16.0%
1997 6,770.9 1,083.3 16.0%
Annual growth 23.5% 23.0%
Source: General Statistics Office.  (Data obtained by DSI/MPI).
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Table 5.5 Geographic distribution of seafood export processing by province
Province Number of Percentage Number of Percentage of
companies of all seafood export seafood export
seafood processors with processors with
export EU certification EU certification
processors 
Quang Ninh 5 2.3% 1 20.0%
Hai Phong 6 2.8% 3 50.0%
Ha Noi 4 1.9% 0 0.0%
Other Red R. Delta 5 2.3% 1 20.0%
Thanh Hoa 7 3.3% 0 0.0%
Quang Tri 4 1.9% 0 0.0%
Thua Thien Hue 6 2.8% 2 33.3%
Other N.C. Coast 6 2.8% 2 33.3%
Da Nang 11 5.1% 4 36.4%
Kanh Hoa 25 11.7% 4 16.0%
Quang Ngai 4 1.9% 0 0.0%
Binh Dinh 4 1.9% 2 50.0%
Binh Thuan 4 1.9% 0 0.0%
Other S.C. Coast 6 2.8% 1 16.7%
Ba Ria - Vung Tau 14 6.5% 3 21.4%
Ho Chi Minh City 51 23.8% 18 35.3%
Dong Thap 4 1.9% 0 0.0%
Ben Tre 4 1.9% 0 0.0%
Can Tho 6 2.8% 3 50.0%
Kien Giang 10 4.7% 3 30.0%
Ca Mau - Bac Lieu 17 7.9% 6 35.3%
Other Mekong Delta 11 5.1% 8 72.7%
Total 214 100.0% 61 28.5%
Source: Calculated from data from the Ministry of Fisheries, SEAQIP project. 
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Table 5.6 Geographic distribution of seafood export processing by region
Region Number of Percentage Number of Percentage of
companies of all seafood export seafood export
seafood processors with processors with
export EU certification EU certification
processors 
Northern Uplands 5 2.3% 1 20.0%
Red River Delta 15 7.0% 4 26.7%
North Central Coast 23 10.7% 4 17.4%
South Central Coast 54 25.2% 11 20.4%
Southeast 65 30.4% 21 32.3%
Mekong River Delta 52 24.3% 20 38.5%
Total 214 100.0% 61 28.5%
Source: Calculated from data from the Ministry of Fisheries, SEAQIP project. 
Table 5.7 Largest seafood processor-exporters
Company Value of exports Percent of all
(million US$) seafood exports 
Ca Mau - Minh Ha Frozen Seafood PME Co. 53.2 6.9%
(CAMINEX)
Can Tho Animal Fishery Prod. PE Enterprise 42.5 5.5%
(CAFATEX)
FIMEX - Viet Nam 36.2 4.7%
Kim Anh Company Ltd. 30.5 3.9%
STAPIMEX 30.0 3.9%
An Giang Fishery Imp.-Exp. Company (AGIFISH) 26.3 3.4%
SEAPRODEX Exporter Centre 25.2 3.2%
Aquatex Products Trading Company (APT Co.) 22.9 3.0%
Special Aquatic Product Imp.-Exp. Co. (SEASPIMEX) 20.9 2.7%
Coastal Fisheries Development Corp. (COFIDEC) 20.3 2.6%
Others 468.0 60.3%
Total 776.0 100.0%
Source: Data from Ministry of Fisheries, SEAQIP Project.  
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Table 5.8 Cost structure of seafood processors
Item Proportion of all costs Proportion of costs other
than raw materials
Raw materials 80.0
Wages 4.3 21.3
Other labor income 1.9 1.6
Electricity 1.4 1.3
Fuel 0.6 0.5
Interest 1.9 1.7
Depreciation on capital 1.2 1.1
Taxes 2.5 2.3
Other 6.3 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: General Statistical Office.  Data for 1997.
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Table 5.9 Domestic demand for fish and shrimp in Viet Nam
Household type Per capita Population Total consumption Percent of
consumption of (million) of fish and shrimp total
fish and shrimp (000 tons/year) demand
(kg/person/yr)
Average 15.2 75.0 1,143 100.0
Income group
  Poorest 20 % 8.5 15.0 128 11.2
  2 13.0 15.0 194 17.0
  3 16.4 15.0 247 21.6
  4 18.8 15.0 283 24.7
 Richest 20% 21.4 15.0 320 28.0
Region 
  Northern Uplands 4.6 12.8 58 5.1
  Red River Delta 8.0 15.0 121 10.6
  N. C. Coast 13.0 10.5 136 11.9
  S. C. Coast 24.8 8.3 205 17.9
  Central Highlands 10.1 3.0 30 2.6
  Southeast 18.5 9.0 166 14.6
  Mekong River Delta 26.6 16.5 440 38.5
Source: 1994 Household Survey (GSO, 1998, p. 847-850). 
111
Table 5.10 Domestic demand for fish sauce in Viet Nam
Household type Per capita Population Total consumption Percent of
consumption of (million) of fish sauce total
fish sauce (million liters/year) demand
(liters/pers/year)
Average 4.9 75.0 369 100.0
Income group
  Poorest 20 % 3.4 15.0 50 13.7
  2 4.6 15.0 68 18.5
  3 5.3 15.0 79 21.5
  4 5.8 15.0 86 23.4
 Richest 20% 6.1 15.0 92 24.9
Region 
  Northern Uplands 2.9 12.8 37 10.0
  Red River Delta 4.7 15.0 70 19.0
  N. C. Coast 4.3 10.5 45 12.3
  S. C. Coast 6.1 8.3 50 13.7
  Central Highlands 4.4 3.0 13 3.6
  Southeast 5.3 9.0 48 12.9
  Mekong River Delta 7.1 16.5 117 31.7
Source: 1994 Household Survey (GSO, 1998, p. 847-850).
Note: Because it is difficult for household surveys to measure accurately the consumption
of condiments, these estimates may have a high margin of error. 
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Table 5.11 Trend in the composition of seafood exports
Year Volume (000 tons) Value
(mill. US$)
Frozen Frozen Frozen Dried Total
shrimp squid fish products
1985 8.5 0.7 0.9 2.3 12.4 90.0
1990 34.0 4.8 3.2 5.0 47.0 205.0
1991 40.0 4.5 10.9 5.1 60.5 262.2
1992 48.1 5.3 16.5 8.2 78.1 305.1
1993 55.4 7.1 23.1 9.2 94.8 368.4
1994 63.1 10.0 25.5 12.3 110.9 458.2
1995 66.5 11.3 31.4 18.5 127.7 550.6
1996 670.0
1997 776.0
Annual 22.8% 32.1% 42.6% 23.2% 26.3% 19.7%
growth
Source: Data for 1985-1995 from Ministry of Fisheries, cited in ADB (1996), Appendix H, p. 6. 
Figures for 1996 and 1997 from Viet Nam News (5 January 1998).  
Table 5.12 Trend in the value of seafood exports
Year Seafood Total exports Seafood exports as a
exports (million US$) percentage of total
(million US$) exports
1991 285.4 2,087 13.7%
1992 307.7 2,581 11.9%
1993 427.2 2,985 14.3%
1994 551.2 4,054 13.6%
1995 621.4 5,449 11.4%
1996 651.0 7,256 9.0%
1997 750.0 8,700 8.6%
Annual growth 17.5% 26.9%
Source: General Statistics Office, 1997.
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Table 5.13 Seafood exports by destination (1995)
Value (million US$) Percent of
total
Frozen shrimp Frozen squid Fish Total
Japan 183.7 33.7 20.9 285.7 51.9%
Europe 50.7 2.9 4.6 73.1 13.3%
Hong Kong 32.8 2.7 3.2 44.0 8.0%
Singapore 26.6 0.9 7.5 36.6 6.6%
Taiwan 4.2 0.3 6.2 13.2 2.4%
S Korea 5.6 2.0 2.6 11.8 2.1%
Others 35.6 2.9 28.8 86.2 15.7%
Total value 339.2 45.4 73.8 550.6 100.0%
Source: Ministry of Fisheries, cited in ADB (1996), Appendix H, p. 7.  Note that column
headings in original were in the wrong order and have been corrected here.
Table 5.14 Seafood exports by product (1995)
Volume Percent of Value Percent of Unit value
(000 tons) volume (million US$) value (US$/ton) 
Frozen 66.5 52.0% 339.2 61.6% 5,101
shrimp 
Frozen squid 11.3 8.8% 45.4 8.2% 4,018
Fish 31.4 24.6% 73.8 13.4% 2,350
Other 18.7 14.6% 92.2 16.7% 4,930
Total 127.9 100.0% 550.6 100.0% 4,305
Source: Ministry of Fisheries, cited in ADB (1996), Appendix H, p. 7.  Note that product
headings in original were in the wrong order and have been corrected here.
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Table 5.15 Exports and domestic sales by SEAPRODEX
Country Volume Value Percent of Percent of Average price
(tons) (000 US$) total exports total sales (US$/ton)
Japan 11,416 62,087 49.8% 47.2% 5,439
Hong Kong 2,021 10,231 8.2% 7.8% 5,062
United States 896 9,107 7.3% 6.9% 10,164
Singapore 593 3,205 2.6% 2.4% 5,405
Thailand 1,202 3,205 2.6% 2.4% 2,666
Holland 649 2,998 2.4% 2.3% 4,619
Belgium 548 2,861 2.3% 2.2% 5,221
Taiwan 794 2,733 2.2% 2.1% 3,442
Italy 1,065 2,023 1.6% 1.5% 1,900
Other 6,903 26,160 21.0% 19.9% 3,790
countries 
  Total exports 26,087 124,610 100.0% 94.7% 4,777
  Viet Nam 1,709 6,932 - - 5.3% 4,056
Total sales 27,796 131,542 - - 100.0% 4,732
Source: Data provided by SEAPRODEX. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1. Conclusions for the food processing sector
The competitiveness of food processing industry depends largely on quality and the cost of
production of the raw material.  For export-oriented food processing enterprises, the price of
the output is fixed by international prices.  At the same time, the price of raw materials typically
accounts for 70-90 percent of the cost of producing the exported product.  Thus, a small
change in the cost or the quality of the raw material will make a large difference in the ability of
the processor-exporter to compete with other suppliers on the world market.  The success of
the food processing sector hinges on the ability of farmers and fishermen to make continual
progress in productivity.  This implies a need for higher yields, more efficient use of inputs, and
reduction in post-harvest losses.  This message is reinforced by international experience:
cases of successful expansion of high-value agricultural commodities is almost always based,
at least in part, on lower costs of commodity production.  
The competitiveness of food processing in international markets is subject to rapid change.  
International experience provides numerous cases of countries that were major exporters, only
to lose their ability to compete in export markets some years later.  This may be due to rising
wage rates or land use patterns in the exporting country, the emergence of new competitors,
or shifts in demand patterns among importers.  Furthermore, this pattern is, if anything,
stronger among "niche" markets for differentiated high-value products.  Thus, it is not enough
to find a niche; countries must develop the ability to continuously seek new niches.  The food
processing sectors in countries like Thailand and Taiwan have succeeded mainly by being able
to respond quickly to changing market conditions (see Box 6.1).  
Most countries progress from exporting unprocessed, undifferentiated commodities toward
higher quality, differentiated products.  This process is facilitated by a competitive market-
oriented (private) food processing sector.  The vast majority of the dramatic "success stories"
in exports of high-value agricultural commodities were characterized by private producers and
processor-exporters, facilitated by strong public support in the areas of research, extension,
inspection and certification, and dissemination of information (see Jaffee, 1992).  A
comparison of the shrimp industries in China and Thailand illustrates this point.  Similarly, in
each of the four subsectors examined in this report, high-value niche exports have grown with
the liberalization of the economy and the emergence of private and provincial enterprises
operating on a commercial basis. 
In Viet Nam, state-owned enterprises (particularly centrally managed ones) play a dominant
but declining role in the food processing sector.  In all four subsectors, a centrally-managed
state-owned enterprise formerly had a large share of the processing and export market and
often was involved in production as well.  In some of the subsectors, such as seafood and
coffee, the SOE had a monopoly on exports.  In all four subsectors, the share of this dominant
SOE has declined rapidly as provincial SOEs and private companies have proven themselves
more agile and efficient.  VINACAFE now has a 20 percent share of coffee exports and
SEAPRODEX now accounts for 7 percent of seafood exports.  This does not necessarily mean
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that exports by these formerly-dominant SOEs have declined; rather provincial and private
enterprises have been responsible for much of the dramatic growth in these sectors.
The main reason for the decline in the share of food processing being carried out by central
SOEs is lack of flexibility, slow decision-making, and higher costs.  Both private and state-
owned processors identify the lack of flexibility as a key constraint on state enterprises.  One
SOE manager complained that regulations required him to employ people for certain positions
even if he did not need them.  Furthermore, SOEs are perceived by those inside and outside
the state sector as unable to take advantage of unexpected opportunities, a serious handicap
in a rapidly growing and evolving subsector.  Decision-making by SOEs was widely seen as
too slow and bureaucratic, with centrally managed SOEs needing permission from
headquarters and provincial SOEs needing authorization from the People’s Committee. 
Although good cost data are difficult to obtain, the SOEs appear to have higher overhead
expenses related to over-staffing, larger office spaces, and, in some cases, inappropriate
machinery. 
117
Box 6.1: Evolution of food processing exports from Taiwan  
Taiwan illustrates both the long-term trends in food processing that most countries undergo,
as well as the dynamic nature of food processing exports (this case is based on Jaffee,
1992).  In the early 1960s, Taiwan’s agricultural sector was dominated by rice and rice
milling, reflecting the fact rice was the dominant commodity in Taiwanese diets at the time. 
As a result of rapid economic growth, food consumption patterns changed: the demand for
rice fell, while that of wheat, meat, dairy, and vegetables rose rapidly.  Higher wages and
urbanization has increased the demand for packaged partially-prepared “convenience” food. 
These demand shifts have been reflected in the agricultural and food processing sectors. 
In 1960, Taiwan’s main agricultural export was sugar, followed by bananas and canned
pineapples.  In the 1970s, banana and canned pineapple exports stagnated in the face of
competition from lower-wage countries, but shrimp, fish products, canned mushrooms, and
canned asparagus expanded rapidly to become the dominant agricultural exports.  During
the 1980s, the exports of sugar, canned mushrooms, and canned asparagus collapsed
dramatically, having become uncompetitive relative to Thailand, China, and other countries. 
Similarly, disease and pollution virtually destroyed the Taiwanese shrimp industry. 
However, exports of hogs and pork products, other canned vegetables and eel products
expanded more than enough to fill the gap.
The government’s role in the agricultural sector has included strong support for one of the
best systems of agricultural research and extension in the region, infrastructure, marketing
information systems, the establishment of hog auction markets, and the promotion of a
voluntary cooperative system for vegetable marketing.  Subsidies were provided for some
inputs and investment, but they tended to be focused on declining traditional sectors rather
than emerging ones.  The food processing industry is composed of a several hundred small
to medium private enterprises, known for strong management, high productivity, and
flexibility.  The sustained growth in agricultural exports in spite of the dramatic changes in
the composition of exports is a reflection of the strength and adaptability of the Taiwanese
food processing sector.  
The creation of general corporations has not improved SOE performance.  In spite of the
consolidation of state-owned enterprises into large general corporations, it is the provincial
SOEs and private companies that are expanding their market shares in the four food
processing subsectors considered in this report.  Furthermore, the international experience
with merging SOEs into general corporations or holding companies is not promising.  In many
countries, it tends to lead to cross-subsidization of weaker SOEs and more layers of
management.  Indeed, the success of small, specialized provincial SOEs relative to central
SOEs is a strong sign that the merging of SOEs is not likely to bear fruit.
Outdated machinery is not the key constraint in the food processing sector.  It is striking that
the most successful enterprises are not those with the most modern and technologically
advanced equipment.  Rather, the successful ones are those that are skilled at finding a new
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and better way to do something: the coffee processor who realizes he can save money on
transportation by filling the truck for the return trip from Ho Chi Minh City, the seafood
processor who works to develop relationship directly with fish traders instead of wholesalers, or
the vegetable exporter who to accepts a loss on one shipment in order to maintain his
reputation for reliability with the importer. "Modern" machinery is almost always more efficient
from a technical point of view, but to be efficient from an economic point of view it must justify
its higher cost.  Certainly, additional equipment is needed in many cases, but it will do little to
improve the economic performance without strong management, responsive marketing skills,
adequate training, and a good incentive structure.
Financial sector reform is a key element in improving the competitiveness of the food
processing sector.  The economic reforms have moved in the financial sector in the right
direction by separating commercial banking functions from the State Bank and allowing the
entrance of foreign financial companies.  However, government policy maintains interest rates
that are low in real terms (relative to inflation), presumably to protect existing borrowers,
including a large number of indebted state enterprises.  This policy, however, has two adverse
effects.  First, it makes it difficult for banks to mobilize domestic capital, that is to attract
household savings, thus limiting the pool of capital available for investment.  Second, it forces
banks to pursue a highly risk-averse lending strategies such requiring high levels of collateral
and focusing on short-term commercial credit rather than longer-term investment lending.
Importers and foreign investors are important sources of marketing and management expertise
.  Interviews with food processors revealed numerous examples in which importers and/or
foreign partners work with domestic processors to provide technical assistance, quality control,
and sometimes credit.  In the seafood processing industry, Japanese importers have taken an
active role in upgrading skills and procedures, and in some cases providing credit for the
establishment of new private enterprises to supply seafood.  In fruits and vegetables, it is more
often a joint venture partner.  Even if when no knew equipment is involved, this is an important
form of technology transfer and should be facilitated by the government.  
6.2. Recommendations for the food processing sector
Given the importance of the cost and quality of raw materials to the competitiveness of the
food processing sector, agricultural and fisheries research and extension activities are critical
for maintaining the competitiveness of the food processing industry.  In the case of rice, the
opportunities for area expansion have already been exhausted and opportunities for raising
cropping intensity are being exhausted.  The only way to maintain the existing pace of rice
production growth is by increased public investment in agronomic research and extension
services.  Although Viet Nam’s agricultural research institutes are staffed with dedicated
researchers, they work in conditions of very limited resources.  Numerous studies of
agricultural research across the world indicate that the economic returns to agricultural
research are quite high, in the range of 30-50 percent.  At the least, investment in agriculture
(particularly agricultural research and extension) should be proportional to its share in gross
domestic product.  
Reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is central to the evolution of a stronger food
processing sector.  International experience shows that certain common patterns in successful
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reform of the state-owned enterprise sector.  First, commercial and public service functions
should be separated, forcing the former to cover its costs and fully funding the activities of the
latter.  This is issue is particularly relevant in the case of VINACAFE, which is responsible for
both commercial functions of processing and exporting coffee and public service functions of
research and promotion.  Second, SOEs involved in commercial activities should be required
to compete on the same terms as private enterprises.  Although Viet Nam has made progress
in reducing direct subsidies, indirect support through low-interest loans, uncollected loans,
access to land, and (in the case of rice and coffee) preferential access to export markets. 
Third, the internal structure of SOEs needs to be reformed to create incentives for efficiency
and commercial orientation.  This implies giving management greater autonomy from the
political authorities and perhaps partial equitization.  
The government should not limit the number of exporters in a subsector since export prices are
not affected by the number of exporters.  There is a widespread belief that the existence of a
large number of exporters means that exports are sold at below their market value.  This
argument has been a persistent part of the debate over rice export policy and appears in
discussions of coffee export policy as well.  This argument leads to proposals for government
licensing to reduce the number of exporters.  Limiting the number of exporters, however, does
not improve export prices and is likely to hamper the development of the food processing-
export sector.  Exporting 3 million tons of rice has the same effect on world prices whether five
exporter ship 600 thousand tons each or 30 exporters ship 100 thousand tons each. 
Generally, unqualified exporters will have difficulties finding a buyer and financing the
transaction, so the problem is self-regulating. 
The government should not require approval of the price of export contracts.  Exporters do
occasionally make mistakes and offer goods at a too-generous price.  But this is rare among
experienced exporters.  If the price is too generous, the exporter will lose money on the
contract.  Government intervention is not needed to ensure that exporters follow their own self-
interest.  Furthermore, the price depends on so many factors including world market
conditions, expectations about future market conditions, the quality of the product, the
reputation of the exporter (this affects the risk of default or conflicts), the efficiency of port
facilities, and the bargaining skills of each party.  Thus, evaluating the “fairness” of each
contract is not easy.  At best, the approval system would be cumbersome.  At worst, it would
create a temptation for irregular payments.  One exception to this rule is that case of intra-
company transfers.  When the buyer and seller are the same company, "transfer pricing" may
be used to avoid taxes.  In this case, tighter regulation is warranted.
The government should strengthen its role in disseminating market information and facilitating
market coordination.   Collecting and disseminating information is an important role of the
government.  Interviews with food processors revealed numerous cases in which enterprises
had little information about recent government decisions, the nature of the firms they compete
against, long terms trends in their markets, and so on.  With experience, these enterprises will
become better informed because it is in their interest, but the government can accelerate the
process.  In rice, information is needed regarding the commitments to export rice in order to
help the government and processors make more informed decisions.  In seafood, there is a
need for information about health and safety certification procedures and regulatory activities
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by the government.  In fruits and vegetables, information about markets, shipping options, and
price trends would be useful.  
The government should facilitate the creation and strengthening of business associations. 
These associations should be voluntary and open to all participants in the sector.  It is
important that these organization not become involved in setting prices or other anti-
competitive behavior nor should they be a regulatory body with the power to sanction
members.  Making them open to all would reduce this risk since each group (exporters,
processors, wholesalers, etc.) could monitor the others.  These groups could also serve an
important function of proposing standards for certification of quality.  The standards would
have to be approved by the relevant authorities, but it is important to get input from those the
system is designed to serve.
The government should focus address issues related to common-pool resources.  Common-
pool resources are resources available to many people with no limits on their access.  This is
one situation when self-interested behavior is often destructive.  In the case of fishing, even if
fishermen realize that they are over-fishing an area, there no incentive for an individual to
conserve.  The Ministry of Fisheries has taken steps to prevent over-fishing of coastal waters,
including size limits, seasonal restrictions, and protection of spawning areas.  Nonetheless,
greater resources should be devoted to monitoring fish stocks, estimating maximum
sustainable yield, designing protective measures, and enforcing those measures.  In the area
of coffee development, the issue is groundwater resources.  There are signs that coffee
production is depleting groundwater resources.  The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development should study the evidence, develop a plan to ensure sustainable use of
groundwater, and enforce the policy.  
The government should de-emphasize its role in promoting specific sectors of the economy. 
Advocates of industrial policy believe that the government should select specific sectors with
growth potential and promote them.  In the 1950s, governments were advised to promote
“infant industries”.  In the 1960s, the emphasis was placed on sectors with growth linkages.  In
the 1980s, industrial policy advocates recommended supporting high-value or high-wage
industries.  And currently, the attention has turned to high-technology sectors.  While the
arguments are intuitively plausible, they face severe problems in implementation.  First,
governments rarely have better information about the future direction of the economy than the
private sector.  Second, government decisions on which sectors to promote are too often
affected by lobbying and personal relations.  And third, assistance in the form of import
protection or subsidies seems to make enterprises less competitive rather than more so. 
Indeed, a key ingredient in the Asian currency crisis was the fact that some governments have
channeled foreign loans into sectors that, although not profitable, were favored by the political
authorities.  The agricultural sector and the food processing sector are neither high-wage
sectors, nor high-value sectors, nor a high-technology sectors, and thus are neglected in most
industrial policy proposals.  And yet these sectors have grown rapidly, providing jobs for
millions of Vietnamese and raising the standards of living among many poor households.  The
growth in income and subsequent changes in demand will inevitably result in a gradual decline
in the share of agriculture in GDP, but this does not mean that the government can accelerate
the rise in incomes by neglecting agriculture.
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Technology should be defined broadly to include any improved method using resources to
produce and market a good or service, rather than narrowly as industrial machinery.  Among
government officials and enterprise managers, there is a tendency to think of technology in
narrow terms.  This misunderstanding is linked to the idea that the main determinant of
economic growth is fixed capital.  Other factors such as natural resources, human capital, and
efficient institutions are equally important determinants of growth, as has been repeatedly
demonstrated in economic analysis of growth in developing countries.  For example, the
technology of improved rice seed, developed in part from varieties from the International Rice
Research Institute, has undoubtedly contributed more to raising Vietnamese standards of living
than all the sugar mills in the country, even though the latter are more visibly impressive. 
Similarly, technology that raises yields on shrimp farms by 10 percent would almost certainly
have a greater economic impact than a new high-speed modern cannery.  
6.3. Conclusions and recommendations for the rice subsector
The most important constraint on the growth of the rice processing subsector is the
sustainability of rice export growth.  Vietnamese rice exports have expanded rapidly as a result
of decollectivization and market liberalization which have improved incentives to use fertilizer
and modern seed varieties.  However, some of this increase is a onetime response to reforms. 
It is very unlikely that rice production and exports can continue to grow at the same pace that it
has over the past decade.
An increasing share of rice production growth is due to yield growth.  The cultivated area of
rice lands has not increased since the mid-1980s.  Production growth has been due to rising
cropping intensity and higher yields.  Further increases in cropping intensity are probably
limited, as evidenced by slowing growth in recent years.  Thus, yield growth is becoming the
only avenue for expanding rice output.
Raising the unit value of rice exports requires improvements in port facilities, reliability, and rice
quality.  This conclusion generates several recommendations for government action: 
These conclusions lead to a number of recommendations.  First, the government should
strengthen its support for rice research.  The rate of return on investment in agricultural
research is probably high, particularly given the importance of continuing to raise rice yields. 
This investment could be in the form of better salaries and more funds for equipment and
operating costs. 
In addition, the government should improve Saigon Port facilities, focusing on reducing the
delays in loading which depress the FOB price.  Furthermore, developing the Can Tho port
would reduce the cost of moving rice to the port, thus raising the producer price.  
The government should avoid policies that result in exporters abrogating existing rice export
contracts.  The costs of such policies are not visible, but by damaging the reputation of Viet
Nam as a reliable exporter, they reduce the FOB price that the country will receive in the
future.  
The government should implement a system for reporting rice export commitments.  This
would allow policymakers to limit the volume of rice exports for food security reasons without
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causing exporters to abrogate their contracts.  It would also generate information useful for
monitoring rice markets.  
The government should allow private rice millers to participate in rice exports.  A more
competitive export sector will benefit farmers without reducing the price Viet Nam receives for
its rice exports.  In addition, based on international experience and the experience of other
food processing sectors in Viet Nam, private exporter are more likely to seek out and exploit
market niches for specialty rices.
6.4. Conclusions and recommendations for the coffee subsector
The increase in the number of coffee processors and traders has reduced coffee marketing
margins and improved the prices received by farmers.  Although information on margins over
time is not available, this is the conclusion of almost all coffee processors (including state and
private).  
Recent policy decisions to allow private coffee processors to export will have a modest effect
initially, but a large effect over the coming years.  Initially, few private processors will have the
expertise, contacts, and liquidity to export, but the incentives for direct exporting will encourage
private processors to develop the expertise, make contacts, and seek credit.  
One of the main threats to sustained coffee exports is the depletion of groundwater resources
in the Central Highlands.  The current drought has highlighted the dependence of coffee on
water, but the problem will not disappear with the return of normal rainfall.  
Another threat to sustained coffee exports is the risk of an outbreak of disease.  Coffee
production has expanded more quickly than the institutional capacity to deal with outbreaks of
disease.  The use of irrigation increases the risk of disease.
The government should invest more in coffee research and extension, focusing on disease,
post-harvest practices, and water conservation.  As a result of the risks described above,
research in the issue of sustainable water use, Arabica production, and disease is needed, as
are extension efforts to establish a system for monitoring and reporting diseases.
The government should consider a small export tax to fund coffee research and extension
activities. This would ensure that research funds are available on a sustained basis to support
the coffee sector.  The example of FEDECAFE in Colombia should be studied as a model,
though initially a Vietnamese institute should pursue a more modest agenda.
The government should not limit the number of companies that are allowed to export coffee,
nor set minimum export prices.  Greater competition in the export sector will improve the prices
received by farmers without lowering the export price.  Importers will prevent inexperienced or
under-capitalized processors from exporting, although it might be useful for the government to
"certify" some exporters as qualified.
The government should separate the commercial and public service roles of VINACAFE.  State
enterprises should not be given public services functions and expected to cover all their costs. 
Nor should the public service functions of VINACAFE be neglected in the interest of state
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enterprise reform.  Commercial activities should be self-financing, while public service activities
(research, extension, inspection, etc) should be fully funded by the government or by taxing
the coffee sector.
The government should evaluate the economic returns to arabica coffee production.  The
expansion of arabica coffee production in the north appears to be following an accelerated
schedule, and it is not clear whether there have been adequate studies of the agronomic and
financial aspects of this investment.
The government should study the issue of groundwater depletion in the Central Highlands in
order to design policies to ensure the sustainability of coffee production in this region.  Such a
study would examine the extent of depletion and the mechanisms that the government could
use to reduce water use and/or increase water supply.
6.5. Conclusions and recommendations for the fruit and vegetable subsector
The fruit and vegetable export processing subsector is the least developed of the four
subsectors.  This is partly because, unlike the other three commodities, fruits and vegetables
do not need to be processed (transformed) in order to be edible.  Furthermore, virtually all of
the domestic market and some of the export market is for fresh fruits and vegetables. 
Furthermore, fruit and vegetables exports are small compared to rice, coffee, and seafood
exports.
More than the other export food processing sectors, fruit and vegetable export processors
were adversely affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union than the other three subsectors. 
Rice was not an export crop in the 1980s.  Similarly, coffee exports were minimal in the mid-
1980s and have grown during the economic reform process.  Seafood exports were large
during the 1980s, but even then they were oriented toward Japan and other market
economies.  
Fruit and vegetable processors are recovering by seeking new markets and developing new
products.  The new markets include Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and to a lesser
degree the United States and other southeast Asian nations.  The traditional exports of dry
beans, bananas, and pineapples have declined, while a variety of fresh and canned products.  
The average value of fruit and vegetable exports has been 57 percent higher during the 1990s
than it was in the 1980.  This is the result of the economic reforms that have provided
incentives for smaller private and provincial processor-exporters to seek out high-value
markets.  
The subsector is overly focused on canned fruits and vegetables, in spite of the fact that the
more rapidly growing markets are in fresh fruits and vegetables.   Too often the assumption is
that exporting canned and frozen fruits and vegetables is more profitable and beneficial for the
economy than exports of fresh fruits and vegetables.  But demand growth is higher in fresh
produce and, because of the skills required to market fresh produce the returns can be high. 
Some of the main opportunities in fresh fruit and vegetable exports are temperate fruits and
vegetables for Hong Kong and Singapore, and tropical fruits for Japan, Taiwan, South Korea,
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and North America.  These patterns take advantage of the range of climatic conditions in Viet
Nam,
One of the main constraints on the fruit and vegetable export processing sector is the lack of
varieties that are suitable for processing and/or export.  For example, pineapple processors
consistently noted that the Queen Victoria variety grown in Viet Nam is too small and not juicy
enough for international markets.
The government should expand its investment in research to select and develop suitable
varieties of fruit and vegetable for domestic consumption and for export.  Citrus, pineapple,
and banana are some of the more obvious examples, but nearly every product would benefit
from the introduction of new varieties with higher yields and/or characteristics desired by
importing countries.
The government should facilitate the collection and dissemination of information about export
markets, particularly standards, health restrictions, prices, and demand patterns.  This would
make it easier for Vietnamese processors and exporters to become informed about foreign
markets and identify opportunities.  
The government should facilitate the formation of an association of fruit and vegetable product
exporters.  As mentioned earlier, the association should be voluntary and open to all interested
parties.  It should not be involved in setting terms for dealing with farmers or with importers, but
rather should focus on information exchange, the identification of ways the government can
support the subsector, and assistance to the government in the establishment of grades and
certification.
6.6. Conclusions and recommendations for the seafood subsector
The seafood processing sector has grown rapidly on the basis of low wages, a long coastline,
and proximity to important markets in Asia, primarily Japan.  The adjustment of the seafood
subsector to the doi moi reforms was less painful than that of the fruits and vegetables
subsector because it was not closely tied to trade with the eastern bloc in the 1980s.  
The seafood processing sector is dependent on the continued availability of seafood at
reasonable prices.  Although Thailand has developed a tuna canning industry based on raw
materials caught outside its waters, this is unusual.  In general, the success of the seafood 
processing industry is tied to the success of the fisheries sector, including aquaculture. 
The biggest threat to the subsector growth is the sustainability of marine seafood resources. 
Estimates of the maximum sustainable yield are not very accurate, but most studies agree that
Viet Nam is at or will soon arrive at the capacity of the coastal waters.  Spectacular collapses
of North Sea (Europe) and Grand Banks (North America) fish stocks demonstrate that under-
regulated fishing can result in the rapid disappearance of marine resources. 
Further growth in seafood production and exports will depend to an increasing extent on
aquaculture.  The process of switching to aquaculture as the basis of seafood processing and
export growth has already occurred in China and Thailand.  In both countries, the transition
was facilitated by strong support for aquaculture research and extension.  
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The development of shrimp aquaculture is vulnerable to epidemic diseases.  A sizable
Taiwanese shrimp export subsector was completed undermined by problems related to
disease and pollution.  Smaller scale disease problems are already appearing in the
Vietnamese press.  
The government should increase its efforts to study and monitor the maximum sustainable
yield of different types of marine species and in different regions.  This information is vital in
order to design fishing regulations that protect the marine resources without unnecessarily
limiting the growth of the marine fisheries industry.
The government should strengthen its enforcement of existing regulations designed to protect
fishery resources.  Fisheries specialists believe that the current regulatory system is adequate,
given the limited information available, but that enforcement is weak and inconsistent. 
Although enforcement may be expensive, the costs are small relative to the value of the
resource being protected.
The government should increase its investment in research and extension in aquaculture.  At
least three areas should receive special attention.  First, shrimp yields are low by Thai and
Chinese standards and will need to be raised to maintain competitiveness.  Second, research
and extension efforts are needed in monitoring and controlling contagious diseases
(particularly in shrimp).  And third, the development of improved breeds would facilitate the
transition to a more aquaculture-based seafood subsector.
The government should facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on
seafood export markets, particularly in the area of health and safety regulations of importers. 
Health and safety regulations are tighter on seafood than any of the other three subsectors. 
Furthermore, the regulations vary widely from one importer to another.  Initially, information
could be collected and disseminated by a government institute, but eventually this function
should be taken over by a seafood exporters association.  
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